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PREFACE 
This s tudy deals with the pol itical and economic development of 
Tanzania since its independence in De cember 1961. It covers the major 
pr9plems which have been encountered in the struggle towards the 
realization of a socialist society in an agriculturally backward economy . 
In the course of wri ting thi s  paper , I have incurred debts to many 
people who cannot all be mentioned by name but without their help it is  
inconceivable that this thes i s  would have been completed . However , I 
would like to ?ffer my sincere thanks to my advi sor, Dr . Soderberg, whose 
contribution, by way of guidance and helpful criticism gave me priceless 
insight into the problems at hand . To Ms . Matti e Lewis and Ms . Tokunbo 
Lafinham I would like to express great appreciation for the encouragement 
which they gave . To the library staff, whose efficiency
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ensured that 
I obtained all the necessary research materi als , I give my thanks . Last 
but not least, I would like to mention my parents, whose constant efforts .. 
both financial and spiritual made all of this both probable and possible . 
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CHAPTER I 
BASIC PURPOSES OF THE STUDY 
INTRODUCTION 
Tanzania, a young African country practicing socialist principles 
in many important areas of development, has been chosen as the major 
topic for discussion in this study. It is still at that stage of 
building the foundations for subsequent economic, social and political 
growth, however, it has made considerable progress towards the 
achievement of its socialist objectives since independence in 1961. 
Its ideology, policies and style of political leadership and organization 
have been of interest not only to students of development, but to 
political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists and other social 
scientists. It has adopted an approach to development which attempts 
to transform society in terms of the society's own goals and values.· 
This particular study is an attempt to analyze the major political, 
economic and social changes in Tanzania that have been brought about as 
a result of that country's policy pronouncements. 
Tanzania was singled out for further research not simply because 
it was a developing country, but rather for its attempts at modernization 
via a socialist path. Although it can be debated whether or not there 
is any novelty in such an idea, that fact remains that Tanzania's brand 
of socialism has withstood, at any event has not desintegrated from, 
the pressures of development and modernization. This study does not 
delve deeply into the definitions which abound concerning the nature 
of socialism -- African or otherwise. It is obvious that the varieties 
1 
2 
of socialism are many and well documented in the literature. 1 Many 
African politicians have developed their own ideas of what African 
socialism is and should aim to do. Nyerere is no exception. Since 
one of the primary aims of this study is to give a greater understanding 
of the dynamics of the Tanzanian political system, it is necessary to 
analyze and evaluate the ideas and concepts on which such a system is 
based. This could hardly be achieved without examining the ideas of 
Nyerere, especially those relating to "uj amaa" or rural socialism. The 
transformation of Tanzanian society has been and continues to be guided 
by the principles he outlined in " Ujamaa: The Basis of African 
Socialism", as far back as 1961. 2 
This study concentrates primarily on the building of socialism in 
Tanzania. It looks at the difficulties involved in trying to establish _ 
democratic institutions in a country still suffering from a colonial 
heritage, an entrenched traditionalism, and a lack of natural and 
3 financial resources. It is taken for granted that there is a strong 
1Many works have been compiled on socialism. The writings of Karl 
Marx are often referred to as scientific socialism. See for example, 
Capital and other Writings, Max Eastman: Random House, 1959. The 
socialists who preceeded Marx were given the collective title of 
"utopians" because their ideas, plans, and ventures seemed very far 
reaching . H . w . Laidler, A History of Socialist Thought (Thomas Y. 
Crowell, New York) 1927. For a good introduction to African Socialism 
refer to Paul E. Sigmund (ed) The Ideologies of the Developing Nations 
(New York: Praeger) 1967. Part III Martin Minogue and Judith Malloy 
(eas)African Aims and Attitudes , (C�ridge University Press, 1974.). 
2see J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, Dar-es-Salaam, Oxford Universit y 
Press, 1966. 
3Refer to John H. Kautsky, The Political Consequences of Modernization, 
(New York; John Wiley) 1972. See especially Chapters 3 and 5. 
3 
conunitment on the part of the political leadership to lead the country 
toward the ideal they so conunonly refer to as African conununalism.4 In 
view of this, the study highlights some of the.major problems involved 
in building a political system based on the equality and freedom of all 
men, but which must simultaneously lay down certain restrictions and 
limitations on individual freedom in order to succeed in its socio-
economic development obj ectives. 5 
It is often stated that development poses many problems for a 
young independent state, but choosing a socialist path brings with it 
many additional difficulties. The policy of ujamaa requires mass 
support and participation for its fulfillment -- unity both in the 
population at large and in the political leadership itself is of the 
utmost importance if all the hopes of ujamaa are to be realized. The 
ways in which the political leaders secure the consent and support of 
the populace for development programs are not o�ly important for the 
success of such programs, but also for the stability of the political 
system.6 
4see Freedom and Unity, op.cit. , pp. 165-166. 
SThis is one of the many paradoxes existing in developing countries 
today. The principles of democracy are clearly laid down in their 
constitutions and other political documents. Yet in reality these 
principles are seldom, if ever, practiced. 
6Mobilization has long been a�maj or problem for the developing 
countries and a variety of methods have been used to encourage or force 
people to participate in one form or another. In Tanzania, the 
leadership has spoken out against the use of force -- yet it has been 
noticeable in the implementation of rural policies. 
.. 
4 
In attempting to establish a socialist state, Nyerere has emphasized 
the use of persuasion rather than force and although the latter has been 
brought into play, the occasions have been very few. The idea of 
persuasion is not unique, but in the context of African politics, where 
many oppressive dictatorships and military regimes have come into being, 
Nyerere's ideas on conversion through persuasion merits further 
examination.
7 
It seemed important for this particular survey to 
establish the extent to which such ideas pervade the leadership, that 
is, the degree to which the political elite, both party and government 
officials, believe that the population can be mobilized through strorig 
leadership and example. In addition, this study attempts to outline 
the basic difficulties and limitations involved in relying so heavily 
on such a strategy. 
Essentially , this is a case study of the problems of development 
and the solutions which have been formulated to deal with them. It 
attempts to create an accurate picture of the ways in which a group of 
political leaders are fashioning the instruments which they hope will 
lead their relative�y backward society to progress development and 
modernization. The popular idea of a "developed " country is one that is 
able to provide its citizens with goods and services that is roughly 
equivelent to the highest level of goods and services available in any 
country at that time. Indexes such as per capita income and GNP have 
?Refer to African Institute Bulletin, II, 12, 197 4 .  The article 
entitled "African Democracy " discusses the growth of military dictator­
ships and one-party states and their implications for democracy. See 
especially pp. 52-53. 
5 
been used as measurements for development. However, the best way to 
look at political development, and the way it will be examined in this 
study, is in terms of the role the political system must play if the 
society is to benefit from a higher standard of living. That is, the 
political system's ability to effectively control the population and 
resources of the state. It must bear the responsibility for the 
mobilization of the country's human and material resources and be able 
to accommodate the demands and stress caused by economic and social 
change. 
The terms "modernization" and "development" are usually synonomous, 
except that modernization refers to the process of moving toward the 
.. 
objectives of the state posited by the social theorists.8 "Progress" 
generally means the degree of success attained in moving towards those 
stated ideals. 
Ideology has been a weapon that has proved most useful in the hands 
of the governing elite. It has been a great asset in helping to change 
the attitudes and behavior patterns of the people towards development. 
,, 
In dealing with ideology as it has evolved in Tanzania, it is necessary 
�o examine not only the practical, but also the theoretical aspects. 
This study aims to strike a balance between the "theory" and the 
"practice" by first examining the ideas behind such policies as 
"Education for Self-Reliance", "Nationalization" ,  "Villagization", and 
I 
"Decentralization ". As the study p�ogresses, a closer look will be 
8see Monte Palmer, Dilemmas of Political Development, Illinois: 
F .  E .  Peacock, 197 3, pp. 1-4. 
6 
taken at the application of such policies to the various developmental 
problems that the country is presently facing. In no way can such a 
study of this nature and scope exhaust all the possibilities. For 
example, it would be nigh impossible to examine the whole gamut of 
problems thrown up, for example, by the nationalization policies. 
However, at the end of the survey, the reader, hopefully, should have 
a working knowledge of the way in which the Tanzanian political system 
operates, the norms and values that underlie it and the methods of 
conflict, resolution and problem solving used in it. 
Although there will be elements in the study which could apply to 
many of the developing countries, every effort is made to illustrate 
their particular relevance to the Tanzanian situation. This is not 
to deny the assertion that developing countries have common problems 
or that common solutions can be found. On the contrary, one of the 
major defects of studies relating to developing areas is that they often 
begin with the false assumption that specific problems are unique to 
the country in question. Many of the problems dealt with here, e. g. ,  
political mobilization, communication, and representation, are common 
to the developing areas.9 
In examining Tanzania's development problems, it will be necessary 
to present a brief historical background which will give a clearer 
understanding of the problems that the country now currently faces. An 
attempt will be made to discover the major changes that have occurred, 
9see Gabriel A. Almond and James s . Coleman, The Politics of the 
Developing Areas. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press) � 1960. 
7 
those which are presently occurring, and those likely to occur. 
Evaluation of such changes takes place not on the basis of whether 
they are "good" or "bad", that is, not by normative criteria, but rather 
in terms of the relative benefits, past and present, which they have 
bestowed on the various groups within the society. 
Economic and social changes occurring in any society cannot be 
divorced from or looked upon as independent from the overall functioning 
of the political system.10 All three systems constantly interact and 
interplay, ye�, it is clearly evident that the political leaders are 
using the political system in order to achieve the economic and social 
goals which they have set themselves. Although political changes have 
been instituted as a result of economic and social changes, they have 
on the whole been less frequent.11 But in order to understand the 
changes that are being sought, one should be familiar with the basic 
instruments, i.e., the bureaucracy -- The Party (TANU) and its various 
affiliates such as the Tanu Youth League (TYL), the Tanganyika 
Federation of Labor (TFL), which later became the.National Union of 
Tan9anyika Workers (NUTA), and the Tanu Women's Organization, through 
lOsystems theorists have long held the view that the political 
system is influenced to a great extent by its social and economic 
environment. That is, not only does outputs from the political system 
affect and condition behavior in the social and economic spheres but in 
turn, these systems channel import�nt inputs into the political system 
which have serious implications for policy making within that system. 
11Modernizing elites generally 
instruments and tools to innovate. 
but political instruments appear to 
initiation of change. 
make use of all the available 
In Tanzania, this is equally true 
be the major weapons for the 
8 
which the political leaders hope to effect such changes. An entire 
volume could be dedicated to the role and functions of the Party, but 
in this study it has to be discussed in the total political context --
meaning that other important variables have to be taken into account. 
It is hoped that an explanation of the type of party that exists within 
Tanzania can be adequately given without losing relevance in a discussion 
relating to party-types and systems.12 Definitions and clarifications 
will be given wherever it is thought to be necessary. Once working 
definitions have been established, the organization and operation of 
the political party can be.looked at more closely. As the main 
instrument for the execution of government policy, it is necessary to 
ascertain whether or not TANU is in fact carrying out the policies set 
forth by the political leaders, and how efficient it is in its work. 
Efficiency is taken to mean the satisfaction of wants and needs and 
TANU's achievements are examined and judged on the basis of whether or 
not people are satisfied by the performance of the government and the 
party.13 It is not unlikely that many problems of both a qualitative 
and quantitative nature will arise, but every effort is made to present 
the available data in the most objective way possible. 
This survey attempts to identify and distinguish between the party 
12For more information on the plassification of party systems see 
Maurice Duverger, Political Parties', Trans. By Barbara and Robert North, 
(London: Methuen), 1964. 
13First hand information was not gathered to test the assumptions 
made here. Rather analysis was conducted on the basis of survey and 
studies already completed, i.e. Hopkins, 1971 and Norman Miller, 1970. 
9 
leaders and the party followers, i.e., the rank and file members. 
Furthermore, an analysis and comparison of their values and attitudes 
is attempted in order to weigh its importance for the continued 
stability of the political system. The assumption is made that elite 
consensus is a pre-requisite for stability and thus it was necessary 
to pay greater attention to leadership functions and attitudes to see 
whether there was indeed consensus among them. Examining the behavior 
of decision-makers is important in a study of this type because it 
reveals the identity of the "real" from the "formal" decision-makers. 
The literature, which concerns· the developing areas, documents well 
the futility and unprofitability of attempts to analyze formal decision 
making units in such countries.14 Often, they carry very little weight 
and are constantly by-passed or ignored by the major political actors. 
Their functions are often stated as being more "symbolic" than real. 
It was assumed that there existed in Tanzania a clearly defined set of 
decision makers who exercised a certain amount of power and authority 
and who established priorities according to their assessment (reached 
through discussion and consultation) of what would be more beneficial 
to the coW1try considering the resources available to it. On the basis 
of that assumption, this group played a key role in the political system 
and clearly merited further analysis. 
It became clear as more research was carried out that at certain ' 
14see Fred w. Riggs, Administration in Developing CoW1tries: The 
Theory of Prismatic Society, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin), 1964. See 
especially pages 1 5-19 . 
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periods in Tanzania's history, the leadership produced policies of 
major importance ,that were accepted without any great upsets in the day-
to-day working of the political system. For example, the decision to 
transform Tanzania into a single-party state, the Arusha Declaration to 
speed up the movement towards the establishment of the socialist 
society, and the Decentralization Policies (to enable the people to 
participate to a greater extent in their own development) became the 
laws of the land with little or no disruption in political life. This 
study examines some of the major decisions and their importance in moving 
Tanzania towards its socialist objectives. They illustrated at one and 
the same time the continuity as well as the changes in government policy. 
It was, therefore, of great importance that this study should ascertain 
the reasons behind these changes and their implications for democracy 
and for socialism in Tanzania -- especially in the light of the 
government's stated intentions to involve the people in their own 
progress, development and modernization. 
The political, economic and social changes that this study is 
concerned with cannot be easily observed. They take place over many 
decades. However, it was clear to see that the Tanzania that exists 
today (although retaining many of its past characteristics and elements 
of traditionalism) is very different from that which existed at the 
time of independence. Thus, although it is somewhat early to determine 
' 
the major implications of some of the changes, it is not impossible to 
give an evaluation of the various policies that have influenced the 
government's development strategy. This study would be incomplete 
without a summation of the achievements in the political, economic and 
11 
social spheres. The areas of interests which are discussed were not 
chosen at random, but rather were selected because they appeared to be 
accurate indicators of progress and development. 
To reiterate then, this study attempts to equip the reader with a 
basic understanding of the development of socialism in Tanzania and the 
important ways in which this ideology is being used to transform the 
society. At first glance, this appears to be a massive undertaking but 
it is narrowed down_ considerably by focusing primarily on the problems 
of development. Many of the projections made concerning ujamaa are 
little more than speculation because of the relatively short-space of 
time in which it has been functioning. Speculation relating to the 
aftermath of Nyerere centers primarily around the issues of "stability" 
and "instability ". It was important to discuss the possibilities open 
to the Tanzania leadership after Nyerere steps down from power. 
The conclusions that this study arrives at should not be taken as 
hard and fast rules, but merely as plausible statements with adequate 
supporting evidence. Accurate predictions are not easy to make --
especially for the political scientist whose subject matter does not 
easily lend itself to concrete analysis and quantification. It has 
often been stated that the study of politics or any other social science 
dealing with human.behavior cannot be objective or scientific. This 
study may, no doubt, reinforce sucp claims. Yet in spite of the many 
' 
shortcomings, which a case study of this nature may have, it is hoped 
that a better understanding of Tanzania's development problem and 
prospects will be obtained. 
12 
STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES AND DEFINITIONS 
The hypotheses which will be studied in this survey were generated 
from the literature consulted. Although differences existed between the 
various texts, it was clear that many had similar themes. Many of the 
importnat writings on Tanzania seemed to attest to the general belief 
that important steps had been made in establishing, or at least in 
creating an atmosphere which was conducive to the building of socialism. 
It is the intention of this study to examine the most important 
variables that have been responsible in leading to the transformation 
of Tanzanian society. 
There are six hypotheses which will be examined. The first is 
based on the proposition that: 
I .  Since independence, significant progress has 
been made toward establishing a socialist society 
in Tanzania, evidence of which can be found in the 
formulation and application of the national ideology. 
By significant, we mean that major changes have occurred affecting the 
lives and well-being of the Tanzanian people. Significant events would 
include, for example, the change from a deacto. one party system to a 
�legal one party system. The events that are selected for analysis in 
this study· are justified by the extent to which they have changed or 
influenced Tanzanian society. That is, events which have had an impact 
in the political, economic and social spheres. The significant variables 
that will be dealt with are those that have led Tanzania furthest along 
the road to socialism. This, however, should not be taken as a denial 
of the changes that have had little effect or those that have caused it 
to regress. Attention will be paid to all key variables enabling and 
13 
retarding Tanzania ' s  efforts towards the achievement of its socialist 
obj ectives . However , since the purpose here is  to prove rather than 
disprove that important advances have been made toward this end, the 
emphasis will most naturally be on  those elements that have proved to 
be the most positive and dynamic . 
The type of socialism that i s  currently being practiced in Tanzania 
will be elaborated on in the next chapter . Label s such as "communitarian " , 
"fabian" and "egalitarian" have been attached to Nyerere ' s  brand of  
soc ialism and though it may exhibit many or  all  of these tendencies , 
one sho uld not attach such labels without caution. For among the many 
things that Tanzanian socialism has been named , it is essentially 
pragmatic . It  is  a doctrine which is still being formulated , adapted 
and re-adapted to suit the conditions which exist in that society . 
Not only is  it difficult to establish an acceptable definition 
of " soc ialism"  or a " socialist state " ,  it is also difficult to arrive 
at one that is both obj ective , e .g . ,  scientific. Even in the writings 
of Marx , who is said to be the father of scientific socialism , one 
finds many brands of socialism.ls And many elements of Marxian 
Socialism , i . e . , the class-concious proletariat , finds no such counter­
part in Tanzania .  In fact , Nyerere ' s  brand o f  African Soc ial ism denies 
the existences o f  classes -- a phenomenon , he believes to be completely 
alien to Africa . He also denies tµe belief, held by many of the Marxist­
Leninist School , that socialism can only take place in a highly developed , 
post-capitalist society . He maintains that Tanzania has never been a 
lSRefer to Max Eastman , op . cit . , pp . 343-352. 
14 
capitalist  society and refutes the idea that historic conditions have 
to be ripe before socialism can be established . 16 Nyerere ' s  own 
position is that , by seizing the initiative , exercising good leader ship 
and j udgement , making sound policies and working hard , Tanzania will 
move closer towards the reali zation of many of its socialist obj ectives . 
When analyzing and assessing the growth of soc ialism in Tanzania , 
one must  not approach it exclusively from a Marxian or a Leninist 
standpoint . There are , to be sure , certain elements that are comparable , 
but there are also many that are not . The Tanzanian leaders believe in 
large-scale public ownership and the abolition of exploitation , they 
also endorse the idea of  bui lding a socialist society based on the 
freedom and co-operation of the individual. However , there i s  little 
evidence to support the claim that they endorse an all out class war , 
and revolutionary methods to achieve their aims . 17 By examining not 
only the goals , but the methods used to attain them , a c learer under-
standing of Tanzania ' s  brand of socialism will be obtained . 
The role that decision-makers play in any pol itical system is  
always of great importance and in  a developing country such as Tanzania 
they take on special significance . Decis ion-making is not as dispersed 
as o ne would imagine for several reasons . One of  the most important is 
the low level of development and the general lack of resources  which 
dictate that priorities be set and plans for their fulfillment clearly 
I 
' 
16see J .  K. Nyerere , Freedom and Socialism , Dar -e s-Salaam , (Oxford 
University Press) ,  1968 , pp . 15-16 .  
17�. ,  p. 26 . 
15 
worked out by government and administrative personnel . Thus , rather 
than building so cialism through sponteneity , 18 Tanzania's leaders are 
conciously fashioning certain policies des igned to guide the country 
along the socialist path . This study will thus examine the assertion 
that : 
I I .  The (national )  political elite has been and 
continues to be the maj or deci sion-makers in the 
political system and that the dec i sion-making 
powers of the ( local )  political leaders will  
increase with increases in  the level o f  development 
and decision-making units . 
The use o f  the term "political elite" should be taken to include not 
only those in the higher echelons of the government, but also leading 
party members and higher and middle level administrators ,  i . e . , 
bureaucratic personnel. To define the Tanzanian political elite in 
terms similar to that of c .  Wright-Mills  would certainly lead to many 
difficulties especially when working from the assumption that Tanzania 
is  essentially a socialist country . However , it would not be misleading 
to state as Mills that the members of the political elite are those 
members  of soc iety " • • •
. 
that have a greater share than other people of 
"'the things and experiences that are most highly valued 11•19 Nonetheless , 
it should be borne in mind that although abuse s of power and position 
18Many socialists , especially Marxists-Leninists , believe that 
socialism can only be achieved thr9ugh the spontaneous acts of the 
working class . The idea was that when the historic conditions were right , 
the masses would rebe l spontaneously and take up arms against the 
capitalist . Lenin spent a great deal of time on the subj ect of 
sponteneity . See  v. I .  Lenin, Selected Works , New York :  International 
Publishers ,  Vol . I ,  pp . 120-141.  
19 Refer to c. Wright-Mills , The Power Elite , (Oxford Univers ity 
Press ) , 19 56 . p .  9 .  
16 
have occurred , strenuous e fforts have been made by Nyerere and many of 
his colleagues to abide by the rules and principles which they consider 
to be necessary for the building of a socialist  soc iety . The political 
elite , without any doubt ., could possibly be conceived of as a social 
class distinct and sperate from the others .  Theoretically , they d o  not 
evisage themselves as members of  a " social c ircle " acquiring and 
retaining wealth , s tatus and prestige by virtue o f  the pos ition and 
offices which they hold . 
However , at this particular stage in Tanzania ' s  development , there 
is a po litical elite that formulates policy, at any event , generates 
policy guidelines into which demands must.be accommodated. However, it 
is felt that as the soc iety becomes more complex and as demands increase , 
some of  the power and authority of  the political elite at the national 
level will  be given to leaders at the local level.  
In any developing country , policy execution must be carried out by 
a wel l  organized and effic ient body if such policies are to be effective . 
In Tanzania , the decision makers have relied extensively on the political 
party (TANU : Tanganyika African National Union ) and its various 
affiliates , i . e . , the TYL : Tanu Youth League , and NUTA : National Union 
of Tangany.jkp. Workers .  The role of the party cannot be over-emphasised . 
In its pre-independence days , it was a mass-party calling for unity in 
oppos ition against the colonial government . 2 0 It �ppealed to the 
various groups within society because it had a s ingle purpose wit.h which 
2 0see G. Andrew Maguire , �oward 'Uhuru '  in Tanzania : The Politics  
of  Participation , (Cambridge unlversity Pres s ) , 1969 , part III�  (ch . 6,7 , 
& 8 ) .  
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many could identi fy -- independence .  It became evident to Nyerere after 
this goal was achieved , that serious thought now had to be given to the 
speci fic task of �ational integration . The party was unprepared for the 
monumental task o f  nation-building , but Nyerere set to work overhauling 
and reorganizing TANU , after which it was better able to deal with the 
problems which independence brought . We hope to test the statement that: 
I I I . The political party (TANU ) has been used by 
the political elite as the maj or instrument in 
(organizing , educating , persuading and mobilizing 
the people )  the task of nation building . 
It is necessary for �he purposes of this particular study to examine 
and discuss the party system that exists and the democratic or non-
democratic nature of such a structure . The very nature of the party and 
the pervasiveness o f  its activities in the political system merits deeper 
analysis . 
Not only is Tanzania in the process o f  fashioning various instruments 
and creating various institutions and foundations on which to build 
socialism,  it has also introduced various policies designed to hasten 
the progress towards socialism . Leaders are aware that development and 
•growth ·can only be achieved with a j udicious combination o f  enlightened 
leadership , sound policy choices , adequate financial and physical 
resources , and efficient planning and preparation . They realize the 
limitations and obstacles to development -- the low level of political 
I 
awarenes s and consciousnes s ,  the relative poverty of an agricultural 
economy , and the persistence of  strong traditional beliefs and attitudes .  
Tanzanian leaders believe that by bringing socialism to the people , at 
any event encouraging them to practice socialist principles in their 
18 
local habitat , they will be able to instil in them the val ues and 
discipline necessary to develop and modernize . Villagization or rural 
conununali sm i s  an attempt by the leader s to enco urage socialism at the 
gras s roots level . Not only is  it an ambitious policy, it is  also one 
that calls for mass support and participation in order to be successful. 
This study seeks to discover the importance of rural soc iali sm in 
Tanzania . The fourth hypothesis is that : 
r:v. Rural socialism (ujarnaa) will  play a maj or 
role in Tanzania ' s  development and that c hanges 
in rural attitudes and behavior will  be determined 
largely by the success or failure of villagization 
policy . 
Uj arnaa has been trans lated to mean familyhood which , according to 
Nyerere , i s  an inherent feature o f  African s ociety . He is  not trying to 
return to the type of society or life that existed in the past . Nyerere 
claims that he is attempting to use the relevant principles , on which 
traditional society was based , to move his country along the path of 
development . Thus , to a great extent , ujamaa is  based upon the concept 
of the extended family -- whic h  insured all its members both spiritual 
and material comforts in return for their contribution of work . Every 
individual had a responsibility to the entire unit which , in return , 
satisfied his basic needs . 2 1 
Having established the policies they intend to follow , leaders 
have sought to devise strategies b�lieved to be congruent with their 
basic aims . Goals and s trategies have to be formulated within the 
framework of the s ame political , economic and social constraints .  Grand 
2 1see Freedom and Unity, op.cit. , pp . 162-17 1 .  
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designs on paper are unobtainable if realistic strategies are not 
developed to achieve them . Emphasising a rural socialist economy and 
conununity, especially with Tanzani a's level of development , may appear 
to the onlooker to be somewhat impractical when agric ultural conununities 
appear to be incapable of generating s ufficient investments for further 
development and growth.22  The leaders of Tanzania are aware of the 
difficulties involved in establishing a strong agricultural economy but 
they firmly believe that other alternatives would create even greater 
pressures forcing them to compromise their basic beliefs and principles .  
Industrialization on a large scale would have meant an initial heavy 
reliance on foreign aid which could have resulted in a loss  o f  effective 
sovereignty as many developing countries today illustrate . The with-
holding of foreign aid by Britain and We st Germany in the 1960 ' s  
adversely affected Tanzania ' s  development plans. Subsequently , the 
strategies of " self-help " and " self-reliance " were adopted to ensure that 
foreign aid played a less significant role in the achievement of 
development obj ectives . The fifth hypothesis can thus be written: 
V .  The strategies of self-help and self-reliance 
(considering the level of economic development and 
the emphasis given to an independent foreign pol icy) 
are not only necessary but practical mea sures for 
the implementation of  ujamaa . 
The Tanzanian leaders have not only mapped out the path for 
socialist transformation ,  but also the strategies to be used . It  is 
f 
still early to j udge , but it is  clearly evident that many of the variables 
2 2Refer to G. M .  Meier , Leading Is sues in Deve lopment Economics , 
(Oxford University Press ) , 1964 , pp. 3 34 -3 7 6 . 
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which have been mentioned , e . g .  , stro_ng leadership , elite consensus , 
mas s  participation and support and economic efficiency , will  be o f  
maj or s ignificance i n  determining the outcome o f  the maj or pol icies . 
However , the relative stability that has characterised the political 
system in its pre- and post-independent years played an important role 
in facilitating the widespread adoption and acceptance of the outputs 
of the regime . We will  examine the role that stability has played in 
the politic al system . The final hypothesis that will  be tes�ed  is : 
VI . The stability of  the political system will  
greatly enhance the chances of  success of the 
maj or development policies and will continue to 
be a maj or feature in the Tanzanian political 
system . 
METHODOLOGY 
There are many approaches to the study of pol itic s -- nay to the 
study of development itself.  It can take the form of an  historical 
sur vey , a structural functional analysis , or it  can be examined from 
the perspective of elite , group ,  systems , communications and.other 
theories . In this particular study , no single theory or approach will  
··:!:>e exc lusively relied upon , rather use  wil l  be made o f  any of  the 
differ ing approaches wherever they seem to be most valuable .  Simply 
adopting one approach would pose severe problems in a study of this 
nature , hence the adoption of an eclectic methodology which wil l  utilize 
some of the approaches mentioned above , i . e . , elite , systems , groups , 
etc . This particular approach ·was used by Joel S arnoff in his study o f  
1 l . . 23 oca government in Tanzania . He warns against the dangers of such an 
2 3see �oel S arnoff,  Tanzania: Local Politics and the Struc ture of 
Power, (University of Wisconsin Pres s ) , 1974. 
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approach , pointing out that the ass umptions of the theories presented 
should not be accepted without some re servation . Furthermore , he warns 
agains t  us ing eclecticism in methodology as a s ubstitute for coming 
squarely to grips with the maj or problems of analysis and interpretation . 2 4 
But , by us ing this method , it  is  hoped that unnecessary theorizing wi ll  
be  avoided by enabling the author to  use a particular theory where it seems 
to be the most appropriate . This study does not attempt to es tablish a 
rigorous methodology which may prove to be one of its many shortcomings . 
Clearly , every effort will  be made to ensure that the data presented is 
intell igible to the reader by relating it to the relevant theory or 
theories . The analys is  wi ll not be highly statisti cal and will be based 
largely on information gathered from existing s urveys and studies . There 
are many disadvantage s in using s uch s urveys but the collection of new 
information was not possibl e on this occasion . At any event , many of 
the studies reviewed contained recent and adequate data which proved 
useful in this analysis . Although the data emanated primarily from 
secondary sources , the analys is and interpretation came from the writer 
of this study . It is  hoped that the secondary nature of the sources 
wil l not detract from the validity of the data or its application to 
the study of socialism and development politics.  
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The obj ect of this very brief �eview is to fami liarize the reader 
with s ome of the existing studies  relating to Tanzanian socialism and 
24Ibid . , p .  7. 
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development . This list is not exhaustive . The books and articles used 
cover a wide variety of  subj ects , some adopt a general macro-approach , 
while others take on a more specific micro-approach . It i s  simply 
intended here to outline their major areas o f  c oncentration , the 
specific contribution that each makes ,  and relevance to the hypothesis  
under examination . 
In analysing and discussing the extent to which socialism or 
socialist principles are being practiced in Tanzania , it was first 
necessary to _obtain a deeper understanding of the theories behind the 
ideology . The writings of Nyerere were found to be most  informative in 
this respect .  The concept o f  "uj amaa " was first outlined by Nyerere in 
1961 in an article entitled , Ujamaa : The Basis of  African Socialism . 2 5  
Here , the components o f  African socialism were clearly ·stated and 
Nyerere outlined the type o f  society that he believed should be 
established in Tanzania . The extended family unit, its various 
' 
practices and characteristic s , was looked upon as the focal point for 
socialist development . The famil y  unit appealed to Nyerere for three 
basic reas ons . Firstly , it commanded "respect " and instil led a sense 
of obligation within its members .  Secondly , it  fostered collectivist 
rather than individualistic attitudes by its common o wnership of  land; 
and thirdly , it demanded that all its ·members contribute to the well  
being o f  the community through harµ work.26 
2 5see Freedom and Unity , op . cit., p .  162- 17 1 .  
26Ibid . , Pp.164-168 . 
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Freedom and Unity is a collection of  Nyerere's early writings which , 
among other things , sums up not only the type of  the political system 
that was desired , but also the principle s and organizations which were 
to guide it . Nyerere saw the need for a single party structure that 
was well organized and active . Members of  the corronunity were to think 
of  themselves as workers sharing their prosperity and co-operating 
together to build a better life for themselves . Freedom and Unity 
was a c all to the nation to fac e  up to the challenge of nationhood 
and to direct its efforts towards the establishment of a socialist 
society .  Ujamaa thus became the watchword because it was based on a 
philosophy which was diametrically opposed to capitalism .  According 
to Nyerere , ujamaa stood out in conflict with capitalist philosophy 
because the latter sought to build a society based on the exploitation 
of man by man . Equally , ujamaa was also opposed to the concept of 
doctrinaire socialism which seeks to establish its society on a bel ief 
of inevitable conflict between man and man . 27  
In Freedom and Socialism,  Nyerere's ideas on  his  country ' s  chosen 
path to development were made even more explicit . Again , he stressed 
the importance of creating a socialist society .  His maj or emphasis 
was, however , on the amount of  work which remained to be done and the 
polic ies that were neces sary in order to reach the stated obj ective . 
I f  there had been any doubt about Tanzania ' s socialist proposals and 
I 
willingnes s  of the leadership to work for their fulfilment , Nyerere ' s  
writings dispelled this . Among the col lections in thi s  work was The 
27Ibid . , p .  17 0 . 
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Arusha Declaration,  a policy document which s ignaled the turning point 
in Tanzania ' s  poiitics . It outlined more clearly the aims , pol icies , 
and strategies  and gave greater insights i nto the directions i n  which the 
thoughts of the l eaders were going .  I t  demonstrated the existence of a 
strong commitment among them to continue worki ng toward their socialist  
ideals . 
The third of  Nyerere ' s  vol ume s , Freedom and Development , illustrated 
the continuity in his thoughts . 28 It  emphasised that socialism was of  
little benefit to  the country i f  it did not go  hand in  hand with 
development -- that is , the development of  the people . 29  The measures 
that were propos ed were conciously formulated to increase the participatio n 
of the people in their own development . But the onus was placed on 
the l eaders themselves to encourage mas s  participation . · One of the 
main themes throughout the book was that the establishment of socialism 
could not be achieved through force but rather through e nl ightened 
l eaders hip , good planning , hard work and self-reliance . 
Other works were us ed to give a wel l-rounded perspective of  the 
role of ideology i n  Tanzania . A Theory of Ideology by John R .  Nellis 
was found to be  particularly useful in  exploring the component parts of 
the ideology . 30  Large sections o f  this work were highly theoretical , 
but Nellis manages .to give a lucid account of  the maj or ideological 
28J . K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development , (Dar-es-Salaam , Oxford 
University Press},  197 3 . 
2 9Ibid . , p .  59 .  
30John R .  Nellis , A Theory of Ideology,  (Nairobi , Oxford University 
Press),  1972 . ' 
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chang e s  s ince independenc e .  The var ious artic l e s  and documents in the 
vo lume Soc ialj sm ·in Tanzania edited by Lionel C l i f f e  and John A .  Saul 
counterba lanced the theoretical study by Nel l i s .
3 1  
Rather than 
attempting to bui ld or e laborate on theor i e s , readi_ngs such a s  
Ujamaa on the March , The Po licy of S e l f - Reliance , and Rural Deve lopment 
Po licy , dwe lt mor e  on the diff iculties o f  putting the ideology into 
prac tic e . Thi s  volume covered a variety o f  are a s  r elating to the 
deve lopment of rural social i sm .  I t  discu s s ed the ma j or significance 
of the plans .for action and dealt with the conf l i c t� that wou.ld ar i s e  
throughout the cour s e  o f  implementation. Many of the collec tions in 
this volume were use ful for the information concerning the value s 
and attitude s o f  rural population and the way in which they s e e  
thems e lve s and their roles i n  the po l itical sys tem . Thi s i s· very 
important for the survey because i t  enable s compari son between what 
the ideo logy i s - intended to do and what i t  actua l ly managed to achi eve 
in terms of mob i l i z ing the population for the development e f fort . 
Ideological and Ec onomic Deve lopment in Tanzania r elated the 
ideol ogy pr imarily to the maj or economic rather than pol itical event s . 3 2  
It thus i l lustrated the ways in which the pr inc ipl e s  o f  uj amaa were 
be�ng brought into play to bring about the various economic change s  
co_ngruent with the notions o f  a social i s t  society. Soc ial i sm and 
3 1see Lione l Cliffe and John A .  Saul ( ed s ), S o c i a l i sm in Tan zania , 
(Dar - e s - Sal aam ,  East Afri�a Publ i shing House ) , 197 2 . 
3 2 ran C. Parker , " Ideolog ical and Economic Deve lopment in Tanzan ia '' , 
African S tudie s Rev i ew , XV ,  1 ,  197 2 . 
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Economic Development in Tanzania3 3 further illustrates the role that 
ideology i s  play:j..ng in shaping national economic life . One of the 
stro_ng points of both these papers was the balanced view they presented . 
Not only did they comment on the benefits , they also elaborated on the 
costs that continue to accrue from adopting a sociali st model o f  
development . 
These are just a few of the studies that deal with ideology in 
Tanzania . Many simply document its growth and development .  Others 
analyze its basic concepts and principles and still others demonstrate 
its impact in bringing or stimulating changes in the various aspects 
of Tanzanian life . 
Specific works dealing with the leadership were more difficult 
to obtain . Quite often the discussions on ideology incorporated the 
values and principles of the political leaders which influenced the 
formulation of the ideology . However ,  two studies were particularly 
important -- both were carried out by the same author . Political Ro l e s  
i n  a New State and The Role of the MP in Tanzania , helped considerably 
in understanding the bac_kground , bel iefs and attitudes of Tanzanian 
rulers . The fqrmer is  a useful study in political soc ialization and 
pol itical behavior -- it gives an exquis ite account o f  the role of the 
administrator , the legislator and the President not found in many of  
thev·current literature . 34 The Evolution of  Tanzanian Political 
3 3G .  K . Helleiner , "Socialism and Economic Development in Tanzania " ,  
Journal of Development Studies , VIII , 2 ,  197 1-7 2 . 
34Raymond F .  Hopkins ,  Political Roles in a New State , (Yale 
University Pre s s ) , 197 1 . Also , "The Role of the MP in Tanzania " ,  American 
Political Science Review , .LXIV , 2 , 1970 . 
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Leader ship gave great insights into the "recruitment " ,  "repre s entative­
ne s s " ,  and " c irculation " o f  the leadership . 3 5  Like many stud i e s  of thi s 
natur e it dwel t  a great deal on the " National Leadership Formula " ,  that 
i s , the rul e s  and princip l e s  on which behavior is bas ed . 
To a great extent , many of the se s tud i e s  concerned themse lves 
with national leader ship r ather than with local leadership . The 
reason s  for thi s  are obvious but it i s  nec e s sary to unders tand the 
differences and the leve l s  of interac tion between the national and 
local leader s .  S everal works were consulted . Among them , Joel Sarno f f ' s  
work on Loca l  Politics in Tanzania�6 C lyde Ing l e ' s  From V i l lage to State 
in Tan zania , 3 7  and S tanley Dryden ' s  Loc a l  Admin i s tration in Tanzania " - ­
a penetrating s tudy o f  local pol i tic s . 3 8  Wr i ter s on Tanzanian leadership , 
for the mos t  part , seem preoc cupied with the style and content of 
national leadership . Thi s c le ar ly i s  a re flecti on o f  their c entral 
po s i tion in the dec i s ion making system . 
The importance o f  the party i s  c learly evident by the number o f  
public ations relating t o  its r o l e  and function within the polit ical 
sys tem . Henry Bi enen ' s  work , Tanzania : Party Trans formation and 
Economic Development is a c l a s s ic study on the nature o f  the par ty 
3 5P .  J .  McGowan and H .  K .  M .  Wac irah , " The Evo lution of Tanzanian 
Political Le adership " ,  African S tudies Review , XV I I , l ,  1 9 7 4 .  
3 6Joel S altlo f f , op . , c i t  • •  
3 7clyde R .  Ingle , F rom Vi llage to State in Tanzania : The P o l i t ic s 
of Rural Deve lopment ,  ( I thica , New York : Corn e l l  Unive r s i ty Pre s s ) , 1967 . 
3 8stan l ey Dryden , Loca l  Admin i s tration in Tan zania , (Nairob i , East 
African Pub l ishing Hou s e ) ,  1 9 6 8 . 
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system and the way in which it operates within var ious areas o f  the 
politica l , economic , and social spher e s . 3 9 Great attention i s  focu sed 
on the evo lution and development o f  the party in addition to its compo s i tion , 
organi zation , and activiti e s . Towards ' Uhuru ' in Tan zania (The Po l i tic s 
o f  Par tic ipation ) , make s  a great contribution to the unders tanding o f  
the party b y  its detai l ed documentation o f  the early years of indigeneous 
l • t •  
4 0  
p o  J. J.CS . I t  i s  e specially informat ive on the formation o f  TANU and 
its predeces sors but a maj or drawback r e s t s  on the fac t  that thi s study 
doe s  not go beyond 1 9 6 5  - - the year when Tan zania offic ially bec ame a 
one-party state . S ince then , there have been many chang e s  in the 
organi zation o f  the party . One Party Democracy goe s  a long way in 
4 1 
making thos e  c hang e s  intell igible to the observer . Primarily i� dea l s  
with the fir s t  elections that occur r ed under the new system and pre s ents 
many interes ting c a s e  s tud i e s  o f  the elec tion activitie s o f  the par ty in · ·  
regions a s  diver s e  a s  Kil imanj aro and Sukuma land . Norman Miller ' s  
paper, The Rural African Party : Po l itical Participation in Tanzani a ,  
' 
4 2 
gave great ins ight s into party activity at the gra s s -roo t s  leve l . 
It conveyed a good understanding o f  the party ' s  role in he lping to 
achieve soc ia l i sm in Tanzania and a l so the ways in which the party and 
3 9Henry Bi enen , Tan zania : Party Tran s format ion and Ec onomi c 
Development , (New Jer s ey , Princeton Unive r s i ty Pre ss ) , 1 9 6 7 . 
4 0G .  Andrew Maguire ,  op . c it • •  
4 1Lionel Cl i f fe ( ed } , One Party Democracy , (Nairobi , East African 
Publishing House } , 1 96 7 . 
4 2Norman Mi l ler , " The Rural African P arty : Pol itical Participation 
in Tanzania " ,  American Pol i tical Sc ienc e Revi ew , LXIV , 2 ,  1 9 7 0 . 
-- - ----
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i t s  local l eaders could hinder rather than help development ob j ec tive s .  
In looking at the role that rural soc ial i sm plays in Tanzania , u s e  
was made of numerous artic l e s  and manusc ripts . The wr i tings o f  Rene · 
Dumont c learly demonstrated the importanc e o f  vil lagi zation and the 
deve lopment of a s trong agricultural bas e  to support i t .
4 3 
He pointed 
to many o f  the pitfall s  and the problems , mo stly agricultural , wh ich had 
yet to be faced . Peter Temu ' s  paper, Tanzania -- The U j amaa Exper ime nt , 
documents some o f  the more formidable obstac l e s , i . e . , po l i tical , 
economic , and social , to deve lopment . 44 The afore-mentioned vo lume 
by Cliffe and Saul also contained some highly critical and thought 
provoking comments on rural sociali sm in development . C l i f f e  and 
Cunningham ' s , Ideo logy Organ i zation and S e ttlement Experience in 
Tan z ania , Svendson ' s , General Problems o f  Rural Deve lopment Po licy in 
Tan z ania , and Ka z imoto ' s ,  Pro spec t s  for the Bui lding of Uj amaa Villages , 
are but a handful o f  the artic l e s  which deal with one or another 
problem of village soc i a l i sm . 4 5  
For the mos t  part , the vo lume s o f  Nyerer e , e spec ially Freedom and 
Soc ial i sm and Fre edom and Development wer e  the mo s t  important in 
unders tanding the c oncepts of s e l f -he lp and · sel f-rel ianc e . 4 6  Immanuel 
Wal l er s tein ' s  articl e ,  Dependenc e in an Interdependent Wor ld : The 
4 3 Rene Dumont , Tanzanian Agr iculture Af ter the Arusha Dec laration , 
(Dar - e s - Salaam : Mini s try o f  Economic Affairs and Development Planning ) , 
19 6 9 .  
44P eter Temu , " The U j amaa Experiment " ,  Ceres , July-Augus t , 1 97 3 . 
4 5c l i f fe and Saul (ed �, op . c it • •  
46Freedom and Deve lopment , op . c it • •  
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Limited Pos sibilities o f  Trans formation within the Capitalist World 
Economy , added another dimension to the evaluation o f  the principles 
of self-help and self-reliance . 4 7  These strategies were discussed in 
a national and international context and enabled the reader to grasp 
the complexities of the problems that such s trategies can lead to in a 
capitalist world economy which is largely interdependent . Also 
importan t  for the way in which dealt with self-reliance was Surendra 
Patel ' s  article Collective Sel f-Reliance o f  Developing Countries . 4 8
. 
Villagization i s  often discussed along with self-reliance , thus , 
many papers dealing with the former also include the latter . One 
example of this is  Ichiro Inukai ' s  article , African Soc ialism and 
Agricultural Development : A Comparative Study of Kenya and Tanzania . 4 9  
rt discussed the merits and demerits of  applying a policy o f  self-
reliance to the achievement of  rural development . 
Martin C .  Needler ' s  article , Stability and Instability ,  generated 
t;,he idea of examining the permanence and durability of the Tanzanian 
regime . 5 °  Claude Ake ' s ,  A Definition of Political Stability and 
47rmmanuel  Wallerstein , "Dependence in an Interdependent World : 
The Limited Possibilities of Transformation Within the Capitalist World 
Economy " , African Studies Review , XVII , 1 ,  1974 .  
48surendra J .  Patel , "Collective Self-Re liance of Developing Countries " , 
Journal o f  Modern African Studies ,  XIII , 4 , 1 9 7 6 . 
49 Ichiro Inukai , "African Socialism and Agricultural Development 
Strategy : A Comparative Study of  Kenya and Tanzania " ,  Developing 
Economies , XII , 1, 1974 . 
SOMartin c. Needler , "Stabil ity and Instabil ity" in R. J .  Jackson 
and M .  B. Stein (ed s )  , Issues in Comparative Politics ,  (New York : St . 
Martin ' s  Press ) , 1971 , pp . 2 1 2 - 2 2 1 .  
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Explaining Political Instabil ity in New States , provided further ideas 
on the "uniquenes s "  of the Tanzanian political system , in light of  the 
5 1  current African political context . 
This list of reading materials is  supplemented by further references . 
As stated at the outset , it is  little more than a brief review of some 
of the current literature available . Materials were selected primarily 
for the areas which they covered , their research methods , and their 
potential in generating ideas . Many of  the works quoted here are 
specifically concerned with the dynamic s  of Tanzanian development and 
modernization rather than its more general aspects . In order to obtain 
a broader perspective on modernization and development as it applies to 
many Third World Countries the works of  John Kautsky and Almond and 
Coleman were most use fu1 . 5 2  
In chapter two we will examine more deeply the components of the 
Tanzanian ideology and changes that have been instituted in order to 
move towards the establishment of socialism . 
5l Claude Ake , "A Definition of Political Stability " , Comparative 
Politics ,  VII , 2 ,  197 5 . 
5 2A1mond and Coleman , op . cit � ; John H .  Kautsky , op . cit • •  
CHAPTER I I  
THE DEVELO�MENT OF IDEOLOGY 
In the first chapter it was stated that Tanzania had adopted a 
socialist path to development . I f  one traces the evolution of the 
ideology , it is clear to see that , since independence , the leadership 
has made a sustained effort to guide the country closer towards its 
socialist ideals . In order to as certain the extent of ·achievement in this 
area ,  it i s  neces sary to be acquainted with those ideas and beliefs 
whi ch constitute the foundations o n  whi ch socialism i s  now bei.ng built . 
Much of thi s  chapter wi l l  emphasize the theoreti cal rather than the 
practical sides o f  ideol.ogy as the latter will be more fully elaborated 
on throughout the course of the discussion . Primarily , . we will concern 
ourselves with the ways in which the ideology has acted as a guide to 
policy .  The aim here is t o  marshall enough concrete evidence t o  test 
the hypothesis that ideologically , Tanzania has moved signi ficantly 
towards social ism .  
Before elaborati.ng on the nature o f  Tanzanian socialism , it  is 
necessary to present a definition of what is meant by the term ideology . 
One definition presents it as a ,  "more or less integrated system of 
values and norms noted in a society whi ch iQdividuals and groups proj ect 
on the political plane in order to promote the aspirations they have 
come to value in social life " � 5 3 AccqrCli.ng to ;Fred R. von der Mehden , 
. . . �3.sea\ .. James A .  McCain , " Ideology in Africa : So�a Perceptual Types " ,  
African Studies Review ,  XVJ; I I , 1 ,  .19 7 5 , p .  61 . 
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" an ideology may b e  a sincere bel ief or a political tool , but it usually 
54 appears to be a combination of  both" . Similarly , F . LaMonde Tullis 
sums up ideology as a world view that provides an interpretation o f  the 
past , an explanation of the future , and charts a common course for the 
future . 55 I an C .  Parker believes that an effective ideology require s 
five basic elements . Firstl y ,  " a  teleology " , that is , a vision of the 
ends and obj ectives of society . Secondly , ·  '' a mythology " ,  that is , an 
analysis of  society in relation to its surroundings .  Thirdly ,  a program 
of action . Fourthly , the communication of what he terms "the ideological 
core" and final ly ,  guidelines for the implementation of the plan . 56 
These definitions convey an insight :into what i s  meant by ideology in the 
context of this dis cussion . The tepn was given considerable prominence 
by Karl Marx , who used it to describe the distorted ideas selected by 
the capital ists to defend the status quo . However ,  ideologies can be 
and often are more analogous with doctrines of change than with doctrines 
of status quo . For example , the ideology that has evolved in Tanzania is  
not designed to maintain the status quo but rather to change society 
according to the socialist obj ectives embodied in it . On the whole , it 
would be true to say that developing ideologies are designed . to enable 
many of the poorer countries to move forward more quickly and to j ustify 
the suffering and sacri fices that the maj ority are called upon to make . 
54Refer to Fred R .  Von der Mehden , The Politics o f  the Deve loping 
Nations , Prentice-Hall ,  New Jersey , 1964 , p ,  136 ,  
55see F .  LaMond Tullis , Politics and Social Change in Third World 
Countries , New York , John Wi ley , 197 3 , p .  75 , 
56Refer to Ian c .  Parker , op . cit . , p .  46 .  
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Ideologies have been conciously formed and articulated to meet certain 
needs . Although theory and practice may not often coincide , ideologies 
in devel oping countri es are initi ally designed to put development tasks 
into perspective , to set priorities and ways of achieving them . 
Leaders often rationalize the large sacri fices which development 
calls for in terms of the ideology which serves as the mechanism to 
5 7  overcome backwardness . Ideology often lends meaning t o  political 
acts and gives the ordinary man a cl earer understanding of what i s  going 
on around him . It raises social conflict and tension to a more 
sophisticated level of political dialogue while contributing to consensus 
and normative integration . 58 Ideology is often used to promote stability 
and unity and is  often re sorted to by political leaders in strengthening 
the national party and government . Ideologies are often broad in scope 
and general in wording , yet to be success ful , they must be combined with 
organization in order to bestow some benefits on the population . 59 
The credibility of developmentalist ideologies , therefore , rests on 
their promises of progress of " catching up'' with the industrial ized 
west . However , while many developing nations desi re the benefits which 
·emanate from the western pol itical and economic sys tems , a sizeable 
proportion of the independent African states , rej ect capitalism as a 
political and economic model of  development . In this respect Tanzania 
57Bienen , 
58McCain , 
59von der 
OJ2 • cit , t 
o� . cit , , I • 
Mehden , 
p .  203 , 
p , 61 . 
OJ2 • cit • 1 p .  139 , 
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is  n o  exception . 60 Many African leaders have s e t  forth their views and 
mode ls of development whi ch they believe to be relevant to Africa and to 
their own re spective countries . The ideology generated by such wri tings 
and beliefs has become known as "African Socialism" , though this should 
properly be seen as an umbrella under which many divers e  bel iefs and 
attitudes are accommodated . 61 Although this study concerns itsel f with 
soc ialism in Tanzania , it is use ful to spend a little time looking at 
socialism in wider perspective . 
"African Socialism" , according to James A .  McCain , " is the ideology 
of Afri ca 11 •
62 I t  i s  clear from their rej ections of certain dogmas and 
creeds associated with socialism in the western world that African 
leaders do not want to adopt a foreign ideology . Thi s is  not to deny 
their des ire to e stablish soc ialism and practice various socialist 
principles .  As John Kautsky pointed out , "All the ideologies that 
modernizers acquire from developed countries are , themselves ,  the product 
of industrialized societies 11 • 63  Thus , it is  not surprising that many 
African leaders rej ect such belief systems and their relevance to Africa ' s  
s tage o f  development .  The s trong des ire among African leaders to as sert 
60There are notable exceptions to this . For example , the Ivory 
Coast comes most readily to mind . In  fact many of the French and English 
speaking Afri can countries have been accused o f  carrying on where the 
colonial capitalist governments left off . 
6lsee Martin Minogue and Judith Malloy (eds ) Afric an Aims and 
Attitudes , Cambridge , Cambridge University Pres s . See especially Part. I I . 
"Philosophies and Problems " pp . 63-189 . 
6 2
McCain , op . cit . , p .  61 .  
63 
John Kautsky , op . cit . , p .  140 .  
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themselves and to pro j ect an image of Africa unique to that continent 
requires them to . paint self-portraits as they se� fit . 64 We should not , 
therefore , expect the various models of African Socialism to be identical 
to socialist models elsewhere . 
Es sentially three themes run through the literature pertaining to 
African Socialism ;  the problem of continental identity , the crisis o f  
e conomic development , and the problems of co�trol and class formation . 
The first need not detain us here but a few remarks are in order . African 
socialists adamantly believe that the socialistic tradition is  an 
important feature of African life exemplified by the communal ownership 
of land . They view Afric a  as the birthplace of social i sm .  I n  search o f  
their own identity , they have strongly rej ected the European culture 
and have formul ated a body of knowledge outl ining their own cultural 
heritage . Leopold S enghor ' s  philosophy of "Negritude " and Nkrumah ' s  
11African Personality" come most readily 110 mind . 65 
The idea of social i sm in many Afri can countries , indeed in many 
developing countries , is intimately linked to the commitment of economic 
and social development . In one respect , socialism can be looked upon as 
. . f . l '  t h h 11  f . d .  d 6
6 a re-orientation o nationa i sm o meet t e c a enge o in epen ence . 
64This dis cus sion relates only to sub-Saharan Africa and , therefore , 
does not include Northern Africa - - though even there , one sees an attempt 
to formulate ideologies specific to those countries and relevant to their 
era of development . I 
65see Paul Sigmund , op . cit . , pp , 248�251 . 
66charles W. Anderson , Fred R ,  Von der Mehden and Crawford Young , 
l s sues of Political Development , New Jersey : Prentice-Hall ,  1967 ,  p .  199 . 
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There is the s tro.ng belief that the public sector will be the maj or 
deci sion-maker in ques tions regarding matters of production and 
distribution . To many African leaders , the party-state is  the main 
vehicle for development and planning occupies a central position in 
f f d 1 ' . l i  
67 
many orms o evelopmenta socia sm . 
In Tanzania , it is  a popular belief among the leadership that the 
state should act positively to stimulate domestic sources of productivity 
and enterprise . Nyerere firmly believes that the state should create 
greater equality o f  opportunity and welfare , that development should 
not bestow benefits only on the minority but on as large a s ection o f  
the population as pos sibl e , especially the more impoveri shed sectors . 
It  should be borne in mind that at the outset , social ism was a philosophy 
of redis tribution , not of development . Yet many Afric an  and other 
socialists have gradual ly l inked growth with socialism .  This appears to 
be more acceptable and relevant to their needs becaus e as a philosophy 
of redistribution , socialism makes l ittle s ense in societies with l ittl e 
to distribute . 68 
The problems of control and class formation form another maj or theme 
in the ideology of African Socialism . It i s  the belief that independence 
was not a total ly integrating process and that what took place was the 
,;eplacement of colonial alite by an indic;Jeneous elite . 69 African 
67see Nyerere , Freedom and Development , op . cit . , pp . 80�10 7 . 
68s ee Anderson et . al . , op . cit . , p .  2 0 5 . 
69::;ee Rene Dumont , False · start · in · Africa , London : Andre Deuts ch , 
1966 , p .  86 . 
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Socialism has , there fore , been des cribed as a smokes creen for the 
sel fish desires of the elite , i . e . , " • • •  social ism for the poor and a 
form of prote cted bourgeoi s  capitalism for the elite 11 • 70 This i s  true 
of many African countries that want to prevent the ri s e  of classes and 
at the s ame time promote economic development , more often than not ideal s 
and reality are very far apart . 
Against thi s . general background of African Socialism , the ensuing 
discuss ion of socialism as it pertains to Tanzania takes on greater 
significanc e .  Tanzania , like many developing nations , chos e  a soci al i s t  
path but unlike many of them it has managed t o  pay more than simple lip 
s ervice to its brand o f  socialism . Its political leaders have long 
begun formulating their ideology for development . The ideas of Nyerere 
. alone does not constitute the entire ideology but he has been the 
outspoken ideologue for the country . He has , as Bienen points out , 
"presented an image of Tanzania to the outside world" . 71 Nyerere ' s  
appeal to Africans wi th a " socialist"  orientation i s  not limited only 
to Tanzani a ,  but to a wider audience . Many Africans vi ew him as the ir 
ideal type of social ist leader . McCain described Nyerere as "a condensation 
symbol for persons of di ffering ( socialist)  ideological persuas ion . (His ) 
symbolic appeal is supported by a chari smatic political style , an 
absence of ideological orthodoxy , and ass ertive leadership on issues of 
7 0McCain . . I 0!' • cit . , p , 66 .  
7i�ienen , av . cit , , P �  206 �  
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. importance to African s " . 72 
"Uj amaa" or , " familyhood" adequately sums up Afri can Socialism as 
it is s een by Nyerere . He believed that the family was based on certain 
practices and attitudes which promoted '' equality " , " freedom" and "unity " . 
In Fre edom and Unity , he describes socialism as " an attitude of mind" , 
an ess ential factor which distingui shes the sociali st from the non.-
socialis t .  According to Nyerere , the basic difference between a 
socialist society and ·a 
_
ca�italist soci ety rested not with their differing 
methods of production of wealth but with their varying methods o f  
distribution of wealth . He believes that socialism i s  bas ically 
di stributive becaus e one of its primar}' concerns i s  to see that those 
who sow , reap a fair share from their efforts . 7 3 
Nyerere adopted the ideas of uj amaa because it could be us ed as a 
guideline for the development of Tanzania and because it was rooted in 
the African tradition . As a phi losophy of humanism , uj amaa strives to 
create a socialist society based on the equality of all men ; a society 
where' work is  not only a right but a duty for everyone . Nyerere stre sses 
throughout that " there can be no socialism without work " , that , " idlers " 
.. 
and " loiterers " were unknown in traditional African family l i fe . 7
4 
Gndoubtedly ,  uj amaa is a c al l  to actfon . It js an ideological statement 
of the aims and obj ectives of Tanzan i an  society and the methods by which 
they should be achieved . Before independence , no program for development 
72 McCain , op . ci t . , p .  75 . · 
73N. . F d a· ' ' yerere , · ree om an Unity , op .
. 
cit . , p .. 16 7 . 
74�, p .  168 . 
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existed , only a strong des ire for unity . After independence , the 
problems of natio? bui lding led Nyerere to formulate his ideas . S logans 
of " freedom" and "work" were not uncommon and the primary aim was the 
elilnination of "poverty '' , " ignorance •• and "dis ease " . 
75 
Uj amaa is a brand o f  social ism that is more gradual , less dynamic , 
and not opposed to traditional values where they prove us�ful in the 
deve lopment process . It involves rural development and community action 
programs with a definite emphasi s  on cooperation . Uj amaa has been 
referred to as " an ideology of . production 11
7 6 bec ause it  is a means 
whereby poverty can be eliminated and more wealth can be produced for 
the entire community .  This i s  very important to Nyerere , who believes 
that soc ietal wealth can be accumulated and distributed through 
cooperation rather than conflict . Uj amaa thus posits·  a _ peaceful 
transition to socialism � there is no clas s  conflict inherent in thi s 
doctrine . I t  is not surpri sing , therefore , that Nyerere ' s  sociali sm 
has been cal led " communitarian " as oppos ed . to the " radical mobi l ization" 
socialism of S ekou Toure and Kwame Nkrumah or the "moderate welfare 
socialism••  of Kenyatta . Communitarian social i sm , " i s  identif:i,ed with 
·the vision of a harmonious consequence of radical individualism and the 
furious competitiveness that s eell} to characterize the presently advanced 
nations " .  
77 
Havi_ng already noted the wide variety of socialist attitudes 
75 rbid . , P� · ao�aJ , 
7 6Frances Hill , "Uj amaa : African Socialist ;l?roductionism in Tanzani a" , 
in Helen De s fosses and Jacques Leve sque (eds ) , social ism ·in the Third 
World , New York : Praeger , 1975 .  
77 Anderson , et . al . , p .  191 . 
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and aims that exist ,  it would be  certainly surprising i f  Nyerere ' s  ideas 
went unchallenged ' in Afri ca no less  than in Tanzania . Believers of 
scientific social i sm ,  e . g . , Marxist-Lenini st , especially the Zanz ibaris 
have protested against uj amaa adamantly s tating that only conflict can 
initiate rapid change , ·  the type needed if Tanzania is  to ' 'catch up1' with 
the re s t  of the developed world . Though he readily accepts that there 
are many ideological paths to African socialism , Nyerere has refused to 
accept that Marxi sm-Lenini sm has a role to play in the development of 
Tanzania . He . believe s that capital istic and individualistic attitudes 
were never acquired during the colonial period and that Africans who 
persist in presenting a Marxist-Leninis t  interpretation of Africa are 
certainly not to be commended on their grasp of the dynamic s  of African 
past , present or future . Nyerere ' s  rej ection of the dictatorship of the 
p�oletariat , i . e . , the class war -- the power of history as a force in 
itself ,  has led to cries of " revis ionism' '  from the school of scienti fic 
. l "  7
8 
socia i sm .  However ,  it should b e  borne i n  mind that Nyerere ' s  
thoughts are influenced to a great extent by his religion , i . e . , 
Christianity , in fact Roman Catholicism ,  and it would not be erroneous 
to liken Tanzania social i sm to Fabian socialism . 
�n Freedom and Socialism , Nyerere s tated that there was not one pure 
socialism but that soc ialism was pos sible , " i f  the people a s  a whole are 
involved in( their political and ecqnomic affairs 11 •
7 9  
Therefore , 
7 8Andre De :La Rue , ! 'Uj amaa on the March " , in S aul and Cli ffe ( eds } , 
op . cit , , p . 43 .  
7 9Nyerere , Freedom and Social i sm ,  op . cit . , p .  310 . 
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Tanzanians mus t  seek t o  build a society " .. .  • i n  which all members have 
I 
equal rights and opportunities ; in which all can live at peace with 
their neighbors without suffering or impos ing inj ustice , being exploited 
or exploiting , and in which all have a gradually increasing level of 
80 l'C\aterial welfare before any individual lives in luxury . "  This 
particular statement was made in a policy document of maj or importance 
in the po litical and economic life of Tanzania -- the Arusha Declaration .
8 1 
This Declaration ushered in a new era in Tanzanian politics and made the 
ideology more explicit , outlining rule s  guiding leader ship behavior , 
measures for public ownership and various other socialist policies . 
The Declaration was not formulated in a vacuum . It had a relatively 
long hi s tory because Nyerere has always been committed to a policy of 
social change through socialism . That i s , socialism not only in 
material terms , but socialism in human terms , e . g . , human dignity and · 
equality , should also be maintained . 
The Arusha Declaration carried a more definite commitment than 
anything Africa had seen before . I t  was s ignificant for its bid to 
achieve freedom from external control and to establi sh socialism in 
Af . 
8 2 rica . One writer stated that the importance of the document stemmed 
c learly from the stand it adopted concerning the concept of class . He 
believes that the Arusha Declaration was des igned to promote a class less 
society governed and controlled by , the workers and peasants . He states , 
SOibid . , p .  40 • 
. .  
S.lihid . '  pp . 2 3 1'-50 .  
82oe La Rue , op . cit . , p .  40 .  
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" the Arusha Declaration was an unmistakable manifestation of Nyerere ' s  
concept o f  a clas sless society • • • 11 8 3 
The Declaration provided a more coherent and specific set o f  
guidelines that could b e  eas ily understood by the Tanzanians . I t  was 
il'nportant not only for its originality or consisten9y , but also for the 
course that it charted for Tanzanians and for Nyerere ' s  accurate summary 
o f  the situation o f  development in Africa and the remedial steps to be 
followed . Bienen stated that "perhaps the most dramatic attempt to 
assert a unique Tanzanian solution to development problems has been the 
complex o f  assertions , policies , and ideological strands which has 
become known in the Arusha Declaration 11 • 84 
There are essentially five overlapping themes in the Dec laration : 
self-reliance , rural development , equity , national economic control , and 
socialism . To be sure , Nyerere believed that socialism and equity 
were inseperable because it was inconce ivable for one to be pre sent 
without the other . The policy o f  self-reliance has taken on a whole 
new meaning in the context of Tanzanian politics .  Nyerere saw the 
dangers of relying on outs ide . help and rej ected the idea . The Tanzanian 
people were made responsible for their own deve lopment through their own 
efforts and hard work .  According to Nyerere , the people themselves must 
:t;.i<Jht the war .against poverty , ignorance and disease so that they may 
achieve their own freedom and subs�quent prosperity • .  Money cannot be 
8 3cas de Villiers , "Aspects of African Socialism" , Africa I n s t i tute 
Bulletin , XII I , 6 , 1975 , p .  2 28 . 
84Bienen , op . cit . ,  p . 406 .  
used because Tanzania is  a poor country an4 there fore , financ ial capital 
cannot be the rnaj,or instrument of development .  Altho_ugh foreign aid 
wi ll be accepted , it  wil l  not be relied upon heavily .
85  
The Declaration clearly de-emphas ized the role o f  industrial 
development in Tanzania .  Instead , attention was focused on the rural 
areas and agriculture became the . basis  for development . The country 
was declared a land of peasants and workers . Land was said to be commonly 
owned by the nation and that it was the duty of the government to ensure 
that it was used for the benefit of the population . 
The themes o f  equity and socialism were given even greater emphas i s . 
One o f  the primary reasons for dec lari_ng the nation a land of workers 
and peasants was to prevent the development of a class society . Nyerere 
realized that despite previous policies , the country was s till not 
socialist . At the outset of Freedom and Social ism , he pointed out that , 
" Socialism i s  not built by government decis ions , nor by acts o f  
Parliament ; a country does not become Sociali st by nationalization or 
by grand designs on paper " . 86 In fact , government decisions . had been 
insufficient to prevent the growth of small rural capitalists or the 
accumulation of property and var ious assets ·by those holding high 
J?Q lj.ti.ca.l and adm.inistr_ative office s .  Kence ,  TANU was declared a 
�a.rty o f  peasants and workers and strict leadership codes were outlined 
designed to halt , at any rate retard , the growth of c apitali sm and . ' . 
capitali s t  attitudes .  Leaders had to be prepared to serve and guide 
8.5Nyerere , · Freedom and Socialism , bp . cit . , pp . 2 37 -2 41 . 
86�. , pp . 1-2 . 
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the people , they had t o  b e  committed to the principles of socialism , 
i. e .  ; uj amaa , and had to be of a high moral calibre . In addition , they 
had to identify themselves with the people as socialism required the 
efforts of both leaders and followers . 
The realization that sociali s t  transformation is a slow process 
llas resulted in an emphasis on "persuasion "  rather than force . Nyerere 
has constantly stres sed that compulsion should not enter into the move 
from a nation of individual peasants to a nation of cooperative village s . 
He st�tes tha.t , "it  i s  not a question o f forci:ng people to change the ir 
habits . It is a question of providing leadership . It is a question of 
all of  us  t.ogether making a real ity of  the principle s of  equality and 
freedom which are enshrined in our policy of Tanzanian Socialism" 8 7 
This aforegoing discus s ion serves the purpose o f  i ilustrating the 
important aspects o f  the ideology . Before all o f  this can be evaluated 
in terms of the political and economic real itie s of Tanzania , it is 
necessary to examine the ideas relating to " Democracy " ,  "The 
:
Party" , 
and "The State " . It  seems most appropriate at thi s  point in this discus sion 
to elaborate on these ideas because they not only interplay and overlap 
with ideas relating to uj amaa but also form an integral part o f the 
national ideology . 
DE.MOCAACY : THE PARTY A.ND THE STA.TE 
A,ccord�n9 to Nyerere , democracy " • • • is. government by the people . 
rdeally , it is a form o f  government whereby the people -- all the 
B7 rbid . , p .  3 6 5 . 
- ' 
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people -- settle their. affairs through free discus s ion " . 88  He rec_ognized 
that socialism -could not exist without democracy but that pure democracy 
was practical only in small communitie s . His ideas pertaining to a 
functioni_ng democracy can be summed up as one in which there are no 
factions . Thus a t�o-party system could _be undemocratic i f  it merely 
encourages the growth of factionalism . Nyerere believed that a one-
party system could be democratic and in the l.ight of Tanzanian political 
realities , he thought that such a system seemed to be the mos t  practical . 
� order to achieve its bas ic soc ialist aims , Tanzania had to maintain 
a one-party system to ensure that a c las s structure did not emerge . For 
�erere , " the exi stence of two or more stable political parties implie s 
a class s tructure of society • • • 11 8 9  His thoughts about democracy and the 
party system progressed from the stage where he believed that the one-
party system was as democratic as the two-party system to the s tage 
where he firmly asserted that the former was clearly more democratic . 
He purports that " • • •  where there i s  one party and that party i s  
identified with the nation as a whole , the foundations o f  dem�cracy are 
firmer than they can ever be where (there are ) two or more parties ,  each 
representi_ng only a section of the community . ;; 90 
The rivalry that exists in two- or multi-party systems could be 
damaging to a newly independent polity like Tanzania . In Africa the 
two-party system has s imply failed , to work or to deal adequately with 
8 8Nyerere , Freedom and Unity ; op � cit . , p .  195 . 
8 9Ibid . , p . 134 . 
90rbid : , I p . 196 . 
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the problems of such nations whi ch are essentially different from thos e 
in Western democracie s .  Thus , the retention o f  a two party sys tem can 
be considered to be not only impractical but also inimical to democracy . 
A one-party system can function democratically i f  provisions are made 
for freedom o f  di s cuss ion and express ion . Party membership mus t  be 
rel atively open to everyone and each citi zen should be allowed to 
participate to the fullest . According to Nyerere , there would then be 
little need for suspi cion or the fear that come s from living wi th rival s ,  
the fear of overthrow , that an excluded group is intent on replac ing the 
government at the first given opportunity . As Nyerere states '.' • • •  a 
national movement which i s  open to all , which is identified with the 
whole nation , has nothing to fear from the dis content of an exc luded 
section o f  society , for there is  then no such s ection of society , for 
there is  then no such section '� . 91 
Accounts of traditional African life o ften stress the inclus ivenes s 
of the society and the settlement o f  di sputes through discus s ion by all 
concerned -- none were exc luded . Nyerere believes that by retaining 
a. two-party system , Africans are unconc iously admitting to the exi stence 
of factions and classes . His comparison of European and African 
political parties il lustrated that the two could not be equated in 
several aspects , e . g . , origin , composition and functions . African 
politi cal parties were established in oppos i tion to the colonial powers . 
' 
They represented the entire ( indigenous )  community and their primary 
9 1rbid . I P •  2 01 . 
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function was the destruction of that colonial �egime . In contrast , 
European political parties originated to protect certain interests 
and were comprised o f  various clas s e s  either determined to change or 
retain the status quo . African political partie s sought to unite the 
nation by appealing to their conunon interests while their European 
counterparts sought to divide the nation by appealing to the sectional 
interests . According to Bienen , Nyerere ' s  negativism towards a multi-
or two-party system i s  not s imply an attack on factional i sm ,  but a 
rather veheme!lt anti-party ethic . He believes that "Democ racy and The 
Party System expres ses  a desire to abolish politic s from. society in so 
far as politics means organized disagreement 11 • 9 2  Thi s i s  not t o  say 
that disagreement is not to lerated ; unorganized disagreement is permitted 
because it does not pos e  a great threat to society . Indeed , Nyerere 
accepted the individual ' s  right to have his own opinion and to dis s ent 
from something whi ch he believes is  infinitely wrong but this di ssent 
should in no way threaten the unity and exis tence of the political system . 
\ 
In view o f  thi s , it  becomes clearly obvious that a two-party �ystem , 
defined in Nyerere ' s  terms , could only bring factionalism into play s ince 
it would be organized around various group interests . John Kautsky 
Q.deq_ua.tely illus trates the confli.ct$. , .j..deol.ogical and non-ideol.ogical , 
that could lead to ins tability in developing countries , especially when 
. 9 3  
one. o.rgan.j.zed revolutiona:r::-y <;rroup j,,� excludeQ. f:r::-om power .  Nyerere ' s  
cu;oguments for a national movement are , therefore , well-grounded in the 
92  
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Bienen ; op . cit . , p .  2 3 1 . 
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l.ogic o f  African politics yet this has o ften led to accusations of havi.ng 
� no-party system . 
Tanzania has always maintained a dominant one-party status . During 
the pre-independence years no other party commended so great a portion 
of the support or loyalty of the Tanzanian people as TANU . In 1964 , 
Nyerere appointed a commission to consider the changes that were 
necessary in order to transform Tanzania into a de j ure one-party state . 
The vital question that needed to be answered was this : How could 
freedom be. maintained in the party while simultaneously commanding 
sufficient discipline to enable it to perform the necessary development 
tasks ? In his Guide to the One-Party State Commi ss ion , Nyerere outlined 
certain principles that should be upheld . The state would remain a 
republic and the rule of  law and the independence of  the judiciary would 
be maintained ; all citi zens would have complete freedom and equality and 
maximum participation in government through the s ingle national movement ;  
all  citizens would control the Government and would be free to choose 
th . t t '  94 eir own represen a ives . 
The Commi ssion concluded that TANU should remain a mas s  party , not 
an elite corps . Thus , in 1965 , TANU was open to all citizens irrespective 
of race or occupation . For the first time the party was open to the 
army , police , and civil service . Nyerere ' s  stress on the maintainance 
o� unity had not been taken li.<]h.tl¥ · :J:t was evident that the Commission 
wa,s concious o f  the need to establish a party that was disciplined and 
94see Nyerere , Freedom · and · unity , op . cit . , pp . 26 1-262 . 
so 
effective enough to perform development functions yet democratic enough 
to lead society . The widening of membership seemed to enhance the 
party in two ways . I t  allowed for a greater degree of democracy and a 
substantial increase of skilled personnel within the party . No persons 
were unduly restricted from j oini.ng , for as Bienen points out , "Nyerere ' s  
emphas i s  on unity is attached to a concept o f  nation-building which 
conceives of unity by amalgamation , not unity by cutti.ng off offending 
parts " .  95 There were those who dis.agreed with Nyerere ' s  ideas and felt 
that the party system should be more disciplined and " tougher " 
ideologically . In fac t , Nyerere c ame around to the idea that the party 
had to be more disciplined . In Freedom and Development ,  he s tated that 
discipline was an e s s ential part of freedom and democracy and that 
96 
without it there would be anarchy . 
The mos t  important aspects o f  the ideology are essentially the 
views of Nyerere because there i s  a lack o f  "revolutionary intellectuals " 
among the leaders . Yet in the short space o f  time since independence 
the Tanzanian leadership has formulated an ideology of development which 
is essentially (at least in its theoretical aspects ) both social ist and 
democratic . In the next chapter , the value s , attitudes , s tyle and form 
of  leadership will be discuss ed at length but before so doing , it i s  
neces sa.ry j ust to recap o n  some o� the salient points made here and to 
a.s se ss , if only briefly , the effects of the ideol.ogy . 
gsB . ' t  24 9 ienen , op . ci • , p .  • 
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see Nyerere > ������m ��� . �evel�P���� , pp . 64 -6 5 . 
5 1  
THE IMPACT O F  IDEOLOGY 
Ideol.ogy in · Tanzania , far from bei.ng a static and i solated element 
in national development , has functioned dynamically as an o.rganic and 
evolving image of national direction and priorities in both the soc ial 
and economic spheres . It is  important that the · s tyle and content of the 
ideol.ogy be s tressed . For one thi.ng , ideol.ogy has provided the maj or 
guidelines fo� the trans formation of society according to soc ial ist 
principles . Ideo logy has been responsible for drawing the people at the 
periphery int� contact with those at the center , yet the latter is very 
much restricted in the services that it can provide . The ideas held by 
the leaders affect the direction in which Tanzania develops . As Bienen 
points out , " • • •  it matters whether or not development is less important 
to them than identifying their country as the socialist . state in East 
and Central Africa which takes its place in the sun by virtue of this 
, . 97 identification rather than by virtue o f  its economic growth . 
Tanzania i s  stil l in its formative stage s and it is stil.l early to 
give a complete breakdown on the impact of the various policies because 
they embody long term goals such as nationalization , vill.agi zation , and 
economic self-reliance , etc . However , there is  l ittl e  doubt that " a  
real �eginning " has been made i n  the efforts t o  achieve social ism.  In 
1967 , Bienen stated that uj amaa was s imply " a  statement of ideals "  
which had really never taken hold . , Future oriented revolutionaries 
f;o:und it difficult to accept · uj amaa because it seemed inherently backward 
97sienen , p . 2 50 . 
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and lacking in any form o f  dynamism , and it was imprecise to the extent 
of j us tifying many different governmental policies . 98 Today , uj amaa 
is seen in a more positive l.ight ; events have. given greater credence to 
the (uj amaa ) idea . There are certainly many areas in the ideology that 
can be looked at as somewhat ambiguous but the Arusha Declaration provided 
� more specific p�ogram for sociali s t  development . 
The challenges o f  development in Tanzania are great -- it is  one 
of the poorest countrie s in the World and among the U . N .  l isting of 
least developed countrie s ·. The annual income averages around $ 8 5  per 
person -- roughly hal f  the average for Africa . National re source s  are 
few and the country is predominantly agricultural . Thi s particular 
economic sector accounted for 39% of  GDP in 197 1 . 9 9  The persistence of 
colonial economic s tratification and the migration to . more populated 
towns re sulted not only in a series of regional , but also urban and 
rural imbalance s . The increasing: gap between rich and poor has alerted 
. .  
Nyerere to the dangers of elitism .  The Arusha Dec laration was de signed 
to eradicate this  as well as meet specific political and economic 
problems . Uj amaa . is ,  thus , an attempt to deal not only with the problems 
o f  the appearance o f  an exploitative elite and consequent instabil ity , 
but al so with the problems o f  development and the lack of government 
resources , the diversity of the regions , depressed population , the lack 
of information and the need for mas s  participation • 
• 
98�. ,  pp . 2 52-254 . 
99
Hill , p .  2 2 2 . 
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The obj ectives of the ideology are s imple to understand and they 
are des irable , though not necessarily inevitable . There is  constant 
emphasis on the participation of the entire people . It is  an open 
rather than a closed ideology which has an anti-establishment bias . At 
present this poses no immediate problems for the leadership because o f  
the wide spread support which the political regime has secured . However , 
if such a bias become s deeply ingrained within a substantial portion o f  
the population over a lengthy period o f  time , i t  may b e  increasingly 
difficult to regulate behavior . In the long run , thi s may prove 
detrimental to national goals whose attainment depend primarily (but not 
exclusively) on government s capability to mobilize , control , and direct 
activity towards this  end . There are many gaps in development and 
communication of ideology due primarily to the shortage o f political 
education staff , especially those who combine ideological under standing 
and commitment with a solid technical background in the critical areas 
o f  policy implementation . There i s  great potential for further 
ideological development if the right type of personnel can be recruited 
and effectively trained . 
The impact of the ideology has been felt in many areas and it  has 
played a maj or role  in enabling the pres idential party state to �ove 
significantly toward achieving democracy and soc ialism . For example , 
within the framework o f  the one-pa�ty system , voters are able to elect 
the maj ority of their leaders including the President . They can involve 
themselves in the deci sion-making process through the operation of the 
party cell . In addition , the National Ethic and the creed o f  TANU calling 
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for individual freedom and also social solidarity are allowed to operate 
to a certain extent . However , it should be noted that despite the 
democratic nature of the decision-maki.ng machinery , the most important 
decis ions , including goal formation and articulation , are carried out 
:t>y the leaders , e spec ially the Pre sident . Al tho.ugh such goals are 
j ustified by their representing the wil l  of the people , there is yet very 
little evidence to substantiate this . Gover�ent dec i s ion , e specially 
s ince Arusha , provides a good indication o f  the priorities and character 
' o f the trans �tion to socialism and the maj or obstacles to change . There 
are two maj or socialist initiatives which mus t  be brie fly noted . F irstly , 
the large-scale nationalization in 1967 , which produced large numbers of 
parastatal enterprises . Secondly , the large-scale mobilization for rural 
soc ial ism in 197 0 produced uj amaa vil�ages , thereby reducing the number 
. o f individual small-holdings which previously exis ted . As this wil l  be 
dealt with in greater detail in a subsequent chapter , little time wil l  
b e  spent o n  it here . However , although uj amaa vil lages do not guarantee 
that socialism wil l  emerge , it does provide a base on which g�eater 
cooperation in the rural areas can be built . 
Before nationalization , foreign corporations controlled and owned 
a great many industries and were allowed to operate relatively 
unhampered by restrictions . One o f  the great disadvantages ari sing from 
this state o f  affairs was the expo•tation of capital to the home country 
leavi.ng Tanzania with insufficient capital for investments . Nationalization 
thus secured ownership of  c apital and offered greater opportunities for •. 
its use in accordance with Tanzania ' s  needs by reversing the traditional 
' 
income drain of the economy . Altho.ugh the benefits that such a policy 
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brings continue to be debated , there is  little doubt that it i s  a basic 
prerequis ite for . socialism . loo 
It is still unclear whether nationalization has changed investment 
patterns s ignificantly because Tanzania still relies heavily on foreign 
contractors to provide information , advice , and per sonnel for carrying 
out inve stments . More importantly , state owner ship does not imply 
movement toward soc ialism because the state does  not undergo any 
quantitative changes .  In addition , it may even perpetuate a capitalistic 
bureaucratic c lass by making c ivil servants the. guardians o f  public 
property . Nationalization doe s  not mean workers control , which is the 
real meaning of soc ialism on the economic level , but it has opened the 
way to greater participation on the part of Tanzanians in the economic 
life o f  their country . However , it wil l  be sometime before th� people 
as a whole feel that they are working for· " themselves "  rather than for 
some alien entity . Foreign banks , insurance companies (British owned ) 
and the food processing industries (Asian .. owned) were the main targets  
o f  Nationalization in 1967 .  The National Development Counc il , created 
in 1965 to formulate and coordinate national development plans , took 
maj ority shareholding in many national corporation s .  The government 
acquired 60 percent of the shares in the si sal industry and al so in .. 
�even industrial firms (they �ere l<ilimanj aro Breweries , Tanzanian 
Breweries , Tanzanian Metal Box Company , Tanganyika Extract Company , . ' 
Tanzanian �ortland Cement Company , British-American Tobacco , and Bata 
Shoe Company) • 
. 100 ' . . .  �- , p .  2 3 0 . 
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Maj or step s  have also been taken towards the social control o f  the 
e conomy . Rented ' hou s e s  valued at more than $ 10 , 000 (U . S . )  have been 
social i z ed wi th compensation paid to the owner s -- thi s  i s  a bo ld attempt 
by the Tanzanian leadership to e l iminate the "r entier c la s s " .  Property 
ownership has also been tran s formed in accordance with ideo logical 
principles -- thi s is s een no t  only in the socialization o f  land but 
also in the l egal s tatus o f  l and tenure . Other pol ic i e s  will be discus s ed 
in later chapters but the foregoing analy s i s  i l lustrates some o f  the 
s_igni f icant �teps which have been made towards e s tabli shi_nq social i sm 
in Tanzania . Of course , there are areas where policy has beeri l e s s  
· influential . For example , the po licy o f  s e l f-rel iance has not made 
Tanzania s ignificantly l e s s  dependent . There i s  s t i l l  much to be 
des i red in the planning mechani sm , e specially in the allocation of 
scarce resourc e s . S imilarly , the problems o f  c l a s s e s , e spec ially in 
the rural areas , needs to be square ly tackled . But thi s  should not 
. . 
negate the remarkabl e  achievements that have been made in the areas o f  
political and economic l i f e . 
The suc c e s s  o f  the policies wil l  depend on the extent to whi ch 
worker s and peasant s partic ipate in dec i s ion-making and the extent to 
which such partic ipation rai s e s  the social productivity of labo r . 
D 1 .  . h h b k t . th . ' d  1 lOl ecentra i zation as t us ecome a ey concep in e U J amaa i eo ogy . 
Tl.li.s po licy document produced b:'.( Nyerere outlines his ideals behind 
decentral izatio n . It aims at n�tionaliz�ng and improvi_ng the 
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administration while simultaneously extending to the populace a greater 
share of responsipilities in the development effort . Nyerere realizes 
that infinitely more power has to be exercised at the local level in 
order to bring development and democracy to the people and to solve 
various administrative problems . He believes that by decentralizing 
the administrative machine, " local democracy will  become more real , 
even as the institutions of development wil l  become more efficient11 • 102 
Whether or not the ideological obj ectives of decentral ization , villagization , 
self-reliance , and other policies are fully realized remains to be seen 
but the ideology has had a direct impact in five maj or areas of the 
economy : organization of management and decision-making , property , 
education , labor , and the determination o f  national economic priorities . 
Tanzania ' s program of ideological and economic development is , to 
say the least , most ambitious .  It involves ,  among other things , the 
overcoming 9f bas ic challenges inherent in the decision to achieve 
socialist transformation by evolution rather than revolution . As Ian 
C.  Parker states , "The policy of gradual transition to socialism • • •  
represents a logical response to the relative strength of  the government 
and party and the stability of the nation on the one hand and to extreme 
103 poverty , on the other " . In meeting these challenges ,  Tanzania has 
to experiment , formulate and reformulate ideas . Uj amaa has often been 
referred to as an experiment which, if successful , could serve as a 
I 
102Ibi� . I p .  349 . ' 
. .  ' . - � . . . . . . . . .  . 
io3Parker , op . cit . , p .  7 1 .  
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guide for many developi.ng countries . However , it  depends on more than 
financial resources for its fulfil lment . The active support and practical 
initiative o f  the peasants will be a deciding factor and also the effects 
o f the political and adminis trative organs to provide the neces sary 
leadership . This last factor is  of  the utmost importanc e .  Nyerere has 
emphasised the high standards required of leaders and the important 
functions which they must perform . In the next two chapters , attention 
will focus primarily on the national pol itical elite (both government 
and party ) it ' s  role , attitude and function . Bearing in mind the 
basic principles and ideas of the ideol.ogy concern ing the type of soc iety 
that i s  to be establi shed , it i s  important to ascertain whether the 
practical efforts of the leadership are co.ngruent with the dominant 
ideol.ogy . It is al so important in a study o f  this  nature to isolate 
the maj or dec ision makers and to evaluate their behavior and its 
implications for the establ islunent o f  uj amaa . 
CHAPTER III 
THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
The ideology contains , among other things , a great deal of 
literature pertaini.ng to the exercise of political leadership . For 
example , there are numerous references relating to the type of leadership , 
its role in the development process , its obligations , its scope of 
. . f h 1 . . f d h . 104 authority and in luence and t e imits o that power an aut ority . 
In sum , the ideol.ogy spell s  out the type , nature and furictions of the 
political elite . 
The leaders o f  Tanzania are not only responsible for making their 
program of action intelligible to the masses by explanation and persuasion , 
they must al so act upon those principles . Nyerere pointed out that both 
words and actions are important in the march towards freedom , development 
and socialism .  While the population , too , must support the government 
and actively engage themselves in the development programs , the 
leadership must provide the necessary information , guidance and 
105 organization for the people . 
Political leadership in developing countries is  necessary at all 
levels of government , primarily to ensure the smooth functioning of the 
development machinery and the success of development obj ectives . It is , 
therefore , purported here that the importance of the national political 
104 pee J . K . , Nyerere , Freedom and Socialism , op . cit . , pp . 86�.10 3 , 
136�42 , .187":"2 0 6 ,  394":" 397 . 
lOSibid . , p .  395 . 
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leadership in fashioning polic ies and outl ining programs of action has 
greatly increas ed . It is the national political elite that has formulated 
the goals of the sys tem , the method s by which to attain them and 
campaigned for . thei
.
r acceptance among the populace .  This elite has 
�lso been responsible for shaping the instruments of deve lopment , e . g . , 
TANU , NUTA and the TYL , controlling such organs and thereby dictating 
the direction and pace of development . In this  chapter , the aim is  to 
demonstrate the pivotal role which the national leadership plays in 
worki.ng towards the realization of  a socialist society . At once the 
contradiction between the proclaimed obj ectives and the nature o f  the 
leadership can be seen and explanation will be offered as such problems 
�rise . 
The hypothesis  that the national political leadership has been and 
continue s to be the maj or decis ion-maker and that the initiative of 
local political leaders will increase with increase s  in the level of 
development clearly merits investigation . I t  brings into play key 
concepts that lie at the heart of the study of politics -- "power " ,  
" influence " and " authority 11 • 106 These factors are of  great importance 
1n any analysis of  the role and behavior o f  dec ision-makers , s ince 
leadership can be effective only if it pos s e s s  "political Power " and the 
authority to change and influence behavior in . the direction that it 
des i.res . Power , here , means the ability to command a change in behavior , 
influence can be synonymous with power , while author ity implies the 
�06Max Weber ; From Max Weber : ·  Essays in Socio logy , (1973  ed . ) , 
trans .  H .  H·.· Gerth and c .  Wright Mills , New York : Oxford University 
Press , 1946 . 
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ability to change or influence behavior by virtue of commanding some 
office or pos itio� which confers power or legitimacy .
107  This is  but a 
brief dis cussion of these key concepts , but necessary in order to make 
the succeeding · disc.ussion more fruitful . 
There are many studies and theories relating to elite behavior or 
some aspect of it . Contemporary analys is ranges from specific studies 
:i.n "Who Governos 11 108 and " Small Town u .  S .  A . 11 109 to highly generalized 
a.nalysis of the changing composition of national elites over broad time 
spans , e . g .  , Pareto . · Some s tudies si.ngle out various groups such as 
the military , 
.
the 1.egislators , the administrators 110 and bus inessmen1 1 1  
for special analysis . Other studie� are based primarily on the socio-
economic characteristics of  the elite , assuming that such factors 
influence the way in . which the politic al elite behaves • . 
According to Beck et . al . , there are three dimensions to elite 
studies -- the descriptive , the s tructure-function and the genetic or 
stage analysis dimension . The first identifies the elite and its socio-
' 
economic and political characteristics in any situation . The second 
deals with the structure of elites and the re lationship of the structure 
.., 
to elite performance in government . The third dimens ion can be studied 
lO?Ibid . , p .  299 . 
lOSR. A .  Dahl , Who Governs ? Democracy and . Power in an Amer i can 
City,  New Haven : Yale Univers ity PTess , 1961 . 
109�loyd Hunter , Community .power Structure , Chapel Hill : University 
of North. Carolina Press , 195 3 . 
110Raymond . F . Hopkins , Political Roles · in a New S tate , op . cit . 
. .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  .
lllc . wright. Mills ; ' The · Power Elite , op . cit . 
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by utilizing the concepts o f  personnel circulation , social circulation , 
representiveness , and flexibility . The questions which such concepts 
would be used to answer would relate to the permanency o! the elite , 
the entry of  non-elite groups and the specific conditions for entry . 112 
Beck et . al . , furnished their own concepts for the study of elite 
behavior , i . e . , elite composition , elite structure , elite etiquette and 
elite techniques and mechanisms of control . The pattern of elite 
structure has two dimensions ; elite-elite relationship , and elite-
constituency re lationship . Elite etiquette refers to the behavioral 
dimension of elite-elite relationships and elite-constituency 
relationships . It  is a term borrowed from v .  O .  Key and refers 
specifically to the rules by which elites regulate their behavior . 
These  are rules learned through the process of  sociaiization and they 
are shaped by the views of the elite . Techniques of control are the 
methods by which an individual or a group asserts its eliteness . Elites 
will usually adopt a variety of techniques . However , Beck et . al . , s tate 
that , " the particular technique adopted by an elite will reac t  on the 
system and ramify throughout it . 11 113 
Using the concepts o f  elite structure , elite etiquette , and 
techniques and mechanisms of  control , Beck et . al . , constructed " four 
elite type s " . The constitutional democratic type ; 114 the totalitarian 
1 12car l Beck, James M. Malloy and William R. Campbell , A Survey 
of Elite Studies ,  u .  s .  Government Printing Office , Washington , 1965 . 
1 13Ibid . , p .  17 . 
ll4B k t 1 19 2 2  ec , e . a  . , pp . - • 
6 3  
type ; 115 the authoritarian type ; 116 and non-crystallized soc ieties . 1 1
7 
Much time need no.t be spent on the first three types except to s tate 
that the first could be correlated to the systems of Western Europe and 
North America ; ·  the second to the Soviet Union and its Eas tern European 
satellites ; and the third would find counterparts in some Latin American 
and African countries .  The fourth type , the non-crystallized societies 
pertains mainly to developing areas where no definite pattern of elite 
behavior has yet emerged . However , from the existing literature on 
developing countries , it is clearly evident that elites in such 
countries hold modernizing values and are strongly committed to rapid 
118 socio-economic development . Elite etiquette in such societies is 
difficult to analyze . Some analysts see the elites holding the view 
that the people are obj ects that must be led ; others emphasise the 
leadership ' s  commitment to a relationship of reciprocal responsibility 
between the elite and its constituency . 
Mass  manipulation and suppression of opposition are the main types 
f tr 1 d . f d . 11 ' d . . 119 o con o evices oun in non-crysta ize societies . The study 
was less informative on the type of elites that wil l  emerge in such 
.. 
countries -- although it presented many poss ibilities , e . g . , intellectual , 
115rbid . , pp . 2 2- 25 . 
116Ibid . , pp . 26- 28 . 
ll? Ibid . , pp . 28-3 1 . 
118 See Karl Kautsky , op . cit . , p .  106 .  
1 19Beck , et . al . , op . c it . , p . 30 . 
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political , bureaucratic and technical or military . Anyone or a mixture 
of all may predo�inate at any one time making prediction of the ultimate 
structure of the non-crystallized systems extremely difficult . However , 
the schema for analysing political elites , outlined by Beck , et . al . , 
is useful in studying the nature of  the political leadership in Tanzania . 
The three basic steps outlined by the authors will be followed , that is , 
( 1 )  a description of the composite structure , etiquette and techniques 
and mechanisms of  control ;  ( 2 ) an explanation of  particular patterns and 
their persistence and ( 3 ) an explanation of pattern changes . 120 Primary 
emphasis will be given to the first two aspects . The third will be 
dealt with at greater length in the concluding chapters of thi s  work . 
Before entering into that discussion , references to other studies 
pertaining to pol itical leadership in developing countries should be 
. cited to widen the general framework by providing other important 
variables . 
LEADERSHIP : A STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONAL ANALYS I S  
As a theory and method of approach to the study o f  political 
�leadership functionalism offers several useful concepts . It i s  not 
intended here to elaborate on all the aspects of functionalism or on 
all the criticisms of this method . Structural functional analysis is 
useful here because it allows for a greater understanding of the roles 
and functions of the maj or decisiod makers within the political system .  
One of the basic tenets of  functionalism i s  that there are certain 
1201bid . , p .  3 4 . 
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functions which must  be performed if  any political sys tem is to survive . 
Almond and Powell list five "capabilities " a "political system" should 
12 1 possess and four support_ functions that a society should perform . 
However , only three are useful in discuss ing the kind of capability every 
polity should have -- and for our purposes here , they are regulative , 
extractive and distributive capabil ities . 
A) THE REGULAT ION OF BEHAVIOR 
Every government should be able to control the behavior of 
individual s and groups within society to ensure order . This means that 
government has to elicit positive support for the polity through feelings 
such as patriotism , respect and deference through such methods as 
education , communication and political participation . Secondly , 
government has to provide a:o. effective network of laws and regulations 
concerning the behavior of individuals and groups . A government that 
is able to do this and act in congruence with the expectations , values 
and desires of society has an appropriate level of regulative capability .  
This would also have the effect o f  energizing and improving the political 
system , strengthening the regulative capability of government and in the 
context of developing nations, promote economic development . 
B ) THE EXTRACTION OF RESOURCES 
The extractive aspect of governmental capability , refers to the 
ability of government to make avai+able at its direct and indirect 
disposal the kinds and quantities o f  resources  it needs and intends to 
121Gabriel Almond , and G .  Bingham Powell , Jr . ,  Comparative Politics : 
A Developmental Approach , Bos ton and Toronto : Little , Brown , 1966 . 
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manipulate and utilize for the development and stability o f  society . 
C )  D I S TRIBUTION OF RESOURCES 
This particular aspect of government capability refers to the 
ability to provide goods and services and other values such as status 
and to allocate rewards and punishments in a manner that society at 
large can accept . The distributive capability o f  a government can be 
said to be adequate when it is able to direct resources to the more 
critical needs of society at large . 
The three basic components o f  governmental capability have been 
· but briefly stated , but they are , ceteris paribus , essential to the 
maintainance of the political system . In many developing nations , the 
level of government capability is usually lower than that found in the 
developed countries . Government may be able to control . the population 
but unable to distribute resources in a way that is  acceptable to the 
majority of the people . The pol itical and economic realities in many 
developing areas work against maximization of governmental capabilities . 
Thus , th.is discuss ion not only has to take into account important 
factors such as governmental capabilities, but also the very nature of 
political leadership . The type of  leadership necessary for promoting 
and accelerating national development is clearly of great significance . 
Taketsugu Tsurutani outlined three bas ic requirements of political 
leadership , e . g . , commitment to modernization ideals , political intelligence 
and skill and dominance over sub-national political elites . 122  S ince 
12 2Taketsugu Tsurutani , The Politics of Nati onal Development : 
Political Leadership in Transitional Societies , New York : Abelard 
Schuman , 197 3 , p .  9 2 . 
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no political leadership can promote national development unless it 
wishes to do so , .the first requirement of  political leadership is  
commitment to modernization . Tsurutani did not spec ifically define 
what he meant by intell igence and skill but it involved creativi ty , 
foresight and ma�ipulative capability .  He looked upon intellegence 
as " • • •  the knowledge and application of situational assets and avenues 
toward goal attainment . " Skill  was the tool that translated this 
commitment and understanding into a concrete program of action . 123 
Leadership in developing countries should be independent from 
groups and individuals that resis t their efforts towards development 
and modernization . Dominance over sub-national elites can be achieved 
if there is unity within the national elite and to a certain extent in 
other political elites ; when the legal or political traditions permits 
national leadership control over local and administrative elites ; by 
selective bribery ; and through manipulation and integration of antagonis tic 
elements into the total process of modernization . 
From the leadership requirements Tsurutani constructed a typology . 
For our purposes here , a reproduction of that typology is useful insofar 
as it  enables an analysis of Tanzanian leadership within the framework 
presented . (See following page)  The characteristics of  all the types 
listed are carefully outlined in the text and need not be elaborated 
here . The utility of this typolog¥ is that it allows for analys i s  and 
evaluation of various types of political leadership based on three 
12 3 Ibid . , p . 93 . 
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TABLE 3 . 1  
A TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
INTELLIGENCE 
LEADERSHIP TYPE COMMITMENT & SKILL DOMINANCE 
A Effective Modernizing + + + 
B Attenuated Modernizing + + 
c Crude Modernizing + + 
D Visionary Modernizing + -
E Stable Conservative + + 
F Stagnating + 
G Extortionist  + 
H Revolving-Door 
. . .  
Source : Taketsugu Tsurutani ,  The Politic s o f  Nationa l D eve lopmen t :  
Po l i tical Leadership i n  Transnational Societie s ,  New York : 
Abelard-Shuman , 197 3 ,  p .  96 . 
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important variables ; commitment , intelligence and skill and dominance . 
It  must be borne in mind , however , that the examples Tsurutani developed 
are ideal types but this does not detract from their usefulness in 
providing a broad , if not prec ise , means for as sessing what a given 
political leadership may be capable of in terms of the manner and pace 
of national development . 
Using the concepts, outlined in the studies by Beck , et . al . , ( that 
is elite composition and structure , elite etiquette and techniqu�s and 
mechanisms of control )  and Tsurutani ' s  leadership requirements , i . e . , 
commitment , intelligence and skill ·  and dominance ,  attention will now 
be turned to the dynamic s  of  the Tanzanian political leadership and its 
role in the decis ion making process . 
THE TANZANIA POLITICAL LEADERSHIP : DEFINITION AND COMPOS ITION 
The Tanzanian political elite, as Hopkins defines it, consists o f  
two groups : member s  of .the National Assembly arid government adminis trators . 
He excluded " influential persons from other areas such as business , labor , 
military and education" because (1 )  only few Africans held such positions ; 
� (2 )  they did not play specifically political roles ; ( 3 )  data relating 
to them was extremeiy hard to gather ; (4 )  the relationship between high 
positions in the private sector and pol itical influence is weak . 124 This 
definition serves the purpose  of limiting those who can be included in 
the national political leadership . '  However ,  in the Arusha Declaration , 
leaders were said to include TANU executive committee , MP ' s ,  ministers , 
124Hopkins , op . c it . ,  p .  64 . 
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senior officials of TANU affiliated organizations , senior offic ial s 
of  parastatal or�anizations , anyone elected under any clause of the 
TANU constitution , councilors , and middle and upper-cadre civil servants . 125  
Although this group collectively plays an  important role in  the dec ision-
making process not all of them play specifically pol itical roles .  
Therefore ,  in this particular discussion , the national elite will  be 
defined as those intellectual s ,  technicians and managers in the highest 
political spheres , who formulate and ideology and translate it into 
action . 126 
At the local level the political elite consists primarily of  party 
members , i . e . , the Regional Commissioners , r egional department heads , 
members o f  the regional executive conunittee and the members of 
Regional Development Committee . Potential political elites are not 
identified because o f the lack of information pertaining to them . But 
mention will be made throughout the discussion of groups or individuals 
who have the potential for political influence . 
ELITE STRUCTURE 
Beck , et . al . , stated that there were two dimensions to the pattern 
of elite structure : el ite-elite relationships and elite-constituency 
relationships . It  would be difficult to discuss either of these aspects 
of behavior without relating them to the · ideology fo4 to a great extent , 
12 5Nyerere ,  Freedom and Socialism , op . cit . , p .  3 6 .  
126see Lester G .  Seligman , "Elite Recruitment and Political 
Development" ,  in Jason L .  Finkle and Richard w. Gable (eds ) , Political 
Development and Social Change , New York : John Wiley , 1966 . 
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elite behavior has been , at least theoretically , shaped by the dominant 
attitudes and values which exist in Tanzanian society . To summarize the 
arguments presented in the preceeding chapter , it can be stated that 
three recurring themes run through the politics and political thought 
of Tanzania : egalitarianism , mas s  participation and anti-elitism . The 
Arusha Declaration de-emphasises such values as wealth , formal education 
and skill in the recruitment of leaders in order to discourage elitism 
on the part of the leadership . However , the achievement of economic 
development and modernization usually depends on leadership by a skilled · 
and educated elite . Thus , the · Tanzanian ideo logy , while recognizing 
the importance of political leadership in the development process , attempts 
to provide a "political formula "  for appropriate leadership behavior . 12 7 
Colonial education instilled elites t  attitudes in those that were 
privileged enough to attain an education of any kind . At the end of  
British rule only 0 . 2 per cent of the population had secondary education • 
. The current generation of leaders are products of the colonial sys tem 
and still retain .many of the values which were instilled in them during 
that period . The Tanzanian formula was developed , in part , to insure 
. the protection of the majority from a dominant minority , set apart by 
virture of educational and/or occupational privilege . It tries to be 
consistent with the national ideology . Model leaders are those with a 
peasant or worker background or wh9 strongly identify with one or the 
other � Leadership is  intended to be open , freely circulating and 
1 27P . ;f . McGowan and H .  M .  K .  Wacirah , "The Evolution o f  Tanzanian 
Political Leadership" , African Studies Review , XVI I ,  1 , 1974 , p �: .180 , 
7 2  
representative o f  society at large . McGowan and Wacirah state that 
while every political system is run by a few individuals and obeyed or 
endured by many , the leaders · of Tanzania are not intended to be " . • •  a 
ruling class type o f  political elite -- closed ; intermarrying ; with 
common schooling , outlooks , and as sociation" . The Tanzanian formula 
attempts , in the face of Michels " Iron Law of Oligarchy" and other 
observed political regularities . to make sure that the leaders become 
and remain a governing stratum -- not a crucial political elite or even 
·worse a "ruling clas s "  • 128  
ELITE RECRUI TMENT 
Political recruitment is important in any study of elite behavior . 
The method of selection defines the amount of authority that wi ll be 
exercised , thus , elite recruitment can have far-reaching consequences 
for the political system . 
From the table on the following page , one can see that the recruitment 
process is a fairly well structured one . According to Selig�n ,  " • • •  
candidates emerge from a pool of eligible individuals who themselves 
are pre-selected segment of the prominent , pol itically active , skillful , 
... 
motivated and resource-endowed members of the political famil� '.' • 1 2 9  
Status , wealth and education create greater opportunities for active 
political participation in decision-making ; while the process o f  
128Ibid . , p .  184 • 
. 129see Lester G. Seligman , Recruiting Politi.cal Elites , New York : 
General Learning Press , 197 1 , p . 4 
Pha s e  l :  
E l ig ib i l i ty 
The Electorate 
(The forma l  
opportunity 
s truc ture ) 
. 
Effective 
pol i tical 
opportunity 
Sociali zatio n , - �  
resour c e s  and 
s truc ture o f  
pol itical risk 
Mo tivation 
TABLE 3 . 2 
A GENERAL MODEL OF THE POLITICAL RECRU I TMENT PROCESS 
Phase 2 :  
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Phas e  3 : Ro le 
As s ignment , Decision 
Making 
Dec i s ion-Making 
Pol itical Role 
S tructur e 
Role Ass ignment 
Rol e  Performance 
Source : Lester G .  S e l igman , Recru i ting Po l i tical Elite s , New York : General Lea�ning PFe s s , 
1971 , p .  3 . 
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socialization instill certain values and attitudes into the aspirants . 13 0 
Furthermore , if principal actors play a s ignificant role in recruitment 
they will also play a significant role in decision-making . 13 1 The 
point that came across clearly throughout Seligman ' s  work is that the 
recruitment process selects elites primarily because of certain values 
which they hold and also for their skill and competence . 
In view of these findings , it is  mos t  important to know whether 
these patterns of recruitment persist in Tanzania . I f  recruitment 
patterns correspond with the evidence presented by Seligman then an 
area of potential contradiction exists between the theory and practice 
of leadership behavior in Tanzania . Until World War II there were few 
leadership places available to Africans in Tanzania . Key positions 
were occupied by the white colonial elite . The recruitment of indigeneous 
people came during the drive for independence in the 1950 ' s .  Of the 
7 05 Tanzanian leaders identified by McGowan and Bolland only 7 . 8  per 
cent had leadership positions by 194 3 . Between 1950 and 1960 , the 
number of indigeneous· leaders grew rapidly . 13 2 
The political leadership of Tanzania is relatively youpg , 78  per 
cent of whom were in secondary school s  prior to 1940 .  Clerical and 
teaching professions were found to be the most conunon occupation among 
l30ibid . , p . 7 .  
13 1 Ibid . , p .  16 . 
132Refer to McGowan and Wacirah , op . c it . , pp . 184-185 . 
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the educated . (See Table 3 . 3 ) By 1967 , leaders with less prestigious 
occupations , i . e . , farmers , semi-skilled and skilled worker� decl ined 
markedly . Thus , if Tanzania is described as a land of peasants and 
workers the leaders themselves are not peasants or workers , neither do 
they come from such soci o .. economic backgrounds . McGowan and Wacirah 
state that " • • •  despite the fact that the vast majority o f  the population 
is comprised of  peasant , farmers and workers ,  one does not become a 
leader by starting out as a farmer , a worker or even a trader 11 • 13 3  
The present political system clearly has a preference for white-
collar workers .  Pos t  colonial patterns of  recruitment have not diverged 
significantly from colonial patterns . Two-thirds of the leaders hold 
adminis trative , educational and clerical occupation thus , many are 
concentrated in positions that hold some future potential . Although 
government has de-emphasized occupational prestige , workers , traders 
and farmers are largely excluded from leadership positions ; they only 
accounted for 4 per cent o f  the leadership between 1963-1968 . (See 
Table 3 . 4 )  There i s  a great deal o f  difficulty involved in attempting 
to separate education and occupational status , espec ially when policies 
a.re designed to enhance modernization . It is not surprising then , that 
education and/or occupational status figure largely in the recruitment 
of national political leaders . 
The elite has undergone various educational and personal experiences • • 
They have different levels of  education and ambition , different 
133 Ibid . , p .  186 .  
TABLE 3 . 3 TRENDb IN PRIMARY OCCUPATIONS AMONG TANZANIAN LEADERS 1900-1967 
Percentages 
N=7 05 
Oc cupations 
Student or Youtha 
_ Agricultural i s t  
Trader/Worker 
Ranks M+Pd 
Clerke 
College S tudent 
Teacher 
V .  A .  Leader 
Bus i ness/Profes s ional 
Conunuri cat;io n s  
University S taff 
Officers M+Pf • 
C iv i l  Serv�ntg 
Po l itic ian 
Other 
Unknown 
To 
194 0 
74 
l 
2 
2 
6 
3 
4 
l 
. g  
194 1-
194 5 
60 
1 
2 
3 
10 
4 
7 
1 
1 
1 
8 
1946- 195 1-
1950 1955  
47 18 
2 2 
2 1 
2 2 
20 2 5 
6 1 3  
1 0  12  
2 4 
2 4 
1 
2 4 
5 
-
9 8 
a = Pr imary or secondary s tudents or under 15 years . 
b = '' ..,. " , ;represents less than 1 per cent . 
c = B lank space represents 0 per cent . 
1956-
1960 
1 
2 
1 
15 
12 
13 
7 
7 
1 
2 
16 
14 
-
7 
d = Mil itary and police ranks and non-c ommi s s io ned officers 
1961 196 3 
_b -
2 
l 
10 2 
. 12  4 
9 4 
8 7 
9 1 0  
2 3 
2 3 
24 · 49 
14 1 5  
- -
8 3 · 
e = C lerk s represents c lerical - l evel employees o f  bus i ness and government . 
f = M i l i tary and pol ice c orrun i s s ioned o f f icer s . 
g = Civil Servants are executive clas s or higher . 
1965 
2 
4 
4 
9 
2 
3 
s o  
2 0  
5 
c 
h = Politicians repr e s ent elected o ffice ho l der s and fu ll- time po l i tical party worker s . 
De scriptions 
1 1 7 5 %  o f  Tanzan ia ' s  l eadership were in el ementary or secondar y  scho o l s  pr ior to 1946 . 
1967 
4 
4 
8 
2 
1 
3 
46  
1 9  
13 
21  Af ter forma l educa t ion the mo s t  preva l e nt occupations o f  Tan zanian l eader s were teachi ng or 
cl er ical pr ior to i ndependence . 
3 }  I n  1 9 5 0 ' s  other o c c upa tions were open to Afr ican s ; There fore , the table shows i ncrease in 
leade r s  ho l d i ng high c i v i l  service po s itions . 
4 1  There i s  also an incr e a s e  in leade r s  amo ng po l iti c ian s and party activ i s t s . 
5 ) By 1 9 6 7  leade r s  in s k i l l ed , semi- s kil l ed and non-univ e r s i ty occupations had d e c l i ned . 
-..J °' 
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TABLE 3 . 4 
TRENDS IN THE F I RS T  OCCUPATIONS OF TANZANIAN LEADERS 
lst As reported As reported 
Occupation (Perc entages ) in 196 3 - 64 in 1 96 5 - 6 6  
Trading 2 2 
Party Trade Union 2 2 
Worker 2 2 
Agriculture 2 2 
Conunerc ial 3 4 
Military/Policea 7 7 
Profess ional 7 7 
Clericalb 3 2  3 2  
Education/Administration 3 5 3 5  
Unknown 1 0  9 
Bas e N = 4 9 5 5 94 
a)  Military and police category combines al l ranks 
As 
in 
reported 
1967-68 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
7 
7 
3 3  
3 6 
7 
6 18 
All 
Leaders 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
6 
6 
3 2 
9 
7 0 5 
b )  Clerical category represents ranks below executive officer level and 
clerical employees of private business 
l)  There are a number o f  profess ionals because few Africans were recruited 
in such areas before independence .  
2 )  Asians and Europeans were the main actors in commerc ial activities . 
Source :  McGowan and Wacirah , op . cit . ,  p .  188 . 
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identification and ideologies and different expectations ; yet they 
are engaged , with varying degrees o f  harmony , in the maj or tasks of 
government . 134 However , there is a noticeable amount of agreement among 
them concerning the goals of the system . For example ,  9 2  per cent of 
the elite interviewed by Hopkins believed that democracy was the best 
form of government for Tanzania , and their support for democratic 
procedures was said to be very strong . 13 5  
African Socialism is a n  important ideological concept among many 
of the elite . There is basic agreement that the political sys tem should 
be arranged in such a manner that the goals and obj ectives  of the polity 
are realized . Most  of the elites admire Nyerere and his leadership 
capabil ities . According to McGowan and Wac irah ,  Nyerere is well  
thought of not only because he shares the ideology of any elite member 
but because he has " • • •  a direct down-to-earth approach to leadership and 
a strong , sometimes religious commitment to acting on principle 11 • 13 6 
Thus , support for Nyerere among the elite , is almost universal . He is 
a unifying figure within and without the political leadership and this 
has more than symbolic implications because it is also important in 
the resolving of conflict . 
There is a strong disposition on the part of the elite members to 
view interrelations among the political elite in terms of  hierarchy . 
134 k '  ' t  7 0  Hop ins , op . ci . ,  p .  • 
135Ibid . , PP • 89-95 . 
l36rbid . , p .  103 . 
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Furthermore , there is also a firm commitment to viewing the elite (and 
society at large ) . as cohesive and psychologically homogeneous , even 
if ethnically and socially heterogeneous . This is  mos t  important in 
its implications for the stability of the Tanzanian political sys tem . 
ELITE CONSTITUENCY BEHAVIOR 
The elite has certain views regarding the rights and duties of the 
citizens , which while not overtly undemocratic , express the desire to 
keep criticism to a minimum . Many see the role of  the citizen in the 
nation-building process in terms of carrying out the policies outlined 
by the government . The citizen ' s  role in the political process ,  e . g . , 
voting , is given less emphasis because it seems less important in terms 
of the priorities of the system . The stress on nation-building functions 
then , seem hardly surprising and the level of participation in such 
activities is crucial to the success or failure of government programs . 
Without such participation , policies remain l ittle more than paper 
commitments . 
The elite expects its constituents to be obedient , defining a "good" 
•Citizen as one who shares in the burdens of national development . Many 
leaders , primarily administrators ,  share the view that the masses do 
not understand what they are trying to do , believing that only a few 
of  their constituents are fully cognisant with what development entails . 
Even though they feel that the civil duti7s �f the citizens are secondary 
they still expec ted him to be an important participant in the political 
b t 1 1 th t t . d 137 process -- u arge y on e ou pu si e .  
137�. t P •  106 . 
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ELITE ETIQUETTE 
The hallmark of elite-elite etiquette in Tanzania is the stress on 
co-operation , conformity and adherence to the offic ial line , i . e . , the 
"Party Line " . The norms of  the society rej ects open competition among 
the leaders . Discussion and debate are the primary methods by which 
disagreement is resolved . Recourse to more drastic measures of settle-
ment is often avoided by compromise and accommodation . 
Conformity in elite-elite behavior has not always been easy to 
achie�e prima�ily because of  the variety o f  views and expectations found 
among those in top leadership positions . After the union with Zanzibar 
in 1964 , the overall character of the leadership changed with the 
inclusion of the more revolutionary , Marxist-oriented Zanzibaris . However , 
the elite ' s  emp�asis on unity led it initially to accomodate many divergent 
points of view .  When f igures such as Abdul Rahman Mohammed (Bubu ) , a 
Marxist ,  threatened the unity and �tability of  the elite they were 
removed from office . S imilarly , other Marxists and Maoists were put in 
detention for overtly deviant behavior . It  should be said that such 
behavior does  not constitue a regular pattern of elite-elite behavior . 
Rather than being permanent features o f  the Tanzanian political scene , 
measures such as dismissal s  and detentions have , according to Cranford 
Pratt , "waxed and waned in direct correlation with fluctuations in the 
. 
. 
• . 'I 138 tranquility of  the political scene • 
Interaction among the elite is governed primarily by the values and 
138see Cranford Pratt , The Critical Phase in Tanzania 194 5 - 1968 : 
Nyerere and the Emergence of  a Socialis t Strategy , Cambridge University 
Pres s , 197 6 , pp . 186-187 . 
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norms acquired during socialization . They agree on the rules of the 
game and are more unified on questions pertaining to democracy than on 
ques tions of  economic goals . There is a s trong commitment to the ideal s 
of  soc ialism and a firm belief that development and modernization should 
be carried out according to such principles .  In  working to achieve thi s , 
the members of the political elite real ize the need for unity and the 
importance of minimizing conflict within their ranks . Conflict has been 
I 
relatively non-violent coup d etats , political ass inations and the like 
have been noticeably absent in Tanzania compared to countries such as 
Nigeria or Uganda . 
Elite consensus , that is , agreement among role  expectations has 
been and continues to be strong . Such expectations are shared and 
valued highly by the national political elite . There i s , however , some 
discrepancy in role consensus between administrators and legislators . 
The former view themselves as pol icy-makers when , in fact , they are not , 
which leads in some ins tances , to a conflict in roles . When Hopkins 
confronted a group of legislators with a hypothetical situation in which 
they disliked a proposed government measure , the responses were mixed , 
ranging from weak to strong . The weak respondent would accept , the 
moderate would criticize but accept , and the strong would block the 
measure . Despite the varied viewpoints , Hopkins collected enough evidence 
to prove that , to ' a  large extent tqere was partial agreement among the 
. 139 elite on questions of important role aspects . 
1391bid . , pp . 168-17 1 .  
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Elite-constituency behavior is  largely regulated by the elite ' s  
view of its cons tituency . The elite believe its constituency needs to be 
led and guided so that it may at some future date participate more 
fully in the political process .  Thus , to a certain degree , a kind o f  
paternalism is evident i n  the relationship between the elite and the 
mass . While the elite feels a strong sense of responsibility to its 
constituents , it can hardly be said that they consider themse lves 
responsible to the masses , despite Nyerere ' s  statements that the "will"  
of the people must ultimately prevail . 
Members of the constituency are , for the mos t  part , onlookers in 
the political arena . Nyerere himsel f , in sununing up the political and 
economic conditions of Tanzanian soc iety , stated that the people were 
140 largely unable to govern themselves . At best , ·  the people �Tould chose 
their leaders who , in turn , would be entrusted with serving the community 
14 1  thus , helping the people to help themselves . . The authoritative 
allocation of values into concrete programs cannot b� left up to the 
constituency for they have neither the political education , nor the 
political skill and intelligence requir�d .. Moreover , the need to · 
�ranslate certain dominant values into a common interest necessitates 
. . 1 . . ' d . 
142 the growth of persons who can rise above particu aristic consi erations . i 
14 0Nyerere , Freedom and Unity ,1 op . cit . , pp . 19 5-196 
14 1Nyerere , Freedom and Development ,  op . cit . , pass im . 
14 2G . Lowell Field and John Higley , El ites and Non-Elites : The 
Possibilities and Their Side Effects , Massachusettes : Warner Modular 
Publ ication , 197 3 .  
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TECHNIQUES OF CONTROL 
Unl ike many developing countries ,  the use of  violent techniques as 
a me ans of control has been infrequent in Tanzania . After events such 
as the army mutiny in 1964 and student protest in 1966 the level of 
political tolerance was relatively low and suppression of ideas did take 
place , Time and time again Nyerere stresses that Tanzanian society should 
not be bui lt by violent methods but this does not mean that political leaders 
never use or threaten to use force . To be sure ,  the political regime has 
to demonstrate its regulative capabil ity in order to retain its credibi lity 
but there i s  little evidence to show that totalitarian rule is  coming .  The 
conunitment of the elite to democracy and democratic procedures is unquestioned . 
This has been reinforced , to a great degree , by the type of one-party system 
that has developed . TANU attempts to embrace all element� in society and 
thus , acts as the maj or mechanism of control . The civil service , the army 
and other important and potentially dangerous elements in society are all 
subsumed under the wings of the Party . 
Although a certain amount of indoctrination i s  carried out by the 
. ' 
Party and other organizations ,  e . g . , NUTA and the TYL , generally speaking , 
the regime does not rely primarily on mass  manipulation or suppress ion 
as primary methods of control though the occasional use of force has been 
demonstrated . 
THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP : AN OVERVIFiW 
.• 
Of the various types of elite systems ou�lined , Tanzania appears 
to fit into the non-crystallized category . However ,  there are certain 
features of this type , e . g . , its tot.alitarian nature , that clearly fail s 
to correspond with the reality of political leadership in Tanzania .  In 
84 
analyzing the leader ship according to the typology offered by Tsurutani 
there are proble�s in locating the category into which Tanzania falls . 
Clearly , there is a strong commitment to development and moderni zation . 
noreover , achievements of the leadership illustrate a great degree of  
political intelligence and skill on  their part . Policy pronouncements 
show a critical assessment of actual and potential obstacles to 
development ,  the resources available and the capabilities of  existing 
socio-political values and institutions . However , the leadership has , 
thus far , been unable to fulfill many of  its development obj ectives , e . g . , 
significantly narrowing the gap between rich and poor . A lack of 
intellectual s ,  technicians and managers in the higher echelons of  the 
political hierarchy has been a primary obstacle . 
The level of  development in Tanzania requires leaders o f  a high 
calibre and in great numbers to operate the decision-making machinery . 
Important decisions are not only difficult to make , but also dangerous 
because the decision-making process has not yet been fully 
. 
institutionalized . 143 Thus , not only is the leadership concerned with 
the tasks of  development and modernization , it  is al so involved with 
building and maintaining the political foundations on which the soc iety 
must be built .  These are , to b e  sure , formidable tasks and it  will 
be sometime before one can assess their success in thi s  field . 
The dominance of  the national elite relative, to the local pol itical 
elite and other sub-national groups is evident . The abolition of 
l4 3see Hopkins , op . cit . , Ch . 2 
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traditional sources o f  authority took place soon after independence , 
even though some elements of  traditional pol itical leadership still 
persists . 144 Although local political leaders such as field officers 
or party workers are given a great deal of scope and influence in 
certain areas of  development policy their areas of jurisdiction are 
c learly outlined . For the mos t  par t ,  they lack the technical competence 
necessary to perform effectively in the decision-making process . 
Jrux-thermore , the authority patterns in the society severely restrict 
their powers . 14 5  Duties and function are def ined by law , which coupled 
with the frequent movement of local political leaders , blocks the 
possibility o f  developing local bases o f power . 146 Thus , the dominance 
of the national elite in the decision-making process is almost complete . 
They command and monopolize political intelligence and skill and 
possess the abi lity to absorb sub-national political elites into various 
organizations , e . g . , TANU , Development Committees and paras tatal 
organizations , thus , providing outlets or "cushions " for frustrated or 
d l ' t ' 1 147  severe po i ica careers . 
Elite members come primarily from the well-to-do families . A 
�somewhat surpris ing rev elation in view of stated socialist intentions 
to make the country into a society of peasants and workers .  This offers 
144N .  N. Miller , " The Political Survival of Traditional Leadership '.' , 
in Saul and Cliffe ( ed s ) , op . cit . , 'PP · 145-153 . 
14 5Bi  ' t  3 11 enen , op . ci . ,  p .  • 
14 6rbid . , p .  3 32 .  
147seligman , 197 1 , p .  3 (Ref.er to diagram) . 
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support for the theories outlined in Field and Higley that elites arise 
because o f  inequalities in individual endowments or that elites come 
about because they are socially advantaged in the competition for power 
and influence . 148  Education and status have clearly influenced the 
recruitment of elites making for contradiction within the leadership 
formula . 
At least 44 , i . e . , 37 per cen� o f  all ethnic groups in Tanzania are 
concerned , the leadership is  representative . (Table 3 . 5  illustrates 
those that count for more than 1 . 5  per cent of the leaders ) .  7 of the 
10 largest groups are represented in the leadership , but 100 or so 
groups are not included though they share 28 per cent of the leadership 
and make up 56 per cent of the population . Bondei , Ngoni , Arab and 
Mixed are slightly over-representative . Although there are strains in 
the leadership , it is not tribal but rather competition between the 
more developed and less developed group� and the regional homelands .  
Progressive regions such as Kilimanj aro and Tanga are over-represented 
relative to such areas like the Makonde in the South , which i s  
relatively undeveloped . 149 The National Assembly reflects the tribal 
proportions found in the nation . However ,  the administrative elite are 
over-represented of such tribes as the Haya , Chagga , and Nyasuka , while 
148Field and Higley , op . cit . , p .  6 .  
149J . Gus Liebenow , Colonial Rule and Political Development . in 
Tanzania : The Cas e of the Makonde , Evanston : Northwestern University 
Pres s , 197 1 ,  pp . 12-15 . 
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TABLE 3 . 5 
RANK ORDER COMPARISON OF THE ETHNIC COMPOS ITION OF THE 
TANZANIAN LEADERSHIP AND THE TOTAL TANZANIAN POPULAT I ON 
Leadership Perc entage Ethnic Population 
Rank Order Lead ership Group Rank Ordera 
1 11 . 6  Chagga 6 
2 10 . 6  Haya 4 
3 6 . 6  Pare/Sambae 5 
4 6 . 4  Bonde! 58 
5 .  s . 1  Sukuma· · . : 1 
6 4 . 8  Nyamweri 2 
7 4 . 5 _ Nyakyula 10 
8 3 . 6 _Ngoni 34 
9 3 . 3  Zigna 19 
10 3 . 2  Arab 7 4  
.11 2 . 5 Hehe 9 
1 2  1 .  7 Zaramo 14 
4 . 0  Non-Tanzanian 
3 . 8  Mixed 
2 8 . l  Other Groups 
Base N=687 N = 8 , 68 6 , 68 1° 
{a ) Calculated from the 1 957  census data (See Tanganyika 1963 ) 
1966 . 
% o f  
Popu lat ion 
3 . 7  
3 . 7  
3 . 7 
0 . 4  
1 2 . 6  
4 . 2  
2 . 5 
I 1 . 2 ' 
1 . 5 
0 . 2  
2 . 9  
2 . 1  
2 . 8 
0 . 0 2 
5 5 . 7  
and Tanzania 
{b) This total represents 8 , 66 5 Africans , 19 , 088 Arabs and 2 , 2 57 Coloureds . 
' 
. Source : McGowan and Wacirah , o.e . cit . , p . 193 • 
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the Sukuma , Makonde and Hehe are under-repres ented . On the whole , 
tribalism is not .a s ignificant fac tor in r einforc ing economic and social 
cleavages among the el ite . 1 5 0 Rel ig ion , too , plays an insignificant part 
in e lite behavior ,  though Chris tians are over-represented relative to 
Musl ims . 1 51 In summary , it can be said that the background charac ter-
i s tics of the elite and the emphas i s  on conformity works to downplay 
the differences between the groups . However , with increas ing moderni zation 
the r epre sentativeness of the leadership may become an i ssue of great 
political impor tance . 
The rate of circul ation among the Tanzanian e lite has been , for 
the greater part , r e latively smal l .  A negligible propor tion o f  the current 
generation o f  leaders lost their s tatus but simi larly only a sma l l  
proportion o f  them have retained their pos itions . 8 0  per c ent o f  the 
leadership have changed roles at leas t three times within an 8 year time 
per iod . There is upward mobility , but the rate o f  l eadership formation 
is slow . Furthermore ,  new top l eadership pos itions tend to be filled 
with individuals from among the ranks of the l eader ship .
1 52 
-SUMMARY AND CONCLUS IONS 
From the forego ing analys is of the Tanzanian pol i tical l eadership 
it is pos s ible to make the fol lowing remarks . Firstly , the norms which 
govern elite behavior work toward the maintainance . of a relatively s table 
I 
political sys tem . The cohes iveness and integr i ty o f  the national 
1 50H k '  . ' t  75 7 8  o p  ins , op . c 1 . , pp - • 
1 51
McGowan and Wac irah , op . c it . , P •  19 5 . 
1 5 2 Ibid . , p .  199 . 
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leadership ensures i t  full control of the decis ion-making process at the 
expens e of local ,political and other elite s . An examination of the 
elite background revealed that only thos e  of a certain educa tional cal ibr e  
and pol itical persuas ion are co-opted into the ranks o f  the govern ing 
elite . Thus , the elite national and sub-national , could be identified 
by a s trong cormnitment to development and moderni zation and the 
e stablislunent o f  social i s t  principles . The national elite provides the 
ideology and the methods to carry i t  out . The Tanzanian approach to 
socialism as McGowan and Wac irah s tate , " • • •  i s  in many ways an embodiment 
of the high soc ial and moral values of the Pres ident and his immediate 
aides 11 • 153 
The national pol itical elite is the maj or force in the deci s ion-
making process not only for its s trong cormni tment but also because it 
monopolizes the political intelligence and skill necessary to operate 
the decision-making machinery . The pol itical party is instrumental in 
recruitment to elite positions because it channels the best recruits into 
the national executive and administration or into the par ty itse l f  at 
the expense of other organi zations and institutions . Fur thermore , 
despite scattered pockets of resistance , the national e lite has managed 
to control the population integrating and co-opting , wherever pes s ible , 
sub-national groups into the development process .  
The leadership has been relatively s tabl e ,  avoiding frequent turnover 
. . 
of personnel in high political positions . The average age of the leadership 
153 Ibid . , p .  202 .  
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is around 4 0- 5 0  and can be expec ted to keep their pos i tions , further 
s lowing down the rate o f creation of new leadership pos i tions . Thi s  
may wel l  result in a widening gap between the leader s and the mas s e s . 
In order to avoid such a situation and to further its social i s t  
obj ectives , the national elite must seek to create more leader ship 
posi tions at the local leve l . The extention o f  decis ion-making 
powers to sub-national pol itical elites will eventual ly come about with 
the increas e in demands on the political sys tem . Increases in the l evel 
of development wil l  result in a multiplication of problems at the 
center . Nyerere has already s een the need for thi s , hence the po l icy 
of "Decentrali zation " in 197 2 . However , for the time be ing , the 
national poli tical elite continues to be the maj or decis ion-makers in 
the proce s s  o f  development and modern i zation . The value system , 
selection and recruitment process guarantees them a dominant pos i tion 
in the political sys tem . 
CHAPTER IV 
THE POLITICAL PARTY AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Political parties whe rever they exis t , o ften play a crucial role 
in the po litical process i f  permi tted to perform the ir functions 
effective ly . The overriding ques tion which permeates many dis cuss ions 
relating to political parties concerns the degree o f  democracy which 
exi sts within their structure and the extent to which such parties 
facilitate or hinder the smooth functioning of the political sys tem . 
This issue i s  e specially relevant here because of the conflicting views 
reqardinq the existence {and non-existence)  of democracy in s ingle-party 
sys tems such as that . found in Tanzania . 
Although the hypothes is examined here primarily concerns the 
political e lites use of the po litical party (TANU ) , as the main vehic l e  
for national deve lopment the broader questions concerning defini tion 
and party type s must be elaborated on in order that ·the discus s ion be 
more meaningfu l . Before i t  can be established that TANU is the ma j or 
ins trument in the deve lopment of the Tanzanian people , it is  necessary 
to point out the problems surrounding any attempt at de finition and 
clas s i f ication of parties and party sys tems . 
TOWARD A DEFINITION OF POLITICAL PARTY 
A po litical party is most o ften described as a group which s eeks 
to place i ts members at the head of goverrunent and thereby gain contro l , 
in contras t to an interest group which merely s eeks to obtain or maintain 
certain des ired values . Fred R .  von der Mehden des cribes a politi cal 
9 1  
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party as " an organized group which seeks the control of the personne l 
and policies of government -- a group that pays at least lip service 
to a principle or a set of principles , including the electoral proces s "  154 
I 
Coleman and Rosberg strike a similar note in the ir study s tating that 
"political parties are associations formally organized with the explicit 
and dec lared purpo s e  of acquiring and/or maintaining legal control , 
either s ingular ly or in coalition or e lectoral competition with other 
similar associations , over the personne l  and the policy of the government 
of an actual or prospective sovereign s tate 11 • 155  Although thes e  two 
des criptions convey an idea of what is mea!lt by a po litical party , they 
are but very narrow descriptions and do not il luminate the difficulties 
encountered in defining politi cal parties in deve loping societies . 
Clement Moore comes much .c loser in outlining the obstac les in 
characterizing the Neo -Des tour in Tunisia . He .states , "The categories 
of Western political s cientis ts • • •  cannot adequately explain Tunis ia ' s  
dominant party . The Neo � · De s tour resembles the Congres s Party o f  India , 
the CPP of Ghana , and various terri torial of fshoots o f  the RDA in French-
speaking Black Africa more than it resembles European pol itical parties . 
Bo litical scientists have not yet devised a generally accepted model to 
characterize thes e  newer but highly s tructured parties . However , they 
may be called " national " parties , and they have a number of traits in 
common . They all originated as elite and then as mas s parties in re action ' 
15 4Fred R. von der Mehden , op . cit . , p .  5 4 . 
1 5 5s ee James s .  Coleman and Car l G .  Rosberg , Jr . , ( eds ) , Po litical 
Parties and National I ntegration in Tropi cal Africa , Berkely : University 
of Cal ifornia Pres s , 1964 , p .  2 .  
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t o  a colonial situation . Their leaders assimilated the political culture 
of  the colonial power which to a greater or lesser extent cons tituted 
the ground ru les of the conflict betwe en the two 11 • 156 
There appears to be a general consensus that a po litical party is 
an instrument to gain power and to govern but when talking about political 
parties in developing countries there are many additional factors which 
should be noted . The single-par.ty system , which predominates in many 
developing countries , is  seen both as an instrument of po litical education 
and as a means to build support for the governing elite . 15 7  In the 
previous chapter , it was stated that one of the maj or tasks o f  the 
decision-makers was that of national development . But in order to 
carry this out , the elite needs the backing and support of the population 
at large or some signi ficant portion of it . In order to enlis t such 
sup.Port the political party is seen as the main vehicle for the 
· mobilization of the people . 
Thus , when defining a political party , it should be borne in mind 
that in developing countries a party means more than an instrument 
through which the decision-makers govern . This may well be a cons equence 
.. 
of the differences in origin . For as Macridis states , political parties 
· in most of the ex-colonial countries emerged " in order to cope with a 
series of problems with which their Western counterparts were not directly 
involved ; national emancipation _ and identity , the creation of a set of 
156clement Moore , "The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia " , World Po l i t i c s , 
XIV , April 1962 , p .  463 . 
157Refer to Roy c .  Macridis ,  · Ced) Political Parties : Contemporary 
Trends and Ideas , New York t Harper and Row , 1967 , P •  16 . 
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values within which political participation would be implemented , the 
creation of legi�imized governmental institutions , the es tablishment 
of new norms conduc ive to indus triali zation , the creation of governmental 
institution to distribute bene fits while incul cating support , and last 
but not leas t ,  the management o f  conflict • • •  1 1
158 
I f , as Kenneth Janda s tates , definitions should be constructed in ; . 
light of the purposes which they serve , then defining a political party 
5\S an Ofiin:i. zation that pe:r:;aYie i  a woal. of. plaQin; 1t& avowell ;r;ep;re::ii enta.tiveli 
' 
in government positions is  far from adequate , cons idering the stated 
. 
. 
. f h "  
15 9 intentions o t is paper . Still less satis factory for purposes here 
would be Sigmund Neumann ' s  description of what the cruc ial factors of 
po litical parties are . He s tates that : 
"A def inition o f  "party " might as wel l begin with 
its s imple word derivation . To become a "party "  
to something a lways means identification with 
one group and d i f ferentiation from another . Every 
party in its very e s s e nce s igni fies partnership in 
a particular organization and s eparation from 
others by a spec ific program 
Such an initial description , to be sure , indicates 
that the very defini tion of party pre suppo ses a 
democratic climate and hence makes i t  a mi snomer 
in every dictatorship . A one-party sys tem ( l e  
parti unique ) is a contradiction in itsel f . "TOO 
However , Neumann ' s  definition points out one of the probl ems of the 
one-party sys tem which any discuss ion of such sys tems mus t take into 
1 5 8Ibid . , pp .1 5- 16 .  
159Kenneth Janda , A Conceptual Framework for the Comparati·; .- Analys i s  
o f  Pol itical Parties , California : ·  Sage Publications , 197 0 ,  p .  6 _ . 
' l.60 S igmund Neumann , Modern Po·l itical Parties , Chicago : Univers ity of 
Chic ago Pre s s , 1956 , p. 3 95 . 
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account and which wi ll b e  elaborated on . Here , it is necessary to point 
out the diff icul�ies involved in attempting to present an adequate 
definition of pol i tical partie s  in moderni zing societies .  Not only i s  
it hard to differentiate the development o f  such parties from the growth 
of the society and the s tate , it is also hard to def ine the ro le o f  the 
party because it is one that is constantly changing in line with the 
other changes that are taking place as the society become s more complex 
and roles become more specific . This means that , to a great degree , 
the parties which now exist in developing countries are shaped by the 
entire socio-political framework o f  such societies . In such 
c ircums tances , although pol itical partie s  can be looked upon as 
ins truments by which soc io-po litical forces are channe led into the task 
of nation-building , these same forces are also at work changing and in 
certa in ins tances trans forming the shape of the party . 
PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS 
The s tudy of pol itical parties has long been of interest because of 
their critical role in the political process . S tudies l ike thos e o f  
. h 1 16
1 162 163 f � Mic e , v .  o .  Key and Duverger , to name but a ew , have proved 
invaluable for the ins ights they have provided into the role , s tructure 
and functions of political parties even though the emphasis res ted 
16 1Robert Michels , Political �arties : A sociological Study of the 
Ol igarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy , Glencoe , IL : Free Press , 
1949 . 
l62v . o .  Key , Jr . ,  Political Parties and Pressure Groups , New York : 
Thomas Y .  Crowe l l , 1942 . 
163 
Maurice Duverger , Political Parties , New York : John Wiley , 1954 . i 
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particularly with parties in Wes tern societies -- perhaps less so in 
Duverger . Concen�ration on the roles o f  such parties in the functioning 
and the deve lopment of the new African societies ( in thi s particular 
instance , Tanzania ) is important not only because parties r eveal much 
about the nature of African po litics but also because they are impor tant 
determinants of the unfolding African pol i tical scene . 
Before dealing specifically with the party sys tem in Tanzania i t  i s  
useful t o  have a general idea o f  Africa ' s  po l itical sys tems because i t  
sets the ensuring discuss ion in clearer perspective . Any meaningful 
clas sifi cation of African par�y systems is almo s t  impos s ible because o f  
their relatively brief exis tence , the fluidity and change in the Afr ican 
po litical scene and the mixture o f  a multitude o f  elements which mus t  be 
taken into cons ideration . Although the typo logy pres ented by Co leman is 
now somewhat outdated , it i s  still relevant to the s tudy of Afr ican 
pol i tical parties in many ways . He d ivided such sys tems into four main 
categories ; territories without po litical partie s , one-party dominant 
sys tems , comprehensive nationali s t  and competitive-party systems . 164 
The fluidity o f  the African political sys tem is c learly borne out here , 
for at the time when Coleman presented this typology , Angola , Mozambique , 
and Ethiopia were included in terr itor ies wi thout pol itical partie s .  Today , 
thes e  former Portugues e colonies have won their independence and have 
established par ties with a s trong Marxis t  bias and mi litary rule has 
been e s tabl ished in Ethiopia . In the light of recent events , one would 
16 4see James s .  Coleman , " The Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa " , in 
Almond and Coleman { eds ) op . c it . , ·1960 , pp . 286-287 . 
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not include Uganda or Zanz ibar in the " competitive-par ty sys tems " 
category as Co lem�n did . Quite the contrary . Party politics i s  non-
exis tant in Uganda where the whims of Amin and his menagerie of army 
officers have replaced the modicum of democratic dec i s ion-making that 
previously exis ted . Zanz ibar united with Tanganyika in 1964 and thus 
formed the United Republic of Tanzania . But ess ential ly , Zanz ibar 
remains unchanged . I t  has persued an independent fore ign and domestic 
pol icy and the Marxis t  dominated Afro-Shirazi Party i s  now the only 
legal party on the island . 
Co leman was c learly not unaware o f  the change s  that such sys tems 
were undergoing by the number of obs ervations and caveats that he made . 
At the time when he wrote , he s tated that the exi sting po litical groups 
should be cal led a "par ty sys tem" only with very cons iderable reservation , 
ful ly reali zing that valid j udgements re lating to the character of a 
party sys tem can only be made over a reasonable period o f  time . That h i s  
typologie s should be ac cepted with some degree of flexibility i s  evidenced 
by his s tatement relating to the lack of permanency in the · emerging 
par ty sys tems . He s tates , "At this s tage in Africa ' s  po litical deve lop-
ment the pattern of pol itical groups refl ects the overriding fact tha t 
the systems thems elves are indeterminate . This makes i t  necessary to 
emphas i ze again that the mos t  rewarding mode of analys is is that which 
165 focuses upon trends rather than upon systems " .  
I 
In addi tion , Coleman po inted out that his classification o f  countries 
according to " no-party " , "one-party " , and " competitive-par ty sys tems " were 
lG Sibid . , p .  294 
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no more than a " s nap- shot "  inventory of the patterning of parties at a 
s ingle point in t,ime . With the benefit of hindSi ght the validity o f  that 
s tatement holds true as much then as it does today . Writing a few years 
later , it was c lear to s ee that Coleman and Rosberg focus ed primar i ly on 
trends rather than sys tems and thus , noted that the trend in sub- Saharan 
166 
Africa was toward s ingle-party sys tems . However ,  in his earlier 
study , which conc entrated primari ly on the general characteristic s and 
patterning of political parties , one of the mos t  s tr iking revelation was 
the diversity and complexity of African pol i tical sys tems along with the 
highly transitional character o f  po litical phenomena . The break-up o f  
the o ld colonial system released certain forces which gave r i s e  to new 
pol i tical sys tems and placed power in the hands o f  groups unaccustomed 
to its use . Thus , an atmosphere of instability and unpredictability 
developed e specially in regard to political authority . In such a s tate 
of f lux , po litical parties became l i ttle more than instruments o f  
particular groups concerned not with pol icy but with the nature o f  the 
167 
political sys tem itsel f . S ince their concern i s  not primari ly wi th 
the party po litics but with their power po sitions within the new order , 
the s tudy o f  par ty systems , per s e , is  o f  little worth in furthering 
greater unders tanding o f  the socio-political forc es in developing nations . 
An examination o f  the trends in party evo lution in sub-Saharan 
Africa clearly shows as Coleman and Rosberg s tate that there "has been 
I 
l66col eman and Rosberg , op . cit . , p .  4 .  
167Almond and Coleman , op . c it . , pp . 3 12-313 . 
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the progressive consol idation o f  one-par ty dominance after 
independence 11 • 168 Although this trend has been disrupted in recent 
years wi th the predominance of the military in the political affairs o f  
countr ies such a s  Ghana , Nigeria , and Uganda , wherever . ·parties exi s t  in 
tropical Africa they tend overwhe lmingly to be of the one-party type . 
The difficulties involved in developing a c las s i f ication scheme of 
African one-par ty systems are s imilar to thos e  encountered in constructing 
a g eneral typology . However ,  Col eman and Ro sberg draw a dis tinction 
between two general tendencies in uni-party or one-party dominant s tates , 
(1) the "pragmatic-pluralis tic " pattern , and ( 2 ) the 'revolutionary­
centrali zing "  trend . 169 Parties of the latter type tend to be , according 
to the analys is pres ented , overtly and compu l s ively preoccupied with 
ideology which is "programmatic and trans formative "  ( in . rel ation to the 
socio-economic moderni zation of present day Afr ican soc iety )  and 
mil i tantly neutrali s t , Pan-Africanis t ,  and national i s ti c  {as far as the ir 
relationships with other Afr ican states and the external world is concerned ) . 
Populism , egalitarianism and a s trong commi tment to development and 
partic ipation feature s trongly in such types .  Their s truc tures are 
�monol ithic and s trongly central ized, usually managing complete fusion 
with other groups . 
Pragmatic-pluralis tic parties tend to place les s  emphas is �n 
ideology and are less concerned about their relationship with former 
168 . . 4 Coleman and Rosberg , op . c it . , p .  • 
169Ibid . ,  p . 6 
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colonial powers .  Their commi tment to the level o f  partic ipation and 
mobili zation is s ,ignificantly le s s  and they tolerate a looser relationship 
between the party and other assoc iations in a climate of " tolerated but 
control led pluralism11 • 17 0 
The classi ficatory s cheme outl ined by Coleman and Rosberg i s  
somewhat more sophisticated than that pres ented b y  Macridis . His mor e  
general schema enables him t o  group a l l  one-party systems together o n  
th e  bas is o f  three f ac tors , support , organization and modes o f  ac tions 
and functions . 17 1 Using these thre e  var iable s , he distinguished 
between competitive party systems ( two or multi-party sys tems ) and 
integrative party sys tems (one-party sys tems ) • The mo st g laring 
shortcoming o f  such a typology is its failur e  to illustrate the 
differences among party systems within the groupings thems elves . C l early , 
not all integrative party systems ar e alike and the typo logy i s , thus , 
mis leading inso far as it pre supposes that party sys tems such as those 
found in the Soviet Union , Cuba and Tanzania are sufficien tly s imi lar to 
be grouped under one heading . 
Even after making allowance for the period o f  time in which he wro te , 
faults can still be attributed to the c las sification scheme pre s ented by 
17 2 
von der Mehden . His survey o f  par ty sys tems led him to establish 
three categories which were fur ther broken down . His first category 
l 7 0ibid . , p .  7 .  
17 1Macridis , op . ci t .  pp. 2 0-2 2 . 
17 2F . R .  von der Mehden , op . c i t .  H i s  c lassi fication is based on the 
political sys tems which exis ted in· 1964 . 
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consis ted of " non- competitive systems " compr is ing states that have no 
parties or in which parties do not play effective governmental ro les , 
e . g . , Haiti , Iran , Libya and Saudi Arabia ; one-par ty or multi-par ty-
proletar iat s tate s , e . g . , China , North Korea and North Vietnam and one-
party s tates , e . g . , *Ghana , *Mali , Tunisia and Tanganyika (now Tanzania ) � 
His s econd category cons is ted o f  " s emi-competitive sys tems " included one-
party dominant states , e . g . , Mexico , Gambia and India and ; two-party 
dictatorial s tate s , e . g . , Morocco , Nicaragua and South Africa . The 
. third category comprised the " competitive par ty systeml' ' which were 
. t . two-party democratic s tates , e . g . , Jamaica , Kenya and ; multi-party 
sys tems , e . g .  , Argentina , Chile and Lebanon:. 
From a cursory glance at this s chema , it is c lear that the degr ee o f  
competition i n  the system is determined large ly b y  the number o f  exis ting 
parties , than by the internal working of the party thems elves . In other 
words , it seems that the greater the number of partie s ,  the more 
competitive the sys tem is thought to be . With the bene fit of hinds ight , 
this is c learly not the case though the adher ents o f  pluralism would 
s trongly disagree . I t  is  not surpris ing that von der Mehden ' s  c las s i f ication 
should have taken such a form cons idering the relative ly br ief exis tence 
f f th . l '  d . d d 
17 3  o many o e countries iste a s  i n  epen ent s tates . 
17 3�. ,  p .  6 5 . 
* The party system has s ince ended in such countr i es . 
* 
In view o f  
* The contemporary political situation in Jamaica is s t i l l  very f luid 
even tho.ugh the constitutional two-party sys tem formally exists . 
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this , the "high inc idence of a lack of party competition" which he 
discovered should. not come as a complete surprise . 
In general , a plethora o f  definitions and tYP9logies o f  pol itical 
parties and par ty sys tems exist . Political par ties may be author i tarian 
and democratic , integrative and representative , ideological and pragmatic , 
national and regional , democratic and revo lutionary , mass and elite to 
name but a few . The mos t  widely used c lassif ication for typologies seem ,  
however , to be based on the number o f  parties ;  one-party , two-party and 
mul ti-party . Other s inc lude closed or competitive , aggregative and 
ideological , integrative and repre sentative . I t  appears that for the 
purposes here , those c las s ification� deal ing specifical ly with one-party 
dominant s tates are particularly useful . It is believed that the 
Tanzanian political sys tem can be analyzed us ing many' of the cri teria 
outl ined by Co leman and Rosberg , i . e ,  ideology , popular partic ipati�n , and 
organi zational aspects . The aim will not be primarily to determine whether 
Tanzania: should be clas sif ied as a " s emi-competitive " or "competitive" 
sys tem or whether i t  exhibits a "pragmatic-plural i s tic pattern" or a 
"revolutionary-c entral izing trend " albeit these are important aspects . 
The maj or purpos e  will be to determine the role that the political 
�arty plays in national integration . Some of the more important ques tions 
which will be examined wi l l  revolve around the origins of the party ; its 
activities , compo s i tion organi zatiqn ,  and struc ture ; the conditions 
under which it operates ,  i . e .  its pol itical , soc ial and economic 
environment , and , the goals and obj ectives which it seeks to bring about . 
1 03 
PARTIES AND NATI ONAL INTEGRATION 
The Tanganyi�an African National Union is the only legal par ty in 
Tanzania , but a s ingle-party sys tem does not mean the party is 
undemocratic , though some observers o f  pol itics in the Third World tend 
to equate democracy wi th the exis tence of two or more partie s .  There 
has not been much experi ence o f  a s ingl e  ruling party until quite recently 
and the . typologies formulated in the early 1960 ' s  such as those outlined 
earlier focus ed primarily on the ir dynamism . Thi s  i s  s een in the 
labeling of such party sys tems as "revolutionary-centralizing " , 
"revolutionary mass movement regimes " , etc . Parties were seen as more 
dynamic and tougher than they rea�ly were . These ear ly typologies 
conveyed an inaccurate picture of newly formed parties because they 
were unable to fulfill many of their development programs . The l iteratur e  
on African po litics, which highlighted such failures , tended to reduc e 
the importance o f  political parties and after numerous military coups in 
the mid 1960 ' s ,  Wes tern scholars prac tically denied the relevance o f  
political parties . 
I t was hardly surpris ing that the newly formed pol itical parties 
failed to match up to the expectations of Wes tern onlookers who assigned 
174 them impossible tasks . The parties were made re spons ible for national 
integration because they were s een as the only modern organization 
capable of transcending tribal , rac ial and regional ties , thus , 
I 
providing a nationwide input mechanism . It was strongly believed that 
·i?tsee Macridis , op . cit . , p .  16 . 
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an effec tive party structure would greatly help to reduce separati st 
antagonisms .
17 5 
,Nowhere was thi s  so forc efully s tated as i� Colem�n 
and Rosberg , who believed that such groups "-are destined , because of their 
central importance , to play a · · .{ · maj or · ) · role in the resolution of , or 
. 17 6 
in the fai lure to solve , the problems · o f  integration " .  By national 
integration , they meant both pol i tical integration , i . e . ( "  • • •  the 
progres s ive bridging of .the elite-mas s  gap on the vertical plane in the 
course o f  d eveloping an integrated political process and a partic ipant 
political community • • •  " ) and territorial i�tegration , L e .  ( " • • •  the 
progre s s ive reduction o f  cultural and regional tens ions and disc�ntinuities 
on the hor izontal plane· in the proc ess of creating a homogeneous 
. . 1 l '  . . fl ) 17 7 terri toria po 1t1cal community .  • 
Even today the problem o f  national integration is s till widespread 
in Africa where the maj ority has been and ' is often d0rninated by 
cul turally and some times rac ial ly different minoritie s .  This situation 
exists at all levels o� African societies ; in cities , e . g . , the 
historically c:'lominant pos itions o f  the Creoles in Freetown , or o f  the 
Coastal Swahili in Dar-es-Salaam , in regions o f  a country , e . g . , the 
Fulani oligarchies in Northern Nigeria and the Bito oligarchies in Eas t  
17 5Refer to Ari s tide R .  Zolberg , "Mass Parties and National Integration : 
The Cas e of the Ivory Coas t" , Journal o f  Po l i bic s , XV ,  February , 19 6 3 , pp . 
36-48 . See also Rupert Emerson , " Parti e s  and National Integration in 
I 
Africa" in J .  La Palombara and M .  Weiner ( eds ) Pol i tical Parti e s  and 
Pol itical Peve loprnent , Princeton : Princeton Unives i ty Press , 1966 , pp . 267-
·304 . 
17 6col eman and Rosberg , op . cit . , p .  8 . 
17 7 Ibid . , p .  9 I 
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Africa , and in entire ·countries , e . g . , Liberia , European-dominated 
Southern Rhodesi� and . South Africa . Although the s i tuation has been 
gradually changing , for example , the supremacy o f  the Creoles in S ierra 
Leone has been ques tioned and chall enged by the indigeneous groups and 
· b lack maj ority rule may come to Rhodesia within the very near future , 
political parties in Afr ica have not overal l  enhanced national integration 
to any s ignificant degree . 
The po litical and economic fai lures of African political parties led 
to a reappraisal o f  the ir c apabil ities . In 196 4 , Aris tide Zol lberg 
stressed the pos itive functions of the political parties in the Ivory 
Coast ,  but later que stioned the impact of such parties . 
"An examination of po litical parties _, the best 
s tudied feature of the Afr ican sc ene , reveals 
such a wide gap between the organizational 
mode l  from whi ch the leaders derived their 
inspiration and the ir capacity to impl ement 
such . s chemes , that the very use by ob servers 
of the word "party " to characterise such 17 8  s tructures involves a dang erous reification . "  
�he new focus on military leaders pushed po litical parties into the 
background . The ir importance should not be so has tily dismi s s ed . The 
�example _ of modernizing countries such as Mexico and Tanzania indicate that 
political parties continue to be relevant outside the non-Western setting . 1
7 9 
The maj or problem with early typologies o f  African pol i tical parties was 
that they were based primar ily on formal s tructures . They r e lated to 
17 8Aris tide R. Zo lberg , "The S tructure of Po l itical Conflict in the 
New States of Tropical Africa " , American Pol itical Sc ience Review , LXI I , 
S eptember , 1968 , pp . 7 0- 87 . 
17 9Mary B . _ Welfing ,
.
Political Institutionali zation : Comparative 
Analys is of African Party Sys tems , Cal ifornia : Sage Publications , 197 3 ,  
p • .  16 . 
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real phenomena but they were l imited to an account of how such organs 
would work if th�y functioned according to the normative expectations of 
the el ites . I n  many instances they made very little contribution to 
economic development , failed to extend their organizations to larger 
sections o f . the population and frequently hindered rather than furthered 
national integration . Inter-party competition seemed to exacerbate 
cTeavages in countries such as Sierra Leone (SLPP versus APC )  and 
Nigeria (NCNC versus NPC versus AG ) . I n  many countries the nationalist 
parties fizzled out or became government agenc ies and po litical 
participation decl ined . Obs ervers began to talk of the creation of no-
18 0  
party s tates ins tead o f  one-party regimes . Henry B ienen pointed out 
the inherent weaknes ses of pol i tical parties even in a s trong party sys tem 
such as Tanzania but he does not deny the relevance that parties may have : 
"The remaining rul ing s ingle . parties have real roles 
to per form . Ne ither mil i tary forces nor c ivi l services 
are likely to make up in performanc e and ef fectiveness 
what they lack in legitimacy and po litical know-how . 
Public order and po litical participation , which are 
preconditions for economic development and are the , 
essence of poli tic s are not going to be guaranteed 
by the removal of parties . " 18 1 
THE TANZANIAN ONE-PARTY SYSTEM : ORIGINS 
Despite the much documented decline of pol it�cal par tie s in tropical 
Africa it is the thesis o f  this paper that far from declining in importance , 
1801 . Wal lerstein , "The Dec line . of the Party in S ingle-Party Afr ican 
State s " , in J .  La Palombara and M. Weiner (ed s ) , op . c it . , pp . 20 1- 2 14 .  
18 1H . Bienen , " The Rul ing Party in the African One-Party S tate : TANU 
in Tanzania" ,  Journal of Commonwealth Po litical S tudies , V ,  3 ,  November 
1967 , p .  2 20 . 
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the Tanganyikan African National Union continues to be the mos t  important 
vehicle for natio.nal integration and development in Tanzania . Its 
. .  
importance is clearly manifested by the fact that politics in Tanzania has 
been characteri zed by attempt s to define new ro les for TANU , and to 
establish tjl.e identity of the ruling party .  TANU i s  the only party in 
Tanzania and has been able to ensur e that all organized politics falls 
within the framework which i t  s et s . Political competition takes place 
within i ts institutions . The Party sets the rule s  for po l itical 
participation and i s  the primary legitimi zing agent within the po l itic�l 
sys tem . Functional organi zations are linked to i t , e . g . , NUTA {National 
Union of Tanganyika Workers ) ,  its organization is hierarch ical and it i s  
l e d  b y  a charismatic leader - - Nyerere . 
TANU was the firs t party to be formed out of the Tanganyika African 
Association in July 1954 , which was founded in Dar-es-Salaam " sometime 
between 1928 and 19 2 9 "  but it remained more a social rather than a 
political organization . It ' s  member ship cons is ted primar i ly o f  c ivi l 
s ervants , teachers and traders with activities c entered in D�r-es-S alaam . 182 
Although the TAA had a respectabl e  membership relative to other groups , 
its importance was not recogni zed and respected by many Africans . I t  
was weak because it la?ked paid o f f ic ers and permanent headquarters . At 
the outset , the TAA had been a 11tea-par ty pol itic s "  c lub for c l erks and 
teachers , thus , many Africans were unaware o f  its exis tenc e . After 1945 . . 
and e specially in the early 50 ' s  it gained new s trength and militancy . 
18 2see G .  Andrew Maguire , op . cit . , pp . 64-75 . 
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I ts branches became infected by the new radical ism o f  local po litics and 
demanded greater ,action from the c enter . The l eadership was taken 9ver 
by Makerere -- trained inte llectural s  in Dar-es -Salaam , fir s t  by 
Vedast Kyaruri in 1950 and then by Jul ius Nyerere in April 195 3 . In 
19 5 2 , Nyere�e s tated that the TAA could become the focus of the ma s s  
nationalist movement . I t  was thus remodelled and given a new name - ­
TANU . 18 � 
The maj or problem fac ing the l eaders o f  TANU was how to expand the 
movement and use it to regain their independence . Freedom and unity 
became the s logan of the new movement . The early successes o f  TANU 
re s ted on three main factors ; firs tly , its simple message of national 
freedom ; secondly , its use of exis ting TAA branches which were located 
throughout the country ! and finally , the existing conf lict between the 
people and their rul ers . As Cliffe s tates , " the people felt the need 
for action ; TANU had only to adapt itself to each local situation , either 
taking over an exis ting popular movement or by organi zing the people 
• t • ' l  II 18
4 
agains privi ege • 
In some areas , such as . Buhaya , leader s  of discontented people 
j oined the organization , thus , making i t  easier for TANU to gain suppor t .  
But in areas such a s  Kilimanj aro , where s trong local leadership exis ted , 
TANU es tabli shed itself through oppos i tion to the pol itical leaders . 
The party met with some initial resistance hut it rapidly dominated local 
• 
politics throughout the country . By 1955 , 200 , 000 members held TANU cards . 
18 3John I llife , " Tanzania Under German and British Rul e " , in Cli ffe 
and Saul (eds ) , op . cit . , p .  14 . 
184Ihid . , p .  1 5 . 
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Once suffic ient numbers were incorporated into the Party , unity was 
maintained by concentrating on freedom though Nyerere never defined 
what he meant by " freedom" . 
TANU launched its attack on the British initial ly through the 
United Nations but the real battleground . was in Tanganyika itself . By 
1956 , Nyerere had gained international support for the nationalist cause 
which now had to contend with the gove�nment- sponsored multiracial United 
Tanganyika Par ty (UTP ) . This opposition forced TANU to be a mor e 
disciplined movement . The Tabora Conference in 1 958, probably one of the 
mos t  important events in the Party ' s  pre- independence days , debated the 
issue of TANU ' s  par ticipation in the forth-coming elections . The maj ority 
o f  the delegates oppos ed the idea but Nyerere persuaded them that only 
by participating would TANU have a fighting chance in the upcoming 
1 f . d d 
18 5 
s trugg e or in epen ence . Overwhelming victory in the 1958/59 election 
enabled TANU representatives to take up ministerial positions in 1959 . 
In the 1960 elections , the Party won 7 0  o f  the 7 1  s eats in the National 
Ass embly and Nyerere was called upon to form a government . In December 
196l , Tanganyika r.egained its independence .  
SOCIO-POLITICAL CONDITIONS 
Despite the initial difficulties which the Party encountered , it 
was relatively easy for a national movement to develop . Unity wi thin 
' 
the Party and within the population at large has been greatly enhanc ed by 
the lack o f  exploitative groups· . The large land mas s  and relatively low 
185willia.Ill Edgett-Smith , We Mus t  Run While They Walk , New York : 
Random Hous e , 1971 , p .  e s . 
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population dens ity lessened the incidenc e of conflict between groups over 
territorial concerns . The tribal situation proved conducive to the 
establislunent o f  national unity because none were able to achieve a h igh 
level of dominance .  The largest tribe , the Sukuma , compri s e s  less than 
12 per cent of the total population . The Eas tern Bantu her itage of many 
tribes freed TANU from tribal quarre ls which have plagued other Afri can 
political partie s .  
Early consolidation o f  party rule was made pos s ible by other factors 
such as poverty , the nature of imperialism and the spread o f  Swahili . In 
the first place , poverty bound . the people toge ther and the lack o f  
. - � . 
explo itabl e  resource s  reduced the degree of inequal ity between them . 
Imperialism was such that little permanent damage was infl icted upon the 
social or political struc tures o f  the country . After· World War I ,  
Tanzania was made a trusteeship of the League of Nations rather than a 
colony though still ruled by Bri tain . ·  The restrictions on British policy , 
however , meant that they were unable to prevent traris tr ibal organi zations , 
or promo te and intensi fy tribal ho stility a s  they had done in many 
� 6  
sub-Saharan countries . 
The breaking up of the traditional soc ial order and the 'spreading 
of Swahili were two important effects of the slave trade . Swahili was 
seen as a non� colonialist lingua-fraca and al so as a basic national 
resource in relation to the demands of ideological communication . The 
breaking up o f  the old order enabled the mixing o f  different people , thus , 
186coleman and Rosberg , op . c it . , p .  10 . 
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f · 1 ·  . h f 1 d h '  by d ' ff . t ' b  18 7 aci itating t e ac ceptance o ea ers ip i ering ri es . TANU 
became a carrier and an expre s s ion of the Swahil i  pol i tical culture as it 
developed in the towns -- though it attempted to organize and represent 
the rural areas . 188 
Contemporary political factors played a major rol e  in establish ing 
unity within TANU . The party ' s  dominance in the pre- independence days 
later gave the one-party system a unity lacking in such multi-party 
systems as that of Zambia , Kenya and Uganda in the 1960 ' s .  The lack o f  
oppos ition to TANU meant that it d i d  not have t o  dominate the countryside 
to s ecure support nor did it need to develop a strong c entral organization 
because other po litical organi zations d id not often aspire to be national l 
TANU was never threatened by economic interest groups which were largely 
18 9 absent from .the pol itical sc ene . This was one less obstacle that 
rulers had to confront but robbed them of valuable instruments through 
whi ch to rule . The pol icy of a planned but dec entralized path to sociali sm 
and the use o f  bas i c  ideological documents to indicate broad pol icy shifts 
. and guidelines . for pol icy implementation (pr ior to the setting up of 
machinery or detai l ed tactic s for long run obj ectives ) have reinforc ed 
-the underlying unity of the system . There has been a great reliance on 
the Party at all levels to explain and promote the policies of government . 
THE ONE PARTY IDEOLOGY 
TANU is greatly influenced , both in its s tructure and its goa l s  by ' 
i�7Bienen , November , 1967 , p .  219 . 
18 8Ibid . , p .  2 2 0 . 
189Ib ' d  . i . , P •  2 2 0 . 
.. : ;  , , . , , .. ., 
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the dominant ideology . In the inunediate pos t- independence year s , the 
problems of nati�nal integration led to a s erious recons ideration of the 
purpos e  and organization of the national movement .  TANU remained a 
de facto one-party sys tem unti l the official ins titution of that sys tem 
in 1965 . The new par ty s tructure was clearly not democratic and caused 
a great deal o f  concern among the leader s . Nyerere appointed a 
Pres idential Commission in 1964 to examine the one-party sys tem . Prior 
to this , he had outlined his fir s t  proposal to make Tanzania an offic ial 
one-party s tate in Democracy and the Party S tate . Nyerere bel ieved that 
a one-party system could be more democratic than a two or multi-party 
, system which he ruled out for Tanzania because , firs tly , a new s tate 
required the combined efforts of all to maximi ze social and economic 
development ;  s econdly , they were alien to the African· culture -� they 
are luxuries which cannot be afforded; and , thirdly , they distort 
d d t t 1 d . . . 1 9 0  emocracy an perpe ua e c ass ivi s ions • .  
The total itarian organi zation of the communist ' s tate was also 
rej ected by Nyerere , who stressed that the ideal of African socialism 
is communal and egalitarian , i . e . , government by popular partic ipation 
not by an elitis t vanguard . Ho�ever ,  after independence , TANU was more 
like the latter than the former . Its leader s were suspic ious and prone 
to use force , many being motivated by their own selfish desire s . They 
j ealously guarded their newly won privileges ,  s ince los s  of pol itical 
' 
office would have meant a return to farming or some other manual occupatign . 
Even when the idea o f  competitive elections within the s ingle party was 
190Nyerere , Freedom and Unity , op . c i t . , PP • 196-199 . 
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introduced , many did not o ffer their support for fear of being ousted 
at the upcoming �lections . 
Nyerere has never supported the idea o f  TANU as a vanguard par ty but 
rather has s tressed a party s tructure that r emains close to the people 
and representative of their interests . However , the immediate po s t-
independence years s aw the TANU leader s determined to enj oy the same 
l iving s tandards as their colonial predeces sors , and to a great extent , 
they secured much Q f  what they wanted . There was constant pressure . 
from within TANU to obtain more highly paid pol i tical pos i tions , which 
resulted in the creation of Regional and Area Commi s s ioners . Moreover , 
in l965 , the TANU National Executive received salaries equival ent to that 
of MP ' s .  It was not too long before the income of the middle and senior 
rank government officials stood high above that of the ordinary c i tizen . 
Thus , by 1967 , it was noticeable that political leaders and bureaucrats 
formed an el ite with a level of income that was vastly superior to the 
average Tanzanian . 
The pre-Arusha years d id not see the introduction of radical 
egalitarian polic ies . by the rul ing elite . There was no genuine socialist 
conuni tment from TANU , economic po licies were not socialist , private and 
foreign inves tments were encouraged apd there was l i ttle concern for 
rural social ism . Although Nyerere constantly r eminded the Party of its 
social ist obj ectives· , he lacked the popular support and cadres to enforce 
. . 
such pol icies . At that time , the country was in dire need of skilled 
and experienced party and bureaucratic personnel who would have been 
alienated by such pol icies . However , from 1961-197 4 , the government 
managed to ho ld down , without upward supervis ion , the salary scales for 
1 14 
top c ivil servants , whil e  increas ing the minimum wage and lower wage 
scales . I ncome tax increased in the higher wage brackets and many 
fringe benefits were cut .  According to Cranford Pratt , • • •  the ratio 
of the purchasing power after direct taxation of the top civil servic e , 
compared to the minimum wage s , has fallen from an estimated 80 : 1  in 1960 
to 16 : 1  in 1971 and 1 1 : 1  in 1 97 4 . Al though the ratio is still somewhat 
large the gap has decreased significantly . 
�ANU was not a party ruled by the peopl e , but rather directed by a 
· handful of men making key decis ions , s et apart..., from the mas s es by their 
education , wealth and s tatus • .  Rweyemamu . .  points out that the class of 
s enior civil servant s who inherited a " European " salary s tructure also 
, 
received access to credi t fac ilities and technical advic e  which enabled 
them to enter into property earning activities , resultil)g in great income 
inequalities in re lation to workers who were unable to obtain similar 
credit . fac ilitie s . 19 1  
Despite Nyerere ' s  social i s t  intentions , inequalities per s i s ted . 
Individual MP ' s  became aware of growing elitism among many Minis ters and 
Regional Commiss ioners , who s ecured large cars , expensive homes and 
servants for themselves . Thus , the Arusha Declaration , although directed 
at the growth of capital is tic attitudes in the rural areas , was also 
aimed at TANU leaders in the Par ty and bureaucracy , who were cutting 
thems elves off from the people . Nyerere desired a narrowing o f  the gap 
between government and Party offic ials and the people and leaders were 
191Jus tinian Rweyemamu , Underdevelopment and Industriali zation in 
Tanzania , Nairobi : Oxford University Pre s s , 1 9 7 3 , pp . 52-53 . 
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thus , given a year ' s  grace to declare assets and dives t  themselves 
of interests the� had acquired . However , prominent TANU officials such 
as A .  s .  Mtaki {MP ) and Ms . Titi Mohamed failed to respond , but on the 
whole there was outwasrd compliance by govern ment and Party leaders , since 
regular ities are easy to evade . 
The leadership code has , thus far , been but hal f-heatedly acted on 
becaus e o f  the lack o f  an effective enforcement mechanism . It  was 
naively assumed that a s ignature guaranteed abandonment o f  all interests 
and class contradiction . Thi s  was not the case , and in April 197 3 , the 
Bunge pass ed a law e s tablishing a permanent enforcement committee to 
deal with those leaders who were fail ing in their commitment to socialism . 1 
The Arusha Declaration described TANU as a par ty of workers and 
peasants . The suggestion for the Party to become less of a mass 
organization and more ' an e l ite or vanguard type party with member s 
schooled in soc ial ist principles was not accepted as i t  ran counter to 
both the ideas of Nyerere and the Commi s s ion . The Declaration thus 
called upon TANU to build a socialist state based on equal ity and 
charged it with preserving the bas ic rights o f  the individual and the 
19 3 
overseeing of development . Although there were those who would have 
the Party rul e with an iron hand , Nyerere ' s  overwhelming concern with 
participation and democracy carried the day . 
19 2see Helge Kj ekshus , "Parl iament in a One-Party S tate - The 
Bunge of Tanzania , . 1965-197 0 " , Journal o f  Modern African Studie s ,  XII , 1 ,  
1974 , p .  37 . 
193Nyerere , Freedom and Soc ial i sm , op . cit . , pp . 187 - 206 . 
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PARTICIPATION AND THE PARTY SYSTEM 
The role outlined for the � arty in national development and the 
high power pos itions whi ch its members hold gives i t  a dominane posit;on 
in the de cision-making process . Whenever outsiders point to the 
oligarchic nature of the Party , its members have been qui ck to point 
to the mas s-based membership of TANU . The total membership has been 
quoted at one million , but thi s  includes all card carrying members 
rather than thos e  currently active . 194 From the '.outse t ,  the educ ated 
.:� 
e lite were prominent in the national leadership but their civil service 
occupations excluded them from active pol itics . Teachers , smal l traders 
and co-operative workers were prominent in local leadership whi le the 
Party , on the whole , found widespread support in both urban and rural 
areas . 
The mas s membership of the Party has strengthened its claims of 
democratic de ci sion-making , The various elements within it are kept 
together by a network of conferences and committees· and at all l evels 
there exists a system of checks and balances whi ch limi t the' autonomy of 
the party�government machinery . Such organs re ach down to the grass 
· roots level , i . e . , the cell , so that even these members are entitled to 
s end their delegates to the vi llage party committee , However ,  the rank 
195 
and file find i t  di fficult to make thei r  voices heard at the top . 
Once de cis ions are made they are handed down and ve ry little can
1
be done 
.l94Lionel Cli ffe , '' Democracy in a One�Party State ; The Tanzanian 
Expe rience '' in Saul and Cli f fe (eds ) , op • .c.it .  1 p .  246 . 
195Emerson , 1 967 , p .  2�4 . 
by the vil lage to change legislation not to their liking . 
Although Nyerere has voiced his pre ference on the type of party that 
TANU should be and the degree of democracy which shou ld exi st within its 
ranks , developments have taken place over which he has had l ittle control . 
To be sure , the mas s membership nature of the Party i s  changing due in 
part to the Arusha Declaration but there is very little evidence to show 
that those now entering the Party are peasants and workers , apart from 
their own statements on the matter . There i s , however , strong emphas is 
on a formal commitment to the goals and policies of TANU in the hope that 
1 d . . l '  ' 1 1 
196 true y edicated socia ists wi emerge . There are no guarantees that 
this obj ective wil l  be ful filled but the lack of discipline whi ch 
unconditional entry permitted has been somewhat counteracted . 
The leadership code intends to e stablish true social ists , yet 
recruitment patterns o f  political leaders have changed very l ittle . The 
commi tment to widen participation has , however , led to the taking of 
steps to provide a political educational program for P arty leaders at 
all levels and to get over to them not only the basic ideology o f  
socialism ,  but , also the economi c logic of sel f-reliance and rural 
development . Theoretical ly , TANU i s  said to be a Party of peas ants and 
workers , excluding from entry tho s e  who fall outside these categories , 
but the vast maj ority of Tanzanians are workers and peasants , there fore , 
many remain eligible . S ince the Declaration makes no distinction 
between manual and intel lectual workers , the l atter may enter the Party 
196samoff , op . cit . , pp . 199�200 . 
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even though hi s position and salary may place him very much above ni s 
manual counterpart . 
I f  workers and peasants can be identified by their leve l of 
education , their occupation and the ir status , then in theory those who 
• 
comprise the most educated and powerful elements in Tanzanian society 
are the ones excluded from the Party . However , i f this were the case , 
TANU would lose the ski l led manpower and expertise which it has acquired 
over the ye ars . The incorporation of the civil servi ce into the Party 
in 1965 provided the technocrats i t  so badly lacked . Many developed an 
espirit de corps with a sense of purpose and were identifiable by their 
education , pre stige and wealth , S ince many of the higbly paid positions 
fall within the Party or government machinery , i t  would appear that 
those elements whi ch the Arusha Declaration hopes to �xclude from the 
�arty are already within its ranks , hence the appeal to -all leaders to 
divest thems elves of the ir accumul ated wealth . 
The development o f  the single-party system is linked not only with' 
the achievement of economic and social progress , but also wi th the 
ab f t . t '  1 
197 sence o an agonis ic c asses , Arusha was a candid admi ttance of 
the exis tence of classes in society evidenced mos t  clearly in the 
government of TANU , i . e . , a government of highly paid politicians an� 
bureaucrats . Even today thi s still holds true . The demands of 
development for an educated and skil led elite , in effect , el iminates 
• 
those with little or no skills to offer , Moreover , workers and peas ants 
l97see Cliffe , Democracy in a One-Party S tate : The Tanzania 
Experience , ·in , SauJ. and Cliff , ( eds ) , op . ci t . , p .  2 4 7 , 
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rarely aspire to positions of power and wealth , and when they do, s carc ely 
have the means by which to achieve it . Those who were privi leged to 
become Party officials , by whatever virtue , obtained positions o f  
power and prestige and perpetuated thems e lves behind a fascade of 
democratic decision-making . 
S cholars have commented on the bourgeoi se attitude which many 
political leaders o f  new states adopt on coming to power . This is no 
less true of TANU members in the higher echelons . However ,  the 
preoc cupation with socialist practice s  by Nyerere and followers like 
Rashidi Kawawa leads Cranford Pratt to argue that such leaders were 
neither the allies of imperialism nor a vanguard committed to a 
socialist ideology . He apologetically accepted the advantageous 
positions in which members of the elite found themselves , for though 
their incomes were substantially high , it was " • • •  not taken from a 
resisting soc iety which rej e cted their l egitimacy • • •  and • • •  l eaders 
did not use their power to perpetuate their interes ts in ways whi ch 
offended the wider Tanzanian society . They remained loyal members o f  
TANU ! ,, 198 
Their loyalty to TANU did not , in effect , amount to very much . I t  
was not put t o  the tes t because the Party was not an organization 
vigorously fighting for the es tablishment of socialist princ ipl es . Thus , 
loyalty to TANU did not mean the forgoing o f  the privil eges to which 
198cranford Pratt , The Critical Phas e in Tanzania 1945-68 : 
Nyerere and the Emergence of a Social i s t  S trategy , Cambridge :  Cambridge 
University Pres s ,  1976 . 
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they had become so accustomed . In general , the democratic nature of 
participation has· been greatly curtai led by the deve lopment of 
oligarchical tendencies within the higher ranks of the Party . 
T1\NU :  STRUCTURE AND ORGANI ZATION 
The post-independence era brought with it new pronouncements and 
new ins titutions but they have not miraculous ly turned Tanzania into a 
classless society or made it any les s economically underdeve loped . 
Moreover , TANU , despite great e fforts , remains an elitist organiz ation 
often <incapable of fulfilling its policy obj ectives . Many factors have 
worked against the development of the Party into a strong , centralized , 
monolithic organization capable of directing government agencies and the 
people towards their socialist goals . The heterogeneity of the elements 
which gave themse lves a. TANU label prevented strong central direction and 
made the Party little more than a conglomerate of various interests . The 
weakne ss of the s tructures were apparent to Bienen when he wrote that 
TANU , " • • •  does not provide an ins titution which can trans form the 
economy and make itself more effective in the proce s s , it is too 
·weak and too loose and has too few material and human resources to tackle 
199 deve lopment problems " . 
Local Party organizations in the pre-independence years consisted 
of disparate elements , reflec ting the is sues of their localities . Their 
' 
pattern of growth made central penetration immensely difficult at first 
199Bienen , op . cit . , 1967 , p .  40 7 . 
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but the central focus which they later developed , along wi th a certain 
degree of integration , provided the pre-conditions for central 
directives . The vigor o f  local political structures died down after 
independence but Nyerere ' s  res ignation in 1962 enabled his return to 
the local areas to s trengthen TANU at the grass roots leve l . The Party 
was further strengthened at the local leve l by the appointment of Reg ional 
and Area Commiss ioners to replace the colonial authorities in the 
districts . This also had the added advantage of bringing the Party and 
the governmen� closer together . At the vil lage level both structure s . 
were merged while the chairman of TANU , , at the district leve l , also 
became the chairman o f  the District Counci l . 
The weaknes s  of the Party and its central decis ion-making organs ,  
which Bienen alluded to , is now being changed ,  though throughout the 
1960 ' s  it was faced with s evere problems . Prior to 1965 , TANU lost many 
important members to the government and the bureaucracy . Its head­
quarters became di sorganized and incompetent ; finance s  dec lined becaus e 
subscriptions dried up; the�e were no approved estimates for �wo years ; 
� no sys tem o f  regular reporting from branches to headquarters and a 
falling off in enrollment . At the 1962 e lections , the inability o f  
TANU t o  mobilize the people was i llustrated when only one-quarter o f  the 
potential voters actually voted . 2 00 In 1964 , the army mutiny further 
revealed the total absence of any capacity within the Party to mobilize 
mas s  support . Effective decisi�n-making took place outs ide the Party 
200Hopkins , 197 1 ,  op . cit . , p .  29 . 
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s tructures . The National Conference (whose current membership s tands at 
over 15 , 000)  did little but ratify government policies whi l e  the National 
Executive Conunittee ( a much smaller but more vigorous body ) rarely 
2 0 1  
initiated policies or acted a s  a n  effective supervisor of government . 
The Party ' s  s trength has gradually increased at the expense of the 
Cabinet and Parliament , i . e . , National Assemb ly or Bunge . By 1967 , the 
shift in power left the. NEC of TAL'lU as the chief beneficiary and maj or 
decis ions were being taken outs ide the Cabinet . In 1965 , the NEC 
acquired powe!s and salaries much l ike that of the National Ass embly , 
e . g . , power to summon witnesses , reqµire production of documents , etc . 
The admittance of the civil service in 1964 and the changes in 196 5 and 
1966 at the national leve l , i . e . , the Party ' s  staff at headquarters was 
paid for by the government and now , expanded and upgraded j obs became 
available , added to the Party ' s  strength . In addition , the President 
spent time each week at Party headquarters , adding to the character and 
role of TANU , not merely because of his pos ition , but also by the very 
ideas he proclaimed . 
S teps des igned to strengthen the Party continued into the 7 0 ' s .  In 
November , 1974 , the meeting of the NEC in Musoma approved a structural 
reorgani�ation of Party headquarters to achieve a rationalization of its 
departments and to find more abl e  people so that the Party could 
demonstrate its supremacy in �o licy,-making functions over all other 
t t. . t ' t t '  202 s a e ins i u ions . Although no detailed s tudy has been carried out 
201see Pratt , op . cit . , p .  212_. 
2 02 f , l '  � f ' C t R d L d Re er to Co in egurn , A rica on emporary e cor , on on : 
Col lings , 1974-197 5 . p ,  B , 282 .  
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o f  the 1 9 7 4  Party elections , it i s  generally felt that th e  qua lity o f  
the leadership h�s improved , especially i n  the Central Committee , where 
of the 20 officials elected by the National Conference , 10 were new 
faces , younger and better educated than their predecessors . 
I t  is evident that over the years TANU has been steadily amass ing 
s trength relative to other organizations in society . The Dec laration 
gave it an " ideological cutting edge " , which resul ted in clearer 
def inition of its policies . The NEC , with many influential members 
within its ranks , has risen to a position of maj or importance in the 
processes of central decis ion-making and execution , while its role in 
explaining central policies has become increas ingly crucial . According 
to Cliffe , the NEC , " • • •  provides an invaluable forum for discus s ion 
between central TANU government leaders and more ar ticulate non-o fficial 
1 . 1 f . " 
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e ernents repres entative o f  a t  east some o the population • 
DEMOCRACY AND THE PARTY SYSTEM 
From 1965-197 5 ,  TANU leader� quietly but e ffectively s trengthened the 
Party ' s  competence as an organization . So much so , that the mos t  important 
•. phenomenon of the independence period has been the consolidation of 
power by TANU . Friedland pointed out that the P arty has become , " a  focal 
institution , which pervades and dominates al l other institutions and 
society11 • 204 This view stands in complete contrast to Bienen ' s  state-
I ment that the structures o f  TANU are weak , with the center having l ittle 
2 0 3cliffe , Democracy in a One-Party State : The Tanzanian Experience , 
op • c_i t • , p • 2 7 4 • 
2 04 
S e e  Hopkins , 1971 , op . cit . , p .  3 1 . 
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power to affect decis ions or behavior at the local level . These views 
are not contradictory if one assumes the f irst to be based on TANU ' s  
s trength relative to other national organizations ; and the second on the 
Party ' s  strength and abi lity to effect change , especial ly of a 
developmental or integrative nature at the local leve l . S ince the latter 
view wil l  be examined in the concluding pages of the chapter , attention 
here wi l l  be focused on TANU ' s  power relative to other organizations and 
groups and the impl ications this has for democracy in the party sys tem . 
While Nyerere has sought to make the Party a s tronger institution , 
he has s imultaneously sought to make it increas ingly democratic , i . e . , 
a maximi zation of popular electoral participation . To this end , he has 
effected a democratic revolution within the Party by introducing elections 
at all levels . The selection of all Party candidates coupled with greater 
scrutiny and discuss ion has led to an increase.  in the degree of democracy 
within the Party . 205 The increased capacity on the part of TANU to cope 
with democratic pre ssures has also strengthened and consolidated its 
status as a national political organization . The 196 5 elections saw 
a s ignificant replacement of MP ' s  ( 8 6  o f  the 107 elected members were 
new to The As sembly ) and able men in the rank and file found places 
wi thin the leadership , without any undermining of TANU ' s  pos ition � 
However , the strengthening of c entral party organs has o ften : re sulted in 
the overlooking of considerations pf democracy . Despite the electoral 
sys tem within the Party s tructure , the NEC or Central Conunittee has the 
2 0 5  . 2 59 See Pratt , op . cit . , p . • 
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power to veto candidates for the As s embly and t o  any elected pos t 
within TANU . I f . thes e  powers are used on a regular bas is , they have the 
potential of making TANU a vanguard party , perpetuating the oligarchical 
tendencies already inherent in its s tructures .  
As far back as 1965 , there was widespread support to estab lish TANU 
as the only party but there was also a strong be lief that effective 
democratic checks should be placed on those exercis ing power . There 
was l ittle evidence of support for rul e  by an ideological el ite . Yet 
the rise of the NEC over Parliament means that elections are no longer 
the democratic control over oligarchical tendencies they were des igned 
to be . Power has indeed moved ; as Pratt s tates , " • • •  towards an 
institution whose members are selected in a more casual manner by a 
much less numerous electorate whos e  meetings are closed· and whos e  open 
s tyle of debate does not depend upon well-established procedure s  but 
upon the inc lination of Nyerere as its chairman � .
2 06 
A .  TANU AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
S ince independence ,  the National Assemb ly has been los ing ground 
�to TANU . Thi s  has been greatly facilitated by the Commi s s ion , which 
reserved all pol icy-making for the Party . From 1960- 196 5 , the Bunge 
. acted in a timid and cautious manner , brushing over many important 
is sues and playing a l imited ro le in other s , e . g . , foreign policy . 
' 
Quite often , it lacks the pres tige and s tatus to enable it to assert 
itself against the TANU l eader ship . Overall ,  government takes the 
206�. , P • 2 1 5 . 
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view that since members participate in Party po licy a t  various levels ,  no 
poli cy-making arena outs ide the P arty is desirable . Only a few MP ' s  have 
concious ly worked out a s trategy to oppos e  the trend of subordination 
and they have achieved very little . In the latter part of the 60 ' s ,  the 
government c lar ified the supremacy i s sue between TANU and the Bunge . The 
Arusha Declaration reass erted the central role of the Party while 
government statement s  left little doubt as to which institution was 
superior . For example , one Parliamentary extract stated : 
"The Party pi cked you in nomination and the Party has 
the right to discipline you and dictate your tasks • • •  
The· Party is supreme and all MP ' s  ar e  working under the 
leader ship of the Party . The time wi l l  come when an 
MP who is fol lowing hi s own head wil l  be called to the 
Party headquarters to be warned . It is high time the 
MP ' s  should know where they come from , and it i s  
above any doubt that this Par liament belongs t o  TANU 
(Wambura) • n 207 
The Bunge became more ac tive and more critical of government 
policies in the ear ly 1970 ' s ,  but remains weak r elative to TANU leaders . 
The expulsion of nine MP ' s by the NEC in 1968 demons trated the weakness 
o f the Bunge as an ins trument of contro l of the political leadership . 
However , the loss o f  power and prestige has not made the Bunge 
. s igni ficantly less elitist . The f inancial rewards for which an MP i s  
e l igible makes such a career attractive and s ets him apart from the 
maj ority . An annual salary of $ 1 , 500 , $ 7 50 extra for representing a 
constituency , travel and maintainance allowance together with a $ 4 0  per 
annum. postage allowance are no meah incentives where per capita income 
averages a l ittle over $ 8 5 per annum . Kj ekshus points out that money , 
207see Kj ekshus , op . cit . , p .  · 3 1 . 
· I  I 
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.. is a powerful incentive for members of the Party to seek election 1 
being also the mos t  tangibl e  reward to help bolster Party support among 
the aspiring elite " . 2 08 
The elitism demonstrated in the Bunge , coupled with the lack of 
democracy in the power relationship between the latter and the Party , 
has important impl ications for the deve lopment of democracy and 
s ocialism in Tanzania . However , the leadership code is he lping to 
avert elitism by acting as a power screening device . The requirement 
of TANU candidates to live and work in uj amaa vil lages further 
eliminate s  a number of otherwis e  eligible Party member s from the election 
race . The Bung e remains an important element in the thrus t  towards 
soc ial ism but at present it suffers from , " • • •  a lack of real power at 
the legis lative stage , and a noticeable ,  albeit unders t�ndable , 
reluctance by members to provide the regime with useful institutionalized 
self-criticism ins ide the Bunge " . 209 I t  is clearly not the pr imary 
locus of power at thi s time . ·  
B .  TANU : GROUPS AND CRITICISM 
At present , there is little indication that power and pre stige are 
gravitating away from the Party to other center s of power . In August 
1974 , the TANU Central Committee held a one month seminar and discus sed 
the :Party ' s  role in national integration and the meaning of "party 
supremacy " in the nation . In Oc to1Der 197 4 , the Pres ident , along with 
2 08Ibid . , p .  37 . 
209�. ' p .  4 3 . 
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the NEC , is sued clar ifications on how to proceed with vill_agization , 
maximizing preparation and discuss ion and minimizing coerc ion and . . . 
confus ion . In addition , NEC members were s ent out to explain and reassure 
peasants and to inves tigate , hal t  and redress grievances and abuses . 210 
TANU remains the pre-eminent political organi zation and holds a · 
dominant position relative to other groups . There are important groups 
within society , e . g . , churches ,  s chool s , co-operatives , labor unions and 
bus ines s organi zations , but they are not permitted to organize thems e lves 
or develop interests of their own . The official restrictions on their 
activities and their absorption into the Party serves to reduce their 
capac ity to bring about s igni ficant changes . Teacher s have been 
effectively alienated from pol itics while the University s tudents who 
oppose the government were initially suspended and later affi liated with 
th . th TY 
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e Party via e L .  
Even the mil i tary has been subdued by the Party , making the threat 
of army takeover very unl ikely . The army mutiny in 1 964 , led to a 
rethinking of the role o f  the military which resulted in army offic ers 
becoming liaison between the Party and the armed forc e s . The appointment 
of a political commissar of the Tanzanian J;>eoples Defence Forces 
(hereafter TDPF } also marked the beginni_ng o f  ins titutional ized 
representation wi thin the Party for the military . The polH:ical 
neutrality of the armed forces was rej ected and there was a firm belief ' 
210see Colin Legum , op . cit . , p .  B 2 8 3  
2 11 Hopkins , 1971 , op . cit . , pp . 3 1- 3 2 . 
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that soldiers should be committed on the side of the ruling party . 212 
The biggest ,shake-up o f  the TPDF s ince the mutiny came in 1974 � 
The number one in command , General Sam Sarakikya, was transferred to 
become Minister o f  National Culture and Spor t .  The second . i n  command , 
Colonel Amin Kashimiri , po sed problems because of his Asian origins and 
Br itish wife and could not replace Sarakikya . The number three ,  Geofrey 
Marealle , was no more eligible than his superior . He was the son of a 
Chagga Chief , a family not notable for their s trong support of TANU 
policies . Af�er careful cons ideration , Lt . -Col • .  Abdallah Twalipo was 
made the new commander and Colone l Mkwere became the second in command . 
The total number o f  the armed forces s tands at 14 , 600 which i s  
small in relation t o  the population, and its defence expenditure for 
19 74-1975 was $4 2  mil l ion . In March , July and November· 1974 , the TPDF 
publicly renewed its pledge of loyalty to the President , the Par ty and 
the people .  This political commitment s erves the purpos e  of helping to 
overcome military anomie while giving the soldiers some sense o f  purpose . 
TANU manages to control , l imit and guide the behavior o f  many · groups 
in society . But in so doing , signs o f  illiberal ism have entered into 
the operation of the one-party system . In 1967 , A .  K . Hanga , a former 
Minister and two MP ' s ,  Oscar Kambona and Eli Anangisiye , were detained 
on the grounds o f  subvers ive activities .  In October 1968 ,  the two MP ' s  
were officially expelled from the farty because of severe criticism o f  
212see Ali A . Mazrui , Cultural Engineer ing and Nation-Building in 
Eas t  Africa , Evans ton , IL : Northwes tern University Press , 197 2 ,  pp . 17 1- 17 2 .  
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govermnent pol icies . The s tress on contairunent of disagreement within the 
Party has long been a preoccupation o f  the political leaders . Their 
intolerance to criticism s tems from the fear of disunity that oppos ition 
wil l  produce facti9nalism ,  corruption and separatism . 2 1 3  Quite often 
national unity is perceived as a more desirable and real good than 
pluralistic pol itical freedom . 
The downplaying of criticism and conflict has resulted in the 
development of a closed sys tem of pol itics in Tanzania . This has done 
very l�ttle to eradicate the authoritarian tendencies within the Party . 
Ins tances of illiberalism have been evident on s everal occasions where 
the desire to avoid criticism has led to the making of important 
decision outside the Cabinet , e . g . , the ending of discrimination agains t 
non-Africans in the c ivil servic e ,  ending relations with Bri tain , 
decis ions on conunitment to socialism , the Union with Zanz ibar etc . 
Increasing illiberalism can also be seen in the pas s ing of the 1968 
Newspaper Ordinance Amendment Bill , in the face of great opposition , which 
gave the President powers to s top publication of anything deemed subvers ive . 
However , these signs do not amount to a trend . The Party has reaffirmed 
its conuni tment to soc ialism and has avoided maj or purges within its 
ranks . In Apri l  1970 , its National Secretary said the movement was still 
open to all , but Nyerere continues to pre s s  for quality rather than 
quantity in the membership . 
2 1 3navid E .  Apter , "Some Reflections on the Role of a Political 
Oppos ition in New Nations " , in George s .  Masannat , (ed) , The Dynamics o f  
Modernization and Soc ial Change : A Reader , California : Good Year 
Publishing co . , 1 197 3 ,  p .  4 2 3 . 
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Today TANU is less obviously a Party "without spec ific function or 
definition" than when Bienen wrote . S teps taken to strengthen national 
and local organs and the increase in elected elements at all levels puts 
' 
the Party in a dominant position vis-a-vis other groups . However , his 
conclus ions on the structure and functioning o f  the Party s till ho lds 
true , TANU does not fall wi th.in the revolutionary-centralizing category . 
C .  TANU AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
TANU ' s  s tructures may be strong when compared to tho� of other 
organizations but its inability to effect changes of a developmental 
nature is clearly evident . Its per formance at the local level is · 
handicapped by a bad conununications network , limited finances , lack of 
organization and trained Party of ficers and s taf f . 2 14 TANU ' s  lack of 
a s trong central party bureaucracy restricts it in many ways . At 
pres ent , it has been impossible for Tanzania to bui ld up both a party and 
a bureaucratic hierarchy , but the Party needs to e s tabl i sh its own bas es 
of independent expertise , e . g . , in agr iculture , marketing , adminis tration ,  
investment , employment , etc • •  Bureaucrats and Party o fficials are now 
-forced to work together but the antagonistic s ituation which .developed 
between the two in Ghana under Nkrumah has been miraculous ly avoided in 
Tanzania . However , mor e  precautions are needed in the bureaucracy ' s  
implementation of policy and more political s timulus is required from a 
better informed TANU . 
2 14Hopkins , 197 1 ; op � ci t . , p .  3 0 . 
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The efficient running of public enterprises , educational re form , 
application of leadership rules , and the mobilization of the rural 
population. all imply a maj or role for the Party . At thi s  point in time , 
the relationship between the Party and the economy becomes increas ingly 
important because TANU seeks not merely to achieve economic growth , but 
to radically alter the structure of Tanzanian society . 2 15 The main 
thrust of this reorganization is directed pr imarily towards the rural 
areas , therefore , the main task of the Par ty is to reach the vi llage s . 
Without so do�ng , the Party and government remain largely confined to 
a few urban centers and thos e  ins titutional innovations , e . g . , Village 
Development Committees (VDC ' s ) , P arty cells and TANU associated groups , 
become mere form without any content . 
S tudies have illus trated the effectivenes s  o f  TANU at the loca l  
level and the overall satisfaction of th e  peas ant w i th  the Party but 
it still has much to achieve . It i s  seen as the carrier o f  both modern 
. and traditional values , yet not all its members opt for modernity . As 
a s ingle dec is ion-making unit_ , TANU cannot impose its devalopment 
ideology on all elements under its j urisdiction . But through a program 
of villagization , it has made cons iderable progress towards involving 
the people in their own development . I t  has been mos t  fortunate in having 
a leader of the calibr e of Nyerere ,  whose appeal is undoubtedly wide . 
Without him , it is inconceivable tQat the Party would have been as 
successful in mobilizing and institutionalizing mass support behind the 
215cliffe ; Party Development .and Social ist Trans formation , op . cit . , 
p .  268 . 
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regime . 
CONCLUSION 
Narrow Wes tern definitions and labels o f  party systems in developing 
nations pre sent an inaccurate picture of such parties . Tanzania s tands 
out as an example of this . TANU i s  not a revolutionary-centra l izing 
par ty in the same mold as the Sovie t  Communist Party ; it c lear ly lacks 
the phys ical and human resources . However ,  TANU has gradually consolidated 
powers and establ i shed a strong NEC and Central Committee .  The election 
of officials at all levels . ha s  he lped to increase democratic participation 
but has not eradicated inherent authoritarianism . 
The paramountcy o f  TANU and its NEC has resulted in a leading role 
in national integration but the Party i s  s everely handicapped by its 
inability to mobilize suf fic ient resources . However, it remains the 
· only institution capable of performing the tasks of national building . 
I ts survival and effectiveness in this area has largely been determined 
by the extent to which its . leaders have worked towards overcoming 
weaknesses in the Party ' s  s tructure and organi zation . Despite continuing 
... \1eaknes s  in its organization , the relatively greater integra�ive capabilities 
6£ TANU and its associated structures make it inevitable that the Party 
should be the maj or organ for national development . 
CHAPTER V 
RURAL SOCIALISM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Nation-building in deve loping countries is handicapped not only by 
the lack of viable political institutions capable of integrating society , 
but also restricted by an absence o f  attitudes and behavior patterns 
necessary for the promotion of economic deve lopment . Tanzania has been 
fortunate in having a political party which is capable of attracting 
large numbers of supporters and mobilizing such support for the task of 
national integration . However , there continues to be gre at concern about 
the way in which socialist principles and attitudes can be instilled into 
the population at large to enable qui cker and smoother transformation 
into a .fully socialist society . In this section the ways in which the 
poli tical leaders are trying to instil.l socialist principles in the 
people and the results which have been brought about (especially in 
relation to the policies of sel f-reliance and uj amaa village s )  wi ll be 
examined .  Essentially , this i s  a study o f  the development problems 
with which Tanzania is currently confronted and the various solutions 
that have been applied . 
The re latively short time span whi ch has elapsed s ince the 
implementation of uj amaa villages and self-he lp s chemes makes it 
difficult to as sess the outcomes of such actions . However ,  i t  is  • 
purported here that rural socialism and vi l lagization wi ll become 
increasingly important in the development of Tanz ania and will be 
instrumental in changing rural attitudes and behavior . Moreover , the 
strategies of self-he lp and sel f-re liance are nece s s ary and practical 
1 34 
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measures for the implementation o f  uj amaa . 
This partic�lar survey wi ll utilize two o f  the numerous approaches 
2 16 to the s tudy of rural deve lopment . They are , examination of 
particular problems ari sing from the implementation of poli cy and 
evaluation of specific deve lopment programs . However , before one can 
examine and evaluate present policies , it i s  necessary to give some 
idea of the economic background and condition of Tanzania . 
THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
Economi c · development is a maj or goal o f  many developing countries ; 
they want to catch up with the more indus trialized societies and to 
this end they have drawn upon Marxist-Leninist ideologies to explain 
their underdevelopment and to serve as a guide for action . 2 17 Howeve r , 
the adoption of a Marxist-Leninist ideology or any other value system 
does not guarantee economic . development .
2 18 Development has proved 
particularly hazardous for many nations undergoing rapid economic and 
social change and Tanz ania is no exception . Early failures in reaching 
planned obj ective s led not only to feelings of dis i l lusionment among 
.;the masses , but also resulted in a growing gap between the population at 
2 16see Ge lia T .  Castillo , " Research and Rural Deve lopment Policy in 
the Phil ippines " , Deve lopment Digest , XIV , 2 ,  1976 .  The writer points 
out that there are essentially six bas ic types of rural development 
oriented research . All could be utilized in this study but for s implicity 
and claritY_ the two selected seem �ppropriate . · 
2 17Leaders o f  developing nations have found the ideas o f  Marx and 
Lenin , especially those dealing with colonialism and neo-colonialism , 
particularly useful in explaining their low level o f  deve lopment and 
continued dependency on former colonial powers . 
2 18 ' · Refer to Massanat , op . cit . , p .  2 0 7 . 
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large and the leaders . Political leaders have discovered that economic 
development is neither easy nor automatic . 
Even be fore development could get underway or reach the take-off 
2 19 s tage , many changes had to be made . These included the breakdown of 
-
traditionalism , the development of new ways of doing things , the expansion 
of educational faci lities ,  development of marketing and financial 
ins titutions , and the reorganization of the social and economic structure . 
This is particularly important in a country espousing a socialist 
doctrine where all previous restrictions on social .mobility and equal 
opportunity must be eliminated to ensure that all share in the benefits 
which development brings . In addition , attitudes towards government 
mus t  be molded in such a fashion that the people accept the new forms 
of government and new centers of social and po litical power . 
The process of economic development and its consequences are far-
reaching and cal l s  for a great deal of sacrifice on the part of the 
mas ses which , all too often , tends to result in popular discontent . The 
situation is further aggravated by the vicious circle of poverty in 
2 2 0  
which Tanz ania finds itself . The economy has al l the landmarks 
of an underdeveloped economy ; 90 per cent of the population l ive in the 
rural areas . Their productivity i s  low and consequently the ir share of 
the GDP only amounts to 4 0  per cent . Much o f  the agricultural activity 
takes place outside the monetary sector , which itself i s  export-
oriented , thus leaving production for local consumption a relatively 
2 19see Walt w. Rostow , The Stage s· of Economi c Growth : A Non­
Communist Manifesto , 2nd ed . England : Cambridge Univers ity Press , 197 1 .  
� -��assanat , op . cit . , p .  2 0 9 . 
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Tanzania is a very poor country ; the UN listed it as one of the least 
developed countries in the world . Per capita income stands at $ 85 and · 
even under optimistic assumptions it is said that real per capita income 
is unlikely to grow more than $ 18 0  by the year 2000 . However , progre s s  
has been made s ince independence when p e r  capita income was about $ 56 , 
the lowest in the whole of British Eas t Africa . Capital resources are 
limited -- physical measures of capital s tock , e . g . , paved roads per 
square mi le , hospital beds per capita and s choo l places per capita , 
i l lustrate that Tanzania is very far behind her East African neighbors . 
Moreover , there are few instit�tions or individuals capable of 
generating sufficient savings vital for e conomic deve lopment . The 
National Development Plan of 1969-74 attempted to rai se the inve stment 
rate from 22 per cent to 25 per c ent but it still left Tanzania a capital 
2 2 3  s tarved country .  
One of the maj or problems of development in Tanz ania has been the 
lack of ski ll and knowledge . In 1964 , only 20 Tanzanian ' s  (out of 6 3 0 )  
graduate teachers were in secondary schools . Expansion in secondary 
education and teacher training programs has not yet produced enough 
� 
school places for children and teachers to fill the gap left by 
expatriates . Managerial talent continues to be imported from abroad at 
very high costs and tends to create conflict , especially in the l ight of 
the Africanization policy . However , in 1968 , nearly 80 per cent of 
senior middle-grade civil servants were Tanzanian ' s  compared with 2 6 in 
1964 . Today , manpower needs are still on the increase and continues to 
2 2 3  K 11 ' it 185 G. • He einer , op . c  . , p .  • 
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po se a maj or obstacle in the path o f  economic deve lopment .  
Many o f  the problems confronted by the political leade rs were 
inhe rited from the colonial system of government and mode of product ion . 
For ins tance , the economic strati fication which took place in colonial 
days still persists . The most developed regions continue to be those 
which provided the colonial government with something they valued , needed 
and were wi lling to pay for . These cash crop areas , e . g . , Ki liman j aro 
and Bukoba , have also been important in producing the bulk of Tanzania ' s 
leaders .  Not only doe s regional imbalances stand out as a maj or prob lem 
for government , but also the rural-urban imbal ance has . taken on increasing 
significance because of the resultant inequalitie s .  Large c ities such 
as Dar-es -Salaam , (with a population of 300 , 00 0 )  have long enj oyed 
greater services than the small village s . Changes have - been made to 
redres s this , but on the whole ,  the development effort still appears to 
be weighted more in favor o f  the urban areas . This has led to heavy 
migration from the rural to the urban areas caus ing overpopulation and 
widespread unemployment . Attempts have been made to round up vagrants 
in the cities and transport them back to the rural areas , but it i s  
2 2 4  
difficult t o  envi sage such a policy going o n  inde finitely . The 
priority of the urban are as can clearly be seen in fiscal 1970-7 1 .  The 
development budget for such areas (which contained 7 per cent of the 
population ) was estimated at 4 5 per cent , whi le that of the rural areas ' . 
2 2 5 (containing 9 0  per cent o f  the population ) was e stimated at 48 . 3  per cent . 
2 2 4Andre de la R.ue , op .• cit . , p .  SO . 
2� 5Hill , op . cit . , p .  2 24 . 
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The emphasi s  on agricultural ac tivity has pers isted from the colonial 
period and no large scale industrialization has yet taken place . There 
were those , namely the more revolutionary Zanzibaris and other left-wing 
Tanzanian ' s  who felt that a strong industrial bas e was necessary in order 
to bring about modernization . They consisted primarily o f  those sub­
scribing to the Marxist-Leninist idea of social i s t  progres s ion . Nyerere 
and his fol lowers are somewhat less dogmatic in their ideological leanings 
but no less socialistic in their outlook . The ultimate goal is for all 
production to be obtained through co-operative e ffort or through 
government co-operative s . The· dangers o f  relying on an agricultural 
economy have been wel l  documented and need not be belabored here but it 
is a problem whi ch will become increas ingly important for Tanzanian 
political leaders in the future . 
The sacrifices which the leaders have called upon the people to 
make in the name of · development have been met with relatively few 
protests for the bulk of the people have not undergone severe hardships 
because of development . They have always been poor and were often by­
passed by the colonial adminis tration . Those who are deprived or feel 
a sense. of deprivation are those in the top echelons who have been 
called upon to make certain sacrifices in the interest of the population 
at large . But on the whole , the response of the people toward government 
policies . has been favorabl$ . From , the outset , great efforts have been 
made on the part of the leadership to secure and mobilize the support 
necessary to ensure policy implementation . 
To recap then , in looking at the economic background , it i s  c lear 
that many problems have been inherited from the colonial era , such as 
regional , urban and rural imbalances and dependence on an agricultural 
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economy . Agricultural activity i s  prevalent and 90 per cent of the 
population are rural . Tanzania lacks physical and financial resources 
and has found economic development to be a particularly haz ardous 
venture . 
I DEOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT 
Ideology has been used by the pol itical leaders to set the goals 
for economic development . Ian C .  Parker states that , " ideology has not 
been a static and isolated element in national development but has 
functioned dynamically as an organic and evo lving image of national 
direction and priorities in the social and e conomic spheres 11 • 2 2 6  
Social ism and sel f-reliance, which make up the core of the ideology , 
reflect not only the strengths but the weaknesses of .the country , for 
-
on the one hand , it has enabled Tanzania to develop in an economi cal ly 
and poli tically viable way , but also new demands have been created which 
the present system cannot adequately deal with , e . g . , increased demands 
for goods and services .  
The pol icy of sel f-reliance completes �d j ustifies the call for 
� the building of uj arnaa by Tanzania ' s  own resources . However , as an 
instrument for the bui lding o f  social i sm , self-reliance doe s not mean 
each individual relying simply on his own resources . As K· Ngotnbale Mwiru 
points out , " Sociali s t  self-reliance hinges upon the group . It means 
making the fullest use of • • •  life in society by co-opting in al l 
226Ian c .  Parker , op . cit . , p .  45 . 
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activities in the interest of all individual members . " 22 7 Sel f-
reliance , thus , m�ans accepting respons ibility for one ' s  own wel fare 
and development and making the best of limited resources . It enables 
cuts in costs by doing away with fore ign exports and facil itates mas s 
participation for increased production -- in keeping with socialist 
obj ective s . The political leaders are aware that a poli cy o f  self-
reliance cannot bring about development by itse l f  but it c an be us eful 
in rehabilitating· labor and in re-educating the people to produce 
2 28 
favorable attitudes towards work . 
Failure to achieve neces sary fore ign aid played a maj or role in 
the adoption of a sel f-re liant s trategy . The F irst Five Year Plan 1964-
196 9  fai led mi serably because principal donqrs o f  aid , i . e . , Great 
Britain and Germany withdrew the aid Tanzania so badly needed . The 
Second Five Year Plan 1969-19 74 incorporated the les sons of failure and 
thus , was based largely on self-reliance . Government was given the 
main role in mobilizing the people in the production effort to ensure 
the fullest use o f  dome stic resources . The self-reliant strategy i s  
designed primari ly to make Tanzania increas ingly independent o f  the 
... 
outside world but there are severe limitations to the use of · such a 
strategy . Immanuel Wal lerstein points out that the modes t  success 
achieved by Tanz ania with the policy of s e lf-reliance is due primari ly 
to the relatively few countries that have taken such a particular course ' 
of action . He believes that the countries of Eastern Europe i l lus trate 
. 
2 27K . Ngombale MWiru · , "The Policy of Self-Relianc e " , in Saul a�d 
Cliffe (eds ) , op . cit . , p .  66 . 
2 28 Ibid . , p .  7 0 . 
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the limits o f  self-reliance . Moreover , pressures to comply with the world 
�conomy and the need for international cooperation leads to compromis e  
and sacrifice i n  internal policie s , eventually leading t o  a greater 
degree o f dependence . 2 2 9  Tanzania may b e  wel l  o n  th e  way t o  real 
pol itical independence but in the economic sphere it is still somewhat 
dependent on various countries in order to fulfill certain of its needs . 
Tanzania is far from sufficient in bas ic cereal production and in 19 7 0  
almo s t  $ 30 mi llion was spent on food imports . By the end of the 197 0 ' s  
there wi ll be approximately four million additional peop�e to be fed and 
c lothed , thus pointing to even greater economic dependence on the 
outside world . 
-
In more ways than one , it has been difficult fo� Tanz ania to pursue 
a policy of self-re liance . The eruption of the oil and foreign exchange 
crisis in 197 3  and 197 5 re spectively , led to almo st constant borrowing 
from the IMF and other sources to keep up with the balance o f  payments . 
Borrowing to finance various proj ects cannot go on indefinit�ly but 
with the l imited expansion of official aid , there are very few alternative s  
avai lable for financial as sistance abroad o r  a t  home . I f  the situation 
-worsens , Tanzania may find itself accepting help from whatever quarters 
it is being o ffered . This could have far reaching implications for the 
independent foreign policy whi ch Tanzania has thus far pursued . Present 
trends in world economic pattelllS tend to support the idea that far from 
becoming more independent , countries ,  both large and small are becoming 
increas ingly inter-dependent and even with a po licy of s e lf-reliance , 
Tanzania i s  no exception . Self-re liance seems to be working better at 
229 
Immanuel Wal lerstein , op . cit . , pp . 14-15 . 
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home especially in its educational obj ectives than it is in the 
international ar�na , 
EDUCATION FOR SELF-RELIANCE230  
Attempts b y  Tanzania to b e  sel f�reliant i n  the international arena 
have been confounded by forces beyond its control but internal ly , 
numerous successes have been achieved through such a pol icy . Education 
for self-reliance is a policy measure de s igned to make every Tanzanian 
( from the top echelons of government to the peas ant) participate equally 
in the country ' s  development . Interim measures taken by Nyerere to 
bridge the gap between the rulers and the rul ed proved ineffe ctive in 
uniting the diverse elements . The elite continued to set itse l f  apart 
from the masses and it was this elitism coupled with ris ing expectations 
whi ch led to the Arusha Declaration , calling for a fresh start . 
Education for self-reliance came one month after the Arusha Declaration , 
rej ecting the colonial system o f  education whi ch reinforced individualist 
rather than group tendencie s . The new system had to create a sense of 
conunitment to the community and had to be geared towards the development 
of the rural community . 
The elitist colonial system left many outs ide the s chool system 
while those on the inside , cut off from society � devel oped paras itic 
attitudes .  They l ived off the people without developing a commitment 
towards them . Mos t  of the educated adopted white-collar attitudes , 
even those with humble beginnings . The leaders now see the necess ity 
2 30Nyerere , Freedom and Socialism ,  op . cit . , pp . 267-290 .  
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of integrating education with the needs o f  the society at all level s . 
S chools are now l_ooked upon as an integral part o f  society , i . e .  , 
'' communities whi ch practice the precept o f  self-reliance " . 2 31 I f  
education for self-reliance i s t o  have any impact o n  Tanzanian society , 
there must be as s .  Toroka states , II • • •  a complete overhaul o f  the 
2 3 2  
attitudes o f  people towards education " . Elitism i n  the educational 
system is slowly being eradicated but stil l persists to a great degree 
because of the lack of s chool places avai lable . Thus , the few who are 
lucky enough to attend s choo l  are sti l l  a privileged minority . Hopefully , 
the situation will change as implementation o f  pol i cy progresses . 
There has never been . enough s chool s  at any leve l , thus , formal education 
has always been a privilege , never a right . 
Education for self-reliance has now become an important obj ective 
in Tanzania . It has led to the altering of s chool curri culums and the 
establi shment of communal agricultural activities within the s chools 
. 2 3 3  
themselve s although their success rates are not too rapid . Output 
from such programs take time to be realized but self-reli ance has 
helped to combat the shortage o f  trained teachers and admi ni s trators 
and alleviate the financial burdens of expanding education . - Education 
for self-reliance is an ambitious program and government has encountered 
difficulties in an educational s ituation where implementation l ags 
2 31J .  Cameron and w . A .  Dodd , Society , S chools and Progress in 
Tanzani a ,  Pergamon Pre s s , 1970 ,. p ,  2 2 5 . 
2 32s . Toroka , " Education for Self-Reliance : The Litowa Experiment" 
in S aul and Cli ffe ( eds ) op . c it . , p .  2 64 . 
2 3 3F .  Bran fman , " S ome Sugges�ions Concerning the Teaching o f  Agriculture 
in the Tanzanian Primary S chool " ,  in S aul and Cli ffe ( eds ) , op . cit . , pp . 259-
26 3 .  
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behind declared poli cy . In the First Five Year Plan 1964-69 , education 
was given the role of providing the necessary manpower .  An atmosphere 
of optimi sm surrounded the plan whi ch pro j ected high growth rates to be 
financed primarily by foreign aid . Approximately $ 2 50 mil lion out o f  a 
total o f  $ 3 00 million was expected to emanate from foreign sources • 
• 
Education ' s  share in development was $40 mil l ion . Although the Plan 
was racked with problems , educational development suffered littl e . 
Output from secondary school s  increased from 3600 in 1964 to over 5 5 00 
in 1967 and the number of students in the Univers i ty o f  East Afri ca for 
the 1966-67 academic year was 9 2 1 , with 850 other s tudents ove rs eas . 
'· 
By 1970 the University College o f  Dar-es -Salaam had an enrollment of 
140 0  students . 
Achievements in education have gone a long way to meet the needs 
o f  a developing agricu ltural society , despite the lack o f  avai l able 
school places and the continued use of ex-patriates .  Adult education 
i s  also expanding ; in 1965 over 11 , 000 class es wi th a total enrollment 
o f 6 , 00 0  learners could be accounted for . However , extension services 
are never enough to meet increasing demands in books and teachers . 
"The emphasis on sel f ... rel i ance " , as Lionel Clif fe points out ; " s eems 
to warrant more investment in practi cal training , linking extens ion 
advi ce with literacy and a broader knowledge of society and its goals 
h . . . " 2 34 may ave more immediate pay-offs than foxmal education • 
UJAMAA VILLAGES : A GENERAL BACKGROUND 
Tanzani a ' s leaders have not only concerned themselves with the 
2 34�. , p. 2 18 . 
147 
breaking up of elitist attitudes in the education system , but also within 
the population at large . Thi s  particular obj ective has led to a concerted 
effort on the part of the political leadership to establish a communal 
life style among the people . Uj amaa vi llages have been looked upon as 
the solution to both rapid economic development and social and political 
emancipation . Uj amaa is no longer s een as one among many alternatives 
to development . As Peter Temu states , " • • •  rightly or wrongly , i t  is  
seen as the only logical path . And as far as rural development goes , 
the uj amaa village has become the focal point of the current approach 
2 35 
to integrated rural development" . 
The Arusha Declaration and other policy decisions since are good 
indications of the priorities and character of the tran sition to 
socialism , but uj amaa villages did not begin with Anisha . They go as 
far back as 1961 with Nyerere ' s  "Uj amaa : The Basis of Afri can Socialism" . 
Essentially , Nyerere and hi s followers are attempting to show that 
modern development can take place without undue sacrifices in equality 
and humanity . However , the burdens of development are not felt equally 
by the various s ections of society . Until the Arusha Declaration , i t  
appeared that the wealth associated wi th development accrued ' to thos e  
who were particularly important i n  government and i n  the economi c 
sectors . The lot of the peas ant had not improved significantly . Thus , 
in order that such benefits be distributed to a wider cross-s ection of 
I 
the people , Nyerere advocated the building of uj amaa villages at the 
grass�roots level with some degree of local autonomy . According to 
2 35Temu , op � cit . , p .  72 . 
148 
Nyerere , uj amaa villages , " • • •  cannot be created from outside nor governed 
from the outside � No one can be forced into a uj amaa village and no 
official at any level can go and tel l the members of a uj amaa vil lage 
what they should do together and what they should do as individual 
f ., 2 3 6 armers • • •  
The Arusha Declaration calls for the building of socialism through 
villagization especially in the rural areas . However ,  any attempt to 
build socialist communities wil l  be affected by the present s ettlement 
patterns which comprises extended family units , not villages , practicing 
farming on an individualist basis . S ince the process has to be carried 
out on a voluntary basi s ,  party leaders and officials wil l  have to take 
it upon themselves to persuade the people that more benefits wil l  be 
obtained through communal farming . Tanzanian peas ants have been 
skeptical about communal l iving and farming because of the poor 
performance of such schemes . The history of s ettlement s chemes dates 
back to 1953 with the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation (TAC) , whi ch 
' 2 3 7  administered the area occupied by the defunct Groundnut S cheme . 
After independence , such s chemes were endorsed by the IBRD and incorporated 
into the Fir st Five Year Plan 196 4 - 6 9  which proposed to settle half a 
million people on 70 schemes costing over $ 3 0  million by 1969 . The 
" transformation approach" embodied in such s chemes failed to bring 
about the necessary changes . Large quantities of financial and physical 
• 
resources were channeled into these proj ects but the returns were 
236see G .  K . Helleiner , op . cit . , p .  1 97 , 
23 7see Maguire , op . cit . , p .  3 9 .  
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negligible .  Mechanization brought benefits in only a few areas , such 
as Upper Kiete �d the Mbulu Districts ; economics of scale were not 
obtained and settlers became disgruntled with their living conditions 
and with the performance of the government . Some even referred to 
2 38 themselves as "watumwe wa serikala" ( s laves of the government) .  
The TAC settlements were not socialist in any sense of the word . 
The main purpose was to promote a healthy and wealthy farmer class which 
could serve as a maj or force in the drive toward modernization . The 
s chemes failed because they lacked good co-ordination and organization 
and reinforced rather than eliminated the individualistic attitudes 
held by many farmers who continued to regard their activities as thei r  
own holdings . Genuinely social ist communities were established in · the 
early years but their results , too , were negligible . The most success-
ful of them were the 1 5  settlements linked through the Ruvuma Development 
Association , and they illustrated quite candidly that the people could , 
by their own efforts , initiate and successfully maintain a development 
23 9  program. But o n  the whole , government ' s  obj ectives of achieving 
a socialist society remained far from being accompli shed . Conflict 
between the principles of uj amaa and the trans formation approach 
became apparent for the l atter created sharp differences between the 
economic opportunities enj oyed by a few spoon fed by government aid and 
the opportunities available to the rest o f  the farmers . 
2 38see L . Cliffe and G. L. Cunningham , " Ideology , Organization and 
the S ettlement Experience in Tanzania" , in S aul and Cliffe (eds ) , op . cit . , 
p .  136 . 
2 39The Ruvuma Settlement has now been disbanded . 
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THE EMERGENCE OF A CLASS SYSTEM 
In earlier chapters it was stated that Tanzania was relatively free 
from ela• • • •  or a cl••• •tructur• · HO�•v•r , at th11 point in tha 
discussion , greater clarification and elaboration becomes necess ary even 
though the statement holds its validity . Unlike many former colonial 
nations , Tanz ani a  escaped much o f  the seamier sides of colonialism . Its 
s tatus as a UN trusteeship prevented the metropolitan country from 
embarking on wides cale exploitation of resources like that associated 
with international capitalism .  Colonial rule did not result i n  the 
perpetuation of classes on a maj or level , nor give ris e  to a powerful 
bourgeois with vested interest in the maintainance of that system. 
However ,  there existed a privileged class of educated and wealthy 
Tanzanians which clearly s tood apart from the maj ority o f  the people .  
However ,  they remained small in numbers by virtue of the fact that 
educational and administrative career opportunities were only made 
available to the indigenous population towards the end of colonial 
rule . 
To return to the subj ect of rural development , it becomes clearly 
�noticeable that the influence of colonial development policy had , to 
a certain extent , perpetuated divis ions within the rural country-side . 
Moreover , as Temu states , had the " trans formation approach succeeded it 
would have created a privileged class of rural capitalist in the midst 
of a vast sea of poor and often landless peasants 11 • 240 Indeed , early 
development policies resulted in isolated pockets of rural capital i sts , 
240 i 7 Temu , op . c t . , p .  3 
. •  
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e . g . , the maize farmers in Iringa ; tobacco growers in Tabora ; coffee 
farmers in Moshi and Bukoba and wheat growers in the Mbulu Distri ct .  I t  
i s  in thes e areas that the establishment an d  progress of uj amaa i s  
I 
slowes t .  Thus , i f  the leaders link a socialist society to a classless 
society , whi ch i s  clearly evident in the Arusha De claration , then · 
Tanzania is still a long way from being a socialist society . 
Tanzanian leaders have often been accused of not facing up to " the 
fact of class " within their society . 241 Yet the Arusha Declaration 
stands out as a policy document recognizing the existence of classes 
(especially the rural capitalists ) and inequal ities wit�in the system . 
The Declaration focused on the re al or potential situations of 
exploitation found in the urban areas where the greater portion of 
people with high incomes , prestigious j obs and high education are 
found . However , Nyerere was nonetheless aware that the wealthier rural 
peasants could assume the attitudes and trappings of a social class , whi le 
24 2  the rest remain downtrodden and poverty stri cken . 
A study made by Gary Thomas furni shes examples of inequalities in 
rural incomes and the development of classes , i . e . , in terms of income 
· differentials in the Mbulu District . In thi s  region , land is  rented out 
by the poorer to the wealthier farmers , who then increase their production 
by hiring labor . So much so , that in 1966 one Mbulu farmer was able to 
earn more money than the government pilot vil lage s ettlement at Upper 
24 1H ' ll ' t  i , op . ci . ,  p . 22 6 .  
242Nyerere , Freedom and Socialism ,  op . cit . , p .  233 . 
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Kietete . 24 3 The Kiwere Village Settlement also showed evidence of income 
di fferential s  where land is not communally owned . Progress ive farmers 
can get ahead because the yields from their plots are exclusively theirs , 
while incomes are the same on communally owned land such as Kietete . 
Although the renting of land and contracting of labor is illegal , Thomas 
believes that such measures were s ignificant factors in the increase of 
wheat production in the Mbulu area from 500 tons in 1959 to 1 , 000 tons 
in 1966 . Looking collectively at the rural areas , he concluded that 
rural incomes wil l  continue to differ substantially because people have 
varying access to the means of production and different motivation and 
skills . 2 44 
The maj or problem , according to Thomas , rested not with the 
farmers thems elves but with the nature of the economy , whi ch tended 
to encourage individual istic tendencies and acquisitiveness as wel l  
a s  dominant an d  subordinate roles . Such tendencies have now become so 
prevalent that they will be difficult to eliminate . I t  may be the case , 
as Thomas points out , that the elimination of such tendencies would 
prove detrimental to the Tanzanian economy but it would be inconsistent 
� wi th their stated socialist obj ectives if the political leaders allow 
such attitudes to persist . Here lies the dilemma . Thomas states that 
the government ' s prime concern should be the elimination of social 
class rather than the elimination of income di fferential , albeit , an 
2 4 3  h " . i 1 1 . l '  Garry T omas , Let Economic Strata Stay : Agr cu tura Capita ism 
and Rural Development in Tanzania" , East Africa Journal , Nov . 1967 , p .  3 0 .  
244�· ,  p .  31 .  
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important obj ective . Since the two are inextricably bound together , 
or appear to be , the elimination of one would quite possibly lead to the 
el imination of the other . Thus , time spent eradicating economic classes 
and the disparities of wealth may also have the benefit of bringing about 
egalitarian attitudes in the minds o f  the peopl e at large . 
Efforts to regroup the rural masses into vi llages and socialize the 
agricultural sector are directed towards the prevention of soc i al classes . 
The tradition of consensus at the national level has tended to make the 
desire for unity within the population at large even more desirable . 
Thus , it is not surprising that class conflict is downplayed and thought 
to be unimportant . However ,  problems concerning the correct s trategy for 
uj amaa have led to conflict at the national level , particularly within . 
government and party decision-making circle s . 
Problems have al so resulted from the implementation of uj amaa 
itself . The �arty has encountered great difficulty in persuading the 
I 
wealthier farmers to j oin in such schemes . H .  u .  E .  Theden van Velzen 
in his study dis covered that the wealthy peasants ( "kulaks " )  · formed 
a distinct elite in the rural areas together with the civil servant 
.. \:hey made up the " dominant coalition 11 • 245 Government officials tended 
to give kulaks preferential treatment ;  they owned the best land and 
occupied the most prestigious pos itions . During the period of study , 
39 officials ' _ functions were made available to Itumba p.easants _,. 2 6  
were occupied by the wealthy peasants who made up 20 p e r  cent of the 
24 5see H .  u .  E .  Thoden Van Velzen , " S taff , Kul aks and Peasants : 
A Study of a Political Field" , in . S aul and Cliffe ( eds ) , op . cit . , p .  262 . 
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population therefore , 20 per cent of the peasants occupy 66 per cent of 
the functions . Thoden Van Velzen concluded that wealthy peasants not 
only have a bigger share of official functions , but they also have a 
greater chance of becoming Party chairmen and assistants . (See Table on 
following page ) 
Wealthier peasants were found to have more political and economic 
clout , and their relationship with government officials often lends to 
the isolation of poorer peas�ts .  This tendency to give preferential 
treatment to a re stricted part of the population clearly runs against 
the grain of the Arusha Declaration and is clearly detrimental to the 
bui lding of social i sm in Tanzania .  This type o f  behavior tends to make . 
the poorer peasants hostile towards his wealthier . counterpart and 
distrustful of party and government officials . Although equality 
remains orie o f  the great pillars on which uj amaa rests , the poorer 
farmers are not unaware of the glaring inequalities that exist , e . g . , 
in suc h  areas as I smani ( an area of the I ringa District) where a sample 
of nine uj amaa villages revealed that 9 per cent of the households own 
47 per cent of the cattle , 51 per cent of the sheep and goats � 53 per 
·cent of the cultivated land and 96 per cent of the capital equipment . 246 
For a variety of reasons ( colonialism , land ownership patterns , 
motivation , etc . ) disparities in incomes have arisen in the rural ( as 
well as urban) areas . The political leaders recognized. the rising 
• 
clas s  of rural capitalist and devised a frontal approach , which allowed 
for the widespread mobilization' effort in the building of socialism .  
246T ' t  74 emu , op . ci . ,  p .  • 
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TABLE 5 . 1  
OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS OCCUPIED BY THE WEALTHIEST 
2 0% OF PEASANT HOUSEHOLDS - ITUMBA 
OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS 
1 .  Branch Chainnan TANU 
2 .  Secretary TANU 
3 .  Chairman VDC 1967 
4 .  Secretary V1'C 1967 
5 .  Chairman Self-Help Commi ttee 
6 .  Chairman Parent ' s  Conunittee 
7 .  Members VDC resident in I tumba 
8 . Recruited as wage laborers in 
government services 
9 .  Assessors Primary Court 
10 . Chainnan TANU cel l 
11 . Representative District Council 
(Diwani ) 
TOTAL NUMBER 
AVAILABLE 
l 
1 
1 
l 
1 
1 
6 
8 
3 
15 
1 
OCCUPIED BY THE 
WEALTHIEST 20% 
1 
l 
l. 
1 
1 
3 
5 
3 
9 
1 
Source : H .  u .  E .  Theden Van Velz en , " Staff , Kulaks and Peasant : A 
Study of a Political Field" , in Saul and Cliffe , ( eds ) , o.p . cit . , p . 165 . 
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But even thi s  did not establish socialism, as such, though it led to the 
eradication of many of the ill s associated with an underdeveloped 
agricultural economy . 
UJAMAA VILLAGES IN NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Uj arnaa villages are seen as the answers to combat the problems o f  
class an d  exploitation , thus , th e  development of such communitie s  are 
now a major preoccupation .
247 Some accounts have given a favorable review 
to thi qovernm1nt ' &  rural development policy �48 while othi�i h�ve geen 
severely erit�eal and quick to point out the shorteominqs . 24 9  However , 
any evaluation of uj amaa villages is difficult because of its rel atively 
brief existence . I t  will be some time before the full implications o f  
uj amaa i s  realized . Any study of rural sociali sm in Tanzania i s  somewhat 
handicapped by the unclear relationship of uj amaa villages to socialist 
trans formation . The purpose of uj amaa could be to bring about change 
from an agrarian to an industrial society or it could be seen as the 
solution to problems in a predominantly agricultural society .  However , 
the de-emphas i s  on industrialization has l ed to uj amaa being �ssociated 
primarily with the latter and for thi s  reason Hill purports that 
"peasantization"  rather than "proletarianization " will result giving 
2 50 rural producers a greater share in the decis ion making process .  
24 7s ee G .  K .  Hel leiner , op . cit . , p .  199 . 
2 48c . K .  Omari , " Tanzania ' s  Emerging Rural Development Policy" , 
Africa Today , Vol . XXI , 3 ,  1974 .  
24 9s ee I chiro Inukai , op . cit . 
250Hill , op . cit . , p .  25 3 .  
ls? 
I t  was stated earlier that many of the rural peasants were excluded 
from the benefits . of development and modernization . The Arusha Declaration 
and decentralization pol icy have made it clear that greater participation 
and s el f-help on the part of the masses is required if they are to share 
in the wealth of the nation . The question of local initiative i s  of 
great importance in the policy of socialist trans formation . Quite 
often leaders do not deal with peasants as a group with their own 
le9itimate interests as this would r'Wl contr�'Y to many of their socialist 
principles . The overridi.ng problem appears to be the degree to whi ch 
local initiative should be pen:nitted to go before it becomes inconsi stent 
with the national control necessary to oversee efficient functioning 
of the entire national economy . Although Nyerere and his follower s have 
devoted a great deal of time and literature to the place and importance 
of self�reliance and local initiative in the building of uj amaa villages , 
government action illustrates that in the implementation of uj amaa policy 
not everything will be left to the people to decide ; 
An element of compulsion seems to be entering into the implementation 
of uj amaa schemes , which may help to defeat the obj ective because such 
.. 
a poli cy calls  for a great deal of flexibility and caution . I f  expansion 
i s  forced or rushed there is the danger that the system may become too 
bureaucratized and the foundations for village development may be lost . 
Thus , leaders are preoccupied with devising methods to bring about 
I 
. . 
changes in individual behavior which will facilitate the achievement 
of national obj ectives . As Clyde R .  Ingle accurately points out , 
''Any effort aimed at changing the behavior of citizens is a combination 
· · - of persuasion on the one hand and coercion , or the threat of coercion 
1 5 8  
on the other11 • 251 It is stated in the Arusha Declaration and other 
policy documents , that uj amaa �ould not be built through force or the 
threat of force . However , there are many inconsistencies between stated 
national intentions and the implementation of poli cy . Ingle clearly 
demonstrates that compulsion is present in Tanzania ' s  rural development 
efforts . While Nyerere ' s  commitment to human freedom cannot be que stioned , 
Ingle maintains that , " • • •  the hard practicalities o f  rural change have 
252 
raised questions in hi s mind as to the l imits of persuasion and reason" . 
In certain case s , Ingle notes that people are being " forced to be free "  
an d  that the u s e  of force i s  " · · ·  tied to increasing frustration with 
the inability of the official to bring about the desired change by 
persuasion alone . 11 253 
Although the leaders emphasize the use of persuasion , there is a 
general acceptance of force by thos e  in the upper echelons , but more 
remarkably , the l egitimacy of force in development efforts is accepted 
by the people .  This has far reaching significance for the future 
development in Tanzania .  However ,  current implementation o f  rural 
development from Dar-es-Salaam proved impractical with or without the 
use of coerc ion -- decentralization was a nece ssary measure . ·  Neverthe-
less , there are dangers within the measure itsel f ,  for as Ingle points 
out , the freedom of decis ion given to local communities could result 
2 51clyde R. Ingle , " Compulsion and Rural Development in Tanzania" 
The Canadian Journal of African Studies , IV , 1 ,  1970 , p. 77 . 
252
Ibid . , p .  82 
. 253�. ,  p .  84 . 
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in their deciding to do nothi.ng . 254 Not all Tanzanian ' s are willing to 
accept or participate in communal activities and there have been reported 
instances of over enthusiastic party officials using force to obtain 
participation . Often , ordinary farmers are forced to j oin development 
s chemes , while village leaders do not participate but use hired labor 
to work their own plots . Thoden Van Velzen found that in Itumba , party 
officials escaped from working in the agricultural programs , while 
villagers were made to participate and were expected to build and 
. t . h 
. 
f ff " . 1 
255 
main ain ouses o o icia s .  
Since 1969 , uj amaa villages have been the prime instrument in 
Tanzania ' s  agricultural development . The Dodoma region became the area 
of c entral focus ; it was to be a '' showcase for the benefits of socialist 
transformation 11 • 2
56 In 1973 , it was stated that 15 per cent of all 
Tanzanians lived in uj amaa villages but this figure tells very little 
about actual participation which tends to vary from region to region . 
For example , in the Kilimanj aro and Shinyanga region s , only l per cent 
of the population live in uj arnaa villages ,  while 64 per cent 
'
of the 
population in the Mtwara region participated in such schemes . Such 
"variations are rel ated to the differences in customary land tenure 
patterns and the availability of new land in di fferent areas for the 
uj amaa campaign . The larger and wealthier landowners such as the Chagga 
have offered severe resistance to uj amaa schemes , thus , making i t  
254 Ibid . , p .  100 . 
255Thoden Van Velzen , op . cit . , P •  158 .  
2 56Hill , op . cit . , p .  2 3 7 . 
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difficult for government to enforce changes in land tenure patterns . 
Land i s  nationali zed but areas of private holdings do persist outside 
and in spite of government efforts to integrate them into uj amaa programs . 
TABLE 5 . 2  
TOTAL NUMBER OF UJAMAA VILLAGES AND THEIR ESTIMATED POPULATION 
ACCORDING TO REGION ON 31 MAY , 1 9 7 3 .  
REGION 
Arusha 
Coas t 
Dodoma 
I ringa 
Kigoma 
· Kilimanj aro 
Mara 
Mbeya 
Morogoro 
Lindi 
Mtwara 
Mwanza 
Ruvuma 
Shinyanga 
Singida 
Tabora 
Tang a 
West Lake 
' Total 
NUMBER 
95 
188 
336  
6 5 9  
1 2 9  
2 4  
2 7 1  
7 1 5  
1 1 8  
589 
1 , 103 
2 8 4  
242  
108 
263 
174 
245 
85 
5 , 62 8 
POPULATION 
2 0 , 11 2  
115 , 3 82 
3 7 8 , 9 1 5  
2 4 3 , 5 2 7  
114 , 3 91 
4 , 934 
108 , 068 
103 , 67 7  
1 9 , 73 2 
169 , 093 
466 , 0 9 8  
4 9 , 846 
4 2 , 38 5  
12 , 05 2  
5 9 , 4 2 0  
2 9 , 2 95 
7 7 , 95 7  
13 , 28 0  
2 , 02 8 , 168 
AVERAGE 
POPULATION 
PER VILLAGE 
2 11 
6 1 3  
1 , 12 7 
3 6 9  
886 
2 05 
3 98 
145 
16 7 
2 8 7  
4 2 2  
175  
175 
111 
2 2 5  
168 
3 18 
156 
3 60 
PERCENT OF 
TOTAL 
· POPULATION 
3 
2 1  
4 7  
2 9  
2 2  
l 
16 
9 
3 
3 6  
64 
4 
9 
l 
12 
5 
7 
2 
. 15 
Source : Peter Temu , " The Uj amaa E.xperiment" , Ceres , July , August , CXCVI I , p .  72 . 
The Dodoma scheme illustrates many problems that have to be faced 
I 
in the e stablishment of uj amaa villages , such as the poverty of many 
�egions . Al though there i s  heavy dependence on government aid , all 
settlements cannot be financed in such manner , moreover ,  such dependence 
. 2 57 
is damaging to , the spirit of uj amaa . The main problem is that uj amaa 
257svenson . , op . cit . , p .  185 • 
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of uj amaa villages in Tanzania , but it is too early to say categorically 
that rural development policy has failed . Some of the problems are 
technical and can be remedied with greater foresight and preparation , 
but others whi ch are structural , e . g . , traditionalism and paternalism , 
are more difficult to correct . Many wealthy farmers have taken 
advantages of loopholes found within the system and rural development 
has been complicated by the intractibility of peasant farmers as a 
whole . A new farmer conservatism i s  said to be emerging which could be 
a drawback to the development of uj amaa villages and the spreading of 
. 2 60 
sociali st principles . However , the extent to which this attitude 
exists is still unclear but makes an additional problem which must 
be squarely faced . 
The difficulties encountered in the immediate post-independent 
years made it impossible for government to deliver the promised goods and 
there was a great deal of similarity between the policies of the 
indigenous government and the old colonial administration . The threat 
of force continued in the effort to stimulate greater production in the 
rural areas , but the government also sought to use self-help techniques 
·to increase economic development . However ,  citizens did not respond as 
the nationalist leaders thought th7y would and many assumptions on which 
early rural development policy was based. had to be revised . 
The leaders of Tanzania have been constantly changing and rearranging 
I 
their ideas to cope with the problems of a society undergoing rapid social , . I 
· economic and political change . There is  still conflict over the type of 
260 . Inukai , ,  op . cit . , p .  23 . 
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soc iety to be built , between those who subscribe to a more revolutionary , 
Marxist-Leninist ideology and those , e . g . , Nyerere , who believe in a 
less radical , less ideological model of economic development . I t would 
be erroneous to think that Nyerere ' s  ideas represent the whole gamut of 
beliefs in Tanzania .  There are many shades o f  opinions but all are 
subsumed within the national ideology where they do not con flict with 
the basic tenets on whi ch the system is  based . Nyerere ' s  ideas have 
been called idealistic because of hi s belief that the rural peasants can 
be led by reason and example . On the whole , there has been little 
spontaneity on ·the part of the masses ; many are still attuned to the 
traditional way of life . Progress , thus far , has usually conformed to 
Nyerere ' s  concept of villagization , while most villages have been formed 
in poor areas with very little potential . There have been few instances 
of conversion from individual to conununal farming and development 
activities seem to benefit the more progressive farmers .  
Education for self-reliance and the new emphas i s  on self-help in 
· development proj ects are important measures to ensure a fairer distribution 
of the benefits of modernization . Moreover , the " frontal " attack on 
•'development , i . e . , large-scale villagization , to trans form rural society 
is important in mobilizing support for a socialist society . I t  is  
c learly evident that Tanzanian peasants are not averse to  capitalist ideas , 
attitudes and values . Indeed , many are in favor of the capitalist 
mode of production and distribution . This i s  amply illustrated by the 
degree of competition , economic independence , seizure of land , concentration 
of production in a few hands and the hiring of laborers . Only with a 
successful policy o f  villagization , L e . , when all the people understand 
164 
and accept the goals of uj amaa , will capitalistic attitudes and values 
begin to disappear . Villagization will not eradicate all the ills 
with which Tanzania is faced , nor can it guarantee the establishment 
I 
and maintainance of a socialist society . 
At present , there seems to be a reluctance to confront the exploiters 
of labor and the existing system of capitalist production . Although the 
maj or means of production have been nationalized and limitations placed 
on foreign investments ,  Tanzania cannot be said to be a truely socialist 
economy . 261 Despite stated sociali st obj ectives they are still producing 
for a world market on the same. principles as any other producer , thus , 
collective ownership is  clearly not enough to prevent the . capitalist - mode 
of production . In 1965 , 1967 , and 1968 , large scale nationalization 
policies were implemented because leaders regarded such as a pre-
. . f . l ' 
262 d 1 t h '  . l '  requisite or socia ism an a so a means o ac ieve socia ism .  The 
policy of national ization created many problems , the most important 
being its relationship to socialism which remained very ambiguous . It 
i s  unc1ear whether nationalization undermined the Party ' s role by putting 
decision-making in the hands of experts for it created a "new class " ,  
i . e . , managers , who fall outside both state and Party structures . 
Parastatals are " states within a state " . consuming scarce resources 
and retarding socialist transformation . 
Issa G .  Sh!vj i holds the view that the economic bureaucracy actively 
26lwallerstein , op . cit ., p .  2 3 ,  
262Peter Temu , "Nationalization in Tanzania" , East Africa Journal , 
June , 1967 , p .  4 0 .  
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resi sts socialist measures (such as worker participation ) and perpetuates 
neo-colonial ties because it has a sociai base in the international 
2 63 
bourgeoisie . Although thi s  may be di sputed , it is  apparent that the 
ambiguous relationship of nationalization poses a threat to the building 
of socialism in Tanzania because parastatals involve elite interests . 
Neither nationalization nor villagization are guaranteed to wipe out 
elitism or inequalities ,  for the latter has yet to produce patterns of 
bebavioi conoucive to soci•li&t transformation . Rene Pumont pointed 
out that " • • •  rural society in Tanzania is still hierarchical . The 
democratic principles in the co-operatives , for example , is  s carcely 
respected except in appearance ; it is  not accepted in reality or in fact , 
· 264 nor in the depth of the people ' s  minds " .  
The building of socialism will no doubt take place in an atmosphere 
of constant struggle against those who are privileged . Shivj i ' s call 
for a revolutionary vanguard to direct the process  of socialist 
reconstruction seems redundant at this point in time because Nyerere 
and his followers are clearly in command of the situation . However ,  
the " struggle " must be intelligently guided to ensure that the spirit 
- of enterprise is  not destroyed and that the number of progressive 
farmers is not decreased by restri?ting them from employing paid workers . 
Although thi s may be difficult to reconcile .with progres s  to socialis t  
equality , i t  should also b e  remembered that progress in .agricultural 
263Issa G.  Shivj i ,  "Tanza�ia : The Silent Class Smuggle " , in Saul 
and Cliffe , (eds ) , op . cit . , p .  321 . 
264Rene D:umont , "Tanzanian Agriculture After the Arusha Declaration " , 
Dar�es-Salaam s :  The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning , 
1969 , p .  36 . 
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development has been effected largely by an increase in the numbers of 
progressiv� farmers . Inequalities must be recognized when working out 
the organization of production and the structure of incentives . Moreover , 
local strategies need to be worked out on the basis  of a class analysis , 
which has been downplayed somewhat by the Tanzanian leaders . 
The Tanzanian peasants are not revolutionary and it is  necessary for 
the goals o f  socialist transformation to develop a socialist conciousness 
in the rural areas . Villagization will help towards this end , especially 
i! trained cadre• are brou;ht within the 1cheme to work an4 live with the 
peasants . While villagization may be successful in influencing change s in 
behavior and attitudes of rural inhabitants , it may not fulfil the equally 
important function of promoting economic development . Studies have demonstrated 
time and time again that "modernizing elite s "  are necessary elements in the 
process of development in emerging nations . Dumont pointed out the 
necessity of having an elite in Tanzania for this  very purpose and the 
possibility of social advance by work had to be present . A more accurate 
assessment of villagization and self-help polic ies will be necessary at 
some future date . Far-reaching goal s have been set and it is too early 
to say whether Tanzania wil l  become a genuine socialist state or repeat 
the steps taken by others such as Uganda or Kenya into a neo-colonialist 
state . Ultimately ,  the success of uj amaa villages will depend increasingly 
on industrialization ; "They cannot be built on the hoe-economy for they 
would hold out no advantage whatsoever to its members vi s-a-vis individual 
pea�ants11 • 265 
· 2 65I ssa G .  Shivj i ,  op . cit . , p .  · 3 2 1 . 
CHAPTER VI 
STABILITY AND INSTABILITY 
Political stability has been a goal that has eluded many deve loping 
nations of Africa , Tanzania has managed to avoid maj or upheavals , with 
the exception of the army mutiny in 1964 266 whi ch has had lasting damage 
on the political system , To the extent that political stabil ity has 
prevailed , economi c deve lopment has been gre atly enhanced . The existarice 
of politi cal s tability doe s not gua�antee success in deve lopment 
obj ectives , but in Tanzania it· ha� faci litated the ease with which 
controversial economic and pol iti cal me asures have been introduced and 
accepted by the population at large . 
The task of economic development enj oys the highest priority in 
many African s tates and i s  s een by the political leaders as the only 
means to prevent the return of colonialism in the di sgui sed "neo-
colonial " manner , However ,  political and economic development and 
moderniz ation tends to bring about a certain amount o f  di sorder and 
dis location in the newly independent countrie s , 2 67 Although development 
and modernization , in some instances , can be undertaken without mass�ve 
amounts of instability and disorganization , there are still many 
instances in whi ch instability must be controlled if a development 
elite is to survive ·the opening phas e s  of its process of change and 
' 
266see Bienen , 1967 , og,. cit . , pp ., 36 3-3 8 1 .  
2 67 Refer to Robert � .  Clark , Development and r'nstability : Political 
Chan�e in the Non-Western World , ·Dryden Press , (division of Holt , 
Rinehart & Winston ) , 1974 ,  pp , 101�io3 . 
l f; 7 
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re form. 
Many Afric� �overnments are faced with situations which , if  left 
unattended ,. can lead to instability . This  is  due primarily to the fact
. 
that many such countries lack a unifying factor . The possibility of 
tribal animosity , the inherent weakness of the administrative framework 
and the rudimentary existance of a national identity all constitute 
threats to the new nation . 
Tanzania ' s  success  in building a national identity has been made 
possible only by outlawing tribal parties , forbidding tribal agitation 
and ruling against the formation of religious political groups . Indeed , 
Tanzania " • • •  promoted a vigorous socialization program and developed 
2 68 imaginative national goals , ideologies , slogans and symbols " . Thus , 
the fear of secession and the threat of regional separatism , common to 
many sub.-Saharan African countries  is largely absent in Tanzania . This 
has enabled the government to direct greater attention and time towards 
the more pressing political and economic needs of the country , e . g . , 
strengthening administrative and party structures and ameliorating some 
of the more unpleasant problems , e . g . , income inequalities , especially 
in the rural areas . 
Since independence ,  Tanzania has been faced with many economic 
crises which seemed to threaten the very fabri c of society but the 
political leaders have retained control . A cursory glance at the 
countries of tropical Africa reveals that many one-party systems have 
been dissolved because they failed to cope adequately with various 
268Benyamin Neuberger , "Has the Single Party Failed in Africa? " ,  
African Studies Review , Vol . XVII ,:  No . 1 ,  April 1974 ,  p .  176 . 
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economic crises . Attempts to introduce unpopular measures ,  e . g . , taxation , 
have led to the downfall of many single-party governments . 269 The lack 
of political stability in many developing nations has had detrimental 
effects on the efficiency of government action in the economic sphere . 
Theories of ins tability in developing areas stress five or more 
related factors to account for such phenomenon . They are , cultural 
heterogeneity , low regime legitimacy , lack of coercive power , economic 
backwardness and structural simplicity .
2 70 Some of these points have 
already been mentioned but to recap briefly , cul tural heterogeneity 
of the developing nations results in a lack of shared values , therefore , 
loyalty rests with an entity other than the state . Political ins titutions 
are said to lack legitimacy both legally and morally and are thus , 
' 
unable to enforce desired behavior patterns within its citi zen s . 
Economic backwardness results from the incapacity o f  the new state to 
provide goods and services which meet existing demands . Generally 
speaking , in new societies , blood ties tend by and large to be the 
basis of social organi zation with a predominance of primary groups in 
social interaction . Such a structure is said to reinforce arid perpetuate 
• the differences between groups in contrast to complex societies where 
overlapping membership in various organizations minimizes group 
d .  d . d fl ' 2 71 isor er an con ict . 
Having outlined the most common causes o f  disorder in new s tates , 
269Ibid . , p .  177 . 
-2?0see Calude Ake , "Explaining Political Instability in New States " ,  
Journal of Modern African Studies , Vol . II , No . 3 ,  197 3 , p .  34 7 . 
2 71Ibid . , 'pp . 353-356 .  
-
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a definition is required of the terms s tability and in stability . Claude 
Ake defines politi cal in stability as the frequency of the flow of · 
exchanges . The more frequent the flow of pol iti cal exchanges ,  the 
more stability there is . 2 72 Political in stability can thus be des cribed 
as irregularitie s or disturbances in the flow of political exchange . 
Whenever political exchanges deviate from the established pattern , 
politi cal ins tabi lity is likely to occur . Instabi lity in one form or 
1nxiaty"  fz:1quantly aHociatad with many of the new 11ader1 . That t a , 
the fear of not being in control of government tempered by a profound 
distrust of politi cal opponent s . 2 7 3 In Tanzani a ,  the operation of the 
single party sys tem has worked to minimi ze fear of political opposition 
by extending membership to a substanti al section of the. population . 
I t  has been stated that elites have been the maj or source o f  
instability i n  developing nation s  an d  that mil itary coups are likely 
to occur in almost any kind of conflict situation . However , elite 
behavior in Tanza.�ia i l lustrates that the size and nature o f
1
the elite 
has reinforced c onformity rather than perpetuate conflict within the 
political arena . Moreover , the relatively smal l army of little more 
than 14 , 000 men has insufficient power or support to enable i t  to play 
a maj or role in government i f  ever a crisis erupted . 
There are many factors , social , economic and political whi ch have 
helped the experiment in basic democracy by minimizing the degree o f  
2 72�. , p . 359 . 
273 Ibid . , :P • 359 . 
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conflict producing situations in Tanzania . To begin with , Europeans 
were but few in number ; there was little land alienation ; tribal , if 
not racial , tension was never intense and tribal authorities were 
severly limited in their area of j urisdiction ; Swahili provided a 
common medium of communication ; national poverty ensured a lack of 
socio-economic differentiation ; and Nyerere provided the nation with 
astute leadership .  
The fight to eradicate economic backwardness has taken on new 
dimensions in Tanzania . The call to make the entire state a land of 
peasants and workers and to regroup settlements into uj amaa villages 
can be realized only i f  the political system maintain s its stability , 
i . e . , i f  demands �o not increase at a rate faster than which the 
government can fulfil them . Political stabil ity has been. derived from 
the extreme poverty of people and country and has enabled the government 
to deal with press ing economic problems (such as health , education and 
nutrition ) which it would not otherwise be able to if scarce resources 
had to be deployed in the maintainance of national unity . Political 
stability in the face of extreme poverty run s contrary to the grain of 
.. popular thinking . 2 74 Yet Tanzania clearly illustrates that a country 
does not have to be wealthy to be stable . However , political stability 
has made for easier and quicker relaying of development plans , and even 
more important , for wider acceptance of such goals and rapid 
mobilization towards their fulfilment . 
2 74see Fred R .  Von der Mehden , Comparative Politi cal Violence , 
New Jersey : Prentice-Hall Inc . , 1973 , · see e specially Chapter 6 .  
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The major developmental obj ective s of the Tanzanian government , 
i . e . , bui lding s9ciali sm via the establishment of  uj amaa villages 
requires high levels of mobilization . Social mobilization brings with 
it increases in human expectations . The development program of the 
Tanzanian govenunent hopes �o increase the capacity of the soc iety to 
satisfy these expectations and simultaneously reduce social frustrations 
and consequent political instability . While political stability is 
necessary i f  economic development is  to take place , 275 the latter tends 
to be an overwhelming de-stabil izing process in the developing countries .  
According to Huntington , economic development produces individuals who 
have lost their family ties ; creates a class of "nouveaux riches " 
seeking power to match their new status ; increases geographical 
mobi lity ; widens the gap between rich and poor ; requires .restrictions  
in certain areas , e . g . , consumption ; increases literacy , education 
and exposure to the medi a;  aggravates conflicts over distribution and 
t . d ak f . . 2 76 consump ion ; an m es or group organization . 
Clearly social mobilization and economic development result in a 
great deal of social frustration to the individual and to society at 
large . The TANU government has taken a more active role in economic 
matters in recent years , thereby reducing conflict which would arise  if 
key areas of the economy were left in private hands . Tanzania ' s  history 
275until quite recently Lebanon was the most stable and prosperous 
country in the Middle East . When the political crisi s erupted this 
had adverse effects on the lev�l of savings and investments which 
consequently led to a decline in the levels of economic performance . 
276see Samuel P .  Huntington ,· Political Order in Changing Societies , 
New Haven : Yale University Press , 1968 , pp . 49-50 .  
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of political stability and social cohesion has worked towards a greater 
acceptance of the burdens and sacrifices which rapid economic development 
calls for , Moreover ,  stability figures largely in the speed with which 
government has been able to take a controlling interest in many firms 
and totally nationalizing others , e � ·g .  , banks and insurance companie s . 
Although inequalities in land ownership and income are potentially 
dangerous to the economic system -� there is a widespread feeling that the 
government , working in concert with TANU � ' is  capable of controlling the 
economic progress of the country and dividing the wealth in an equitable 
fashion , I t  is doubtful whether the population at large would hold the 
degree of confidence in the leadership for the management of the economy , 
if  the political climate was less conducive to economic development . 
Northern Ireland furnishes a good example of the ruinous effects of 
political instability on the economy . Political stability has proved a 
positive advantage for Tanzania in the economic sphere . For instance , 
foreign investment , although comprising only a minor part in the total 
investment , continues to rise steadily and may be due , in part , to the 
predictability of the regime . one industry that has profited i s  that of 
' tourism , although it has not yet been fu1ly exploited . Over�11 , political 
stability has enable� the leadership to concentrate its efforts where 
it is most needed , in the rural areas , upgrading and improving the life 
of the poorer rural peasantry . 
• 
The foundations of political stability in Tanzania , at this point 
in time , seem to be, in contrast to other African states , relatively 
solid . Support for the regime is widespread among its citizens . The 
system of poli�ics which has evolved in Tanzania is designed to provide 
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a democratic core which ensures and encourages meaningful and widespread 
participation . 277  Surveys illustrate that there are high levels of 
political involvement and a strong belief in the efficacy of government 
action . 2 78 Information and decision-making flow both upward and 
downward along government and party structures , though the important 
decisions are made by top government and party officials . There is  little 
reason to assume that the existance of an organized formal opposition 
(which proved meaningless during 1961-1965 ) could ensure a more stable 
or more "democratic "  functioning of the system . Imperfections within 
the system are obvious . The trend towards elitism within the leadership 
and a lack of appreciation of maj or policy decisions are but two areas 
of concern . More important , however , is the institutionalization of a 
Bill of Rights and other safeguards which would work toward enhancing 
the democratic nature and stability of the political system . However ,  
in the light of the continuing erosion of democracy in developing 
countries , the achievements of Tanzania , especially in the areas of 
2 7 9  
personal liberty and freedom , still remain noteworthy . 
Among developing nations , Tanzania is  almost singularly . fortunate 
"' in having a strong symbolic capability .  Although lacking in . national 
symbols in comparison to other African states , the President and TANU 
provide the nation with its most important symbols of national unity 
2 7 7christian P .  Potholm , Four African Political Systems , New Jersey : 
Prentice-Hall Inc , , 1970 , p .  154 � 
' ·  
2 78see K. Prewitt and Goran Hayden , "Voters Look at the Elections " ,  
in Clif�e (ed) , One Party Democracy , op . cit. , p .  2 77  
279Potho� , op . cit . , p .  155 . 
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and integration . As Potholm points out , "the system clearly enj oys a 
legitimacy based . on a frugal , honest , almost humble style of national 
leadership 11 • 280 The credibility of the system is reinforced not only by 
the behavior of the national leadership , but also by behavior of the 
citizens . Students , often said to be alienated from society because 
of their position , are found to be trusting of government and interested 
in matters of state . 
The symbolic capability of the regime is also reinforced by the 
national ideology which provides a basic , if  un specifi c , set of supports 
for the government . Tanzania ' . s socialism i s  not a rigid doctrine --
subscribing to any one ideological position . It i s  at once flexible and 
pragmatic and many of its ideals strike a humanitarian note . Thus , it 
is  relatively easy for most , if not all , to accept at least partially 
some of its obj ectives . Freedom, political development , democratic 
decision-making , welfare and economic development are the maj or goals 
of the political system . They are impressive , if not over ambitious , 
in the light of obstacles which cloud the chances of success � The 
leadership is confronted by staggering problems in the areas of 
literacy , communication s , economic development and manpower . ·  Moreover , 
the extractive capability of the system is relatively small . There are 
few resources to exploit while pressures of population continue to 
mount , e . g . , in terms of providing sufficient food . The distributive 
• 
capability of the system i s  similarly weak because of the lack of 
available goods and services , However , the leaders have comrili.tted 
280Ib ' d I --L· ,  . p .  170 . 
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themselves to allocating rewards on the basis of equality and merit , 
speaking out aga�nst a society ordered by classes . 
If , as Martin c .  Needler points out , policies of government 
have a bearing on political stability , then the "egalitarianism" evident 
in Nyerere ' s  proposals has considerable s_ign�f icance for Tanzania ' s 
political stability . Government has redistributed land , wealth and 
education and through its various village development schemes , 
encour_aged communal farming in order to promote the "greatest good for 
the greatest number" . Efforts have been directed toward mitigating 
inequalities between urban and rural areas , especially in the field of 
income . Restrictions  have been placed on the economic behavior of 
party and government officials to ensure that they do not become a 
privileged class . This does not , however ,  mean that inequalities between 
all groups in society have been eradicated . For instance , there are 
still gaps between the life styles of a top level government official 
and a lower-level official , but laws do exist to ensure that officials 
do not use their positions for self-benefit at the expense of the people 
at large . 
Groups are drawn into the political process and are permitted a 
degree of expression seldom found in newly developing African states . 
If  one compares Tanzania with Ghana under the Convention Peoples ' 
Party , it is clear that groups in the former country now enj oy a greater 
amount of autonomy . After the 1970 General Election the National 
Assembly became a more vigorous body , with MP ' s  who were more critical 
o� government policies than they had been in the past . However , the 
legislature remains a bastion of support for the T� government .  There 
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seems to be much room for improvement in the government ' s  attitude toward 
groµps . Althou�h they are permitted to function , various restrictions 
are placed on their behavior for both economic and political reasons . 
The Tanzanian Students Union had 3 93 of its members expelled by Nyerere 
in 1966 when they staged a protest against National Service . In 1974 , 
" stern warnings " were issued to workers who had caused industrial 
2 81 unrest . Thus , while groups are permitted to exist , they do so only 
to the extent that they do not threaten the existing status quo . At 
every level unity is preserved by the maintainance of the one-party 
I 
system , stress on broad-based policies and constant reminder of outside 
282 enemies attempting to divide the people . 
The single-party system has survived and shows every evidence of 
persisting in Tanzania even in the aftermath of Nyerere . Indicators of 
chronic instability are numerous in developing countries and have led 
many scholars to conclude that the single-party system simply cannot 
prevent instability . In fact , Benyamin Neuberger pointed out that the 
one-party state is inherently unstable . because it forces its opponents 
int ' 11 l . . . 283  o 1 ega act1v1t1es . In light of this , it appears that the 
potential for political instability in Tanzania clearly exi sts . The 
style of politics i s  relatively closed and the decision-making arena is 
11 d 1 . 
2 84 
a sma an exc usive one . Thus , while Tanzania has achieved one of 
281Refer to Colin Legum , Africa Contemporary Record , London : Rex­
Collings , 1974-1975 , p .  B286 . 
282Hopkins ,  1971 , op . cit . , p .  34 . 
283 Neuberger ,  1971 , op . cit . , p .  174 . 
284H k '  1971 it 241 _ op ins , , op . c  . ,  p .  • 
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the central goals of political development , i . e .  stability , it cannot , 
however ,  be said to be a fully democratic country . The political elite 
continues to dominate the maj or decision-making organs of government with 
very little outside control or influence by the non-elite . 
There exists , at present , a wide consensus among the elite on the 
rules for a closed system of politics and this is likely to be 
strengthened over time . The institutionalization of political roles , 
although still in its early stages , has led to greater predictability in 
political behavior . For instance , the powers of administrators were 
reduced without any maj or disruptions . In general , it is  unlikely that 
deviant behavior of great magnitude will occur ,· if members of the elite 
accept and are sati sfied with the rules for p�liticai action and 
think that deviant behavior is likely to be unsuccessful and result in 
great deprivation . However , if the system becomes sufficiently 
unresponsive , there is the possibility that individual elites may begin 
to develop interests outside the main arena , which could lead to 
conflict with the official ideology . In addition , failure to co-opt 
new elites  and expand its membership may lead to severe dysfunctions 
and eventual collapse of the system . 
There are relatively stable patterns in the growth and development 
of the Tanzania leadership but it remains essentially elitist . An 
expansion in the formation of leaders is necessary if Tanzania wishes 
to avoid alienation of its citizens from its rulers -- a situation 
loaded with potential instability . Moreover ,  while many high ideals 
are incorporated into the leadership rules , it is quite clear th'at 
many leaders a�e lacking in some of the socialist characteristics 
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popularized by the Arusha Declaration . Thus , not only are improvements 
needed in the qu?ntity but also in the quality of the Tanzanian 
leadership . 
Whatever potential or actual threat , elitism , and repression of 
opposition may pose to the system , it appears that the greatest danger 
to future stability will probably come from non-ideological sources .  
K·•: . E .  Svenson remarks that "the worst enemy of a socialist policy in 
any African country is  bad economic performance .  The expectations of 
the people cannot be removed by a higher political conciousness . 
Socialism must prove its case . in the very short run 11 • 285 The weakness 
of Tanzania ' s  economic base is  clearly· evident . Nyerere ' s  attempt to 
introduce a new way of li fe for the rural inhabitants has met with 
less success than anticipated . In addition , attempts to change ingrained 
rural customs has proved problematic in areas steeped in traditionalism .  
Party workers and officials have found it increasingly difficult to 
persuade the peasants to voluntarily effect a social revolution . 
The potential for political instability in government ' s  efforts to 
resettle peasants into planned villages is apparent . While it has 
proved relatively easy to persuade poorer peasants to j oin uj arnaa 
villages ,  the more wealthy peasants strongly resent the relinquishing 
of their pos sessions . The first political murder ,  that of a regional 
commission , Dr . Wilbert Klerruu , in December 1974 was said to have 
I . 
resulted from the resentment of wealthy peasants against collectivization 
of their land . Those involved in the assasination were accused of 
285w .  Tordoff and Ali A. Mazrui , "The Left and The Super Left in 
Tanzania" , Journal of Modern African Studies , x ,  3 ,  1972 , p .  439 . 
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counter-revolutionary plotting , as it was believed that they had 
drawn up plans t� murder several cabinet ministers . The incident gave 
rise for concern but did not lead to any signi ficant degree of instabil ity . 
However ,  opposition to government policy still occurs in Kilimanj aro , 
Tanga and other wealthy areas . In spite of this , efforts to bring about 
a socialist transformation of the rural areas continues .  Success 
continues to be slow but notable achievements have been made , e . g . , 
Dodoma . Nyerere believes that much of this i s  due to increased co­
operation between political workers , agricultural workers and other civil 
servants following the implementation of decentralization policies . 
Although the full effects of such a strategy i s  not yet known , 
decentralization has thus far , helped to stimulate local participation 
while simultaneously establishing channels at variou·s levels  for the 
expression of discontent . The potential for conflict between center 
and periphery , albeit not completely eradicated , has been minimized by 
the introduction of decentralization . Yet in the final analysis , 
Tanzania ' s political stability will depend largely on whether the 
center can cope with the increasi.ng demands of the periphery on 
national goals . 
Tanzania ' s last population census in 1967 gave the total as 
12 , 2 31 , 000 . With an estimated population growth of 2 . 7 per annum ,  the 
total by the end of 1 974 was c .  15 , 000 , 000 . Population pressures 
coupled with the greatly increased cost of food and fertilizer prices 
dealt the colintry a severe blow. In 1974 , a sufficient supply of grain 
was secured at the price of committing nearly half of Tanzania.' s 
reserves to payi.ng for imported: grain . As the cost of living ·rose and . 
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food shortages became more common , government popularity decreased . 
Nyerere persona�ly came under attack and there were painted signs 
calling for his resignation and for a new leader . Nyerere continues his 
call for hard work and constantly reminds his people of the obj ectives 
which they yet have to achieve . But there are indications from the 
rural areas that people are increasingly angry at the force being 
applied . 
Low levels of economic performance appear to be the maj or threat 
to the stability of Tanzania , yet such stability is vital if increases 
in both industrial and agricultural production are to come about . The 
1970 • s  have shown that instability may be caused by discrepancies in the 
social and economic areas (despite massive government efforts to reduce 
inequality in living standards) in advancement opport�ities and 
between urban and rural areas . If  the rate of success of present 
government policies and social mobi lization steadily increase bringing 
demands which do not overload the system , then political instability 
might be avoided . Indeed , more responsive policies are needed from the 
government in order to produce greater harmonization of the social 
processes and a greater balance between aspirations and opportunities , 
between political demands and political capabilities . 
Overall , the areas for potential instability in Tanzania are many . 
They are at once political , social and economic . However ,  the social 
and economic policies of the government have reduced severe inequalities 
in living standards , in opportunities bet�een urban· and rural areas and 
between the public and private sectors , In order to stave off the more 
rampant ills associated with modernization and industrialization the 
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rate of urbanization has been deliberately s lowed . In the political 
sphere , however �  deviations in the military could lead to future 
instability . But the reorganization of the army and its politicization 
at all levels through the establishment of party cells , guarantees a 
degree of loyalty to the exi sting regime quite rare in the African 
context . Regular contact between high rankirig officers and civil 
servants , the second Vice-President and the President lessens the 
likelihood of the military aspiring to the leadership role . 
According to Hopkins ,  the Presidency has the greatest potential 
for instability .  He states , " if Nyerere were to alter his style of 
behavior ,  act independently of the law ,  or fail to use the powers of his 
office to reinforce the currently emerging system norms , importa�t 
ch�ges could occur 11 • 2 86 However ,  it seems unlikely that Nyerere ' s  
future behavior will deviate significantly from that of the past ·or 
present.  The system , to a great extent , draws much of its strength 
and iinportance from present presidential performance . The test for the 
Tanzanian political system will come when a changeover of power becomes 
necessary . Already , the ground rules for orderly change by established 
procedures have been laid . But it remains to be seen whethe·r political 
authority and above all legitimacy can be retained and maintained by 
Nyerere ' s  successor . Although the foundations of political stability · 
seem fairly solid at this point in time , the fluidity o f  the African 
• 
political scene works to defy hard and fast conclusions . However , in 
the forseeable future , as lo.n9 as Nyerere retains control ,  political 
286Hopkins , : 1971 , op . cit . , PP • 2 3 3  .. 234 . 
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stability seems likely to persist and will figure largely in Tanzania ' s 
efforts to achieve economic development and modernization . Throughout 
his period as leader , Nyerere has achieved a great deal of power both · 
personal and in the office of the Pre sidency . I f  such an office can 
retain , " .  � .  it ' s  authority and dominance in decision-making , 
fissiparious tendencies wil l  somehow be checked , congruence among major 
political roles will  be reinforced i and the system will likely remain 
stable" . 287 
287 i �. , p . 2 34 . 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
As a developing country , Tanzania stands out not only for its 
efforts to achieve a higher standard of living for all its inhabitants , 
but also for its efforts to accomplish equality through socialism . In 
the immediate post-independence years , it  was much like any other 
developing nation . The Parliamentary system of government operated 
without little effect on the lives of the rural masses while foreign and 
private investors continued to dominate economic life . TANU had no 
coherent philosophy and its leaders had not yet committed themselves 
to a policy of socialism .  For the most part , they continued to enjoy 
the benefits of independence without great concern for the economic and 
social conditions of the rural and urban workers . 
Today , this particular state of affairs no longer exists . Through­
out the 60 ' s a number of maj or socialist initiatives began to clear the 
way for the building of a socialist society . Ideological pronouncements _ _  
became progressively socialist , culminating with the Arusha Declaration 
in 1967 which was immediately followed by large-scale nationalization 
and villagization . Such policies attacked the growth of capitalist 
attitudes and practices which were becoming ubiquitou� especially in 
the rural areas and within the Tanzanian leadership itself . However , 
the implementation of policy continues to lag behind intentions and 
capitalist attitudes and practices have not yet been completely eradicated. 
Many peasants still do not understand or accept the ideological 
goals of the system and are unable or unwilling to make uj arnaa a reality . 
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Villagization has taken place at a rate which many inside and outside 
Tanzania consider alarming and disasterous because of the lack of 
adequate planning and preparation . Complaints have most often rested 
on the pace of the movement and the lack of proper compensation for 
those leaving behind permanent houses and improvements to make a new 
beginning . Quite recently , the use of force in the development of uj amaa 
villages has become of great concern to leaders and observers of Tanzanian 
politics . Although its use has been somewhat checked , continued use 
could severely undermine government efforts . 
The program of villagization has had moderate success but uj amaa 
remains a long way off . Villagization should not be mistaken as the 
establishment of uj amaa for the two are completely different . The 
former is only the first step that makes the next possible , i . e . , the 
transformation of individual s  living in a community into a co-operative 
socialist society . Ultimately , the success of villagization will figure 
largely in the building of socialist communities but at present , 
regrouping villages has done little to effect changes in individual 
farming habits . 
Nationalization , too , has not miraculously led to the achievement 
of socialist relations in public industrie s  and has , thus far , done 
little to advance the country towards its socialist obj ectives . However , 
nationalization remains a significant step in reaffirming the commitment 
to socialism , which is  most important in maintaining the credibility of 
the leadership . At the same time , the continued dependence on foreign 
expertise in the making of economic decision s  makes for the questioning 
of the socialist content of such policy formation . 
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Tanzania has a long road to travel before it becomes a fully fledged 
socialist society . In the leadership sphere , it has drawn strong 
criticism concerning its internal o.rganization , structure and composition . 
Both at the national and local levels the political leaders form an elite 
set apart from the masses . The selection of leaders is based on their 
skill and competence and also on their beliefs and adherence to certain 
values . Moreover , despite the egalitarianism within the ideology , leaders 
are seldom chosen from a worker or peasant background . More of ten than 
not , they come from the best families and are usually well edu�ated and 
profes sionally trained . 
The national leadership dominates the decision-making process . 
Powers are delegated to local political leaders but these powers are 
severely circumscribed . The people play a minor role in setting goal s 
and obj ectives of major importance although they participate more fully 
in day to day decisions affecting their lives . A strong , albeit not yet 
dangerous , element of paternalism is discernible in the relationship 
between the leaders and the masses . While leaders believe strongly 
in the democratic participation of the people via the franchise , they 
also believe that at this stage in Tanzania ' s history the people need 
to be guided with a firm but gentle hand . This led to the adoption of 
a superior attitude towards its constituency with the elite assuming , 
not necessarily correctly , that it knows what is in the best interest 
of the people .  There i s  a noticeable lack o f  faith in the integrity of 
the people despite the emphasis on popular participation . Every 
important stage in the development of democratic institutions in Tanzania 
has witnes sed an outpouri,ng of literature devoted to the mobilization of 
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and participation by the people . In many instances , thi s had led to a 
likening of the �deology to a latent form of populism but in reality the 
government and its agents firmly control all executive decision-making . ·  
Although the ethnic composition of the elite fairly represents the 
tribal makeup of the country , in social composition it is overrepresentative 
of the middle and upper echelons of society . Recruitment patterns have 
changed very little over the past decade and there has been but a slight 
expansion in the number of leadership positions open to aspiring 
Tanzanian ' s .  This lack of upward mobility could become a situation of  
potential conflict if  sufficient interests were left outside the main 
political arena . 
Elites in Tanzania , especially those within the party and government 
bureaucracy , are still a privileged minority in a sea of poverty . Their 
incomes are substantially higher than the ordinary Tanzanian and will 
continue to be so if the skilled are to be financially tempted into 
promoting the development of all the people .  Despite the ideological 
I 
assumptions on which Nyerere ' s  African Socialism i s  based , Tanzania 
has not overcome the fact of classes or the divisions caused by large 
income differentials .  Several factors , e . g . , the continued use of 
expatriates , the inherited salary s tructure , the bourgeoise practices 
of neighboring bureaucracies , the demand for high salaries from skilled 
Tanzanians and the lack of support for an egalitarian ideology , have 
worked against this . 
The lack of commitment to 'socialist ideals and the gradual 
accumulation of wealth by Tanzanian leaders remains a fact of the post-
independent years . Th� gap between rich and poor steadily increased 
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despite rises in minimum wages . Towards the end of the 60 ' s ,  Nyerere 
realized that drastic measures were in order and TANU officially pledged 
itself to effect socialist development . The dominant · position of the 
leadership left them accountable to no one and led to the manifestation 
of oligarchical tendencies within the one-party system . The Party ' s  
gradual rise to supremacy resulted in the trans ferring of decision-
making powers to party appointed bodies , i � e . , the NEC and the Central 
Committee , from a popularly elected body , i . e . , Parliament . The latter , 
along with the Cabinet , declined in importance and Nyerere and his 
immediate associates developed a closed system o f  politics in which 
some key decisions were privately arrived at . 
In the wider political arena , the party leaders effected an almost 
complete neutralization of organized interest . Severe ·restrictions 
have been placed on the political activities of groups and their impact 
in decision-making has thus been negligible . Despite its claims of 
democratic practices and procedures there are often glaring contradictions 
in the operation of the one-party system . Public criticism and dissent 
are not tolerated and can result in expulsion from the Party (and 
subsequent ending of a career) or loss of personal liberty . ' Although 
Nyerere has spent much time and literature expressing the degree of 
freedom which the society guarantees the individual , the President has 
sweeping powers of preventive detention that cannot be challenged in 
• 
any court , Evidently , there is the need for greater protection of the 
individual and firmer guarantees of his freedom and his rights . 
Nyerere stands firmly on his commitment to socialism and the 
development of \ a party �- not an elitist  VC!;Dguard •• capable of leading 
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hi� people . It would seem that the party leaders at this time do constitute 
a vanguard and can be likened somewhat to Plato ' s "guardians " .  The 
. 
little opportunity for influence from below .  Paradoxes clearly exist . 
The elite ' s  struggle for a party system receptive to views and ideas is 
somewhat negated by its intolerance to criticism and dissent . The leaders 
must squarely face the problem of criticism for TANU calll\ot accomodate 
and cater to all groups in society . 
TANU has struggled to build and control institutions by which to 
rule yet it remains largely incapable of fulfilling many of its 
development obj ectives . Its extractive and distributive capabilities 
are noticeably weak and have not been enhanced by the poverty of the 
country . TANU ' s  commitment to reduce inequalities stiil requires more 
sustained effort as there is a great reluctance to confront those who 
are most at fault . 
There i s  little room for complacency within the elite in the ongoing 
st;r:uggle for political and economic development . Thus far , 'the political 
' 
arrangements have proved instrumental in minimizing conflict and in 
settling disputes concerni.ng the allocation and distribution. of scarce 
resources . However ,  the system ' s capability to weather severe economic 
storms has not yet been fully tested . A history of stability and 
l.egitimacy have provided the foundations on which the institutionalization 
of political behavior can be built . Until the time that political 
leaders can turn their maj or focus away from national integration in the 
political arena the broader economic objectives will likely �emain 
unfulfilled . 
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For the immediate future , political considerations are likely to 
take precedence over economic ones . But economic problems will 
increasingly occupy Tanzanian leaders for at this time the economic 
prospects of Tanzania are not too bright . The country has been unable 
to feed itself , while increases in world food prices and decreasing 
returns on export products have cut deeply into its foreign reserves 
and development prospects . Uj amaa policies have not increased production 
significantly , output on nationalized "capitalist0 farms is down and the 
degree of commitment and mobilization by some of the leadership leaves 
much to be desired . The Party has made deliberate moves to improve 
the quality of its membership among the rank and file thus facing up to 
the challenge of producing members and leaders to establish a true 
commitment to its own socialist principles . TANU is also persisting 
in its efforts to persuade thousands of villages to emulate the present 
example of a score or so genuine socialist villages committed to 
socialist production . The obstacles to success are many and the time 
span since the initiation of such policies is much too short to allow 
. detailed analysis at this stage . Long range effects are not yet clear 
but in the short run Tanzania will require a strong , committed and 
resilient leadership to guide it through the years ahead . 
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APPENDIX A 
TANZANIA : ECONOMIC ABSTRACT 
SIZE : Tanzania is the tenth largest country in Africa south of the 
Sahara , the size of Germany and France combined , with a land 
area of 362 , 440 square mile s , and a water area of 2 0 , 650 square 
miles ,  o
.
f which part of Lake Victoria comprises 13 , 450 . 
POPULATION : Tanzanian ' s  last population census in 1967 gave the total 
as 12 1 231 , 000 . With an estimated population growth of 2 . 7% per 
annum ,  the total by the end of 1974 is c .  15 , 000 , 000 . The 
population is concentrated around the edges of the country ; many 
areas in the dry central plateau are virtually uninhabited . There 
is Cl: great deal of regional variation . Zanzibar , the coastal 
areas and the regions around Lake Victoria and Mount Kilimanj aro 
are from five to one hundred time s more densely settled than 
central or southern districts . · Population density is·, around 34 per 
square mile . Europeans number 15 , 000 ; Asians 85 , 00 0 ; . and Arabs 
26 , 000 . 
URBANIZATION : Urbanization in towns over 10 , 000 is  about 5 . 5% .  Dar-es-Salaam 
is the largest city with a population of 300 , 000 . There is 
continuing rapid urban growth , but Tanzania will  remain a 
predominantly rural country. Thus , overcrowding will not pose a 
. great problem in the immediate future . Other principal towns beside 
Dar-es-Salaam are Zanzibar : 70 , 000 , Tanga t 60 , 000 and Mwanza : 34 , 000 . 
200  
201 
INDICES OF DEYELOPMENT : Tanzania compares unfavorably to other 
countries of tropical Africa in many respects . One survey ranked 
it 108th of 12 2 countries in gross national product per capita . 
In 1967 , the annual per capita income was 'about $63  and in 1971 
about $80 . National income has grown slowly because of the decline 
in prices for maj or exports ,  i . e . , coffee , sis al and cotton . 
Agriculture accounts for half the GDP . From 1960-1968 the economy 
grew at about 5 . 9% though earnings from maj or agricultural crops 
grew at a slower pace of 5 . 2 % .  
In 1970 ,  there were 800 , 000 pupi ls i n  primary schools , and 2 8 , 000 
in secondary schools and 600 students attending the University 
of Dar-es-Salaam . The number of doctors was listed at 650 -- one 
doctor per 20 , 000 . In addition there were 180 medical assistants , 
over 100 health inspectors and over 1 , 000  nurses . 
Licensed vehicles in 1966 stood around 36 , 000 for cars and 11 , 500 
for cormnercial vehicles . Telephones numbered some 29 , 000 while 
. radios stood at 125 , 000 . 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCTS ( in millions of Tanzanian Shillings ) 
1972 
GDP at current factor cost 10 , 090 
GDP at constant ( 1966 ) prices 8 , 490 
Increase (per cent) 5 . 9  
1973 
11 , 257  
8 , 864 
4 . 4  
1974 
13 , 74 9  
9 , 006 
2 . 1  
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PRINCIPAL EXPORTS ( excludi.ng those to Kenya and Uganda) 
' ' • 
1972 1 97 3  1974 
Coffee 38 3 4 95 375 
Cotton Lint 336 3 3 3  4 73 
Sisal 145 222  463 
Diamonds 88 17 0  107 
Cashew Nuts 150 141 1 96 
Meat and Preparations 42 18 n . a .  
Clove s 240 2 3 3  8 8  
O i l  Seeds , Nuts , etc . 3 6  47  n . a .  
Tea 54 54 69 
Hide s and Skins 42 47 n . a . 
Pyrethrum Extract 22 17 n . a . 
Petroleum Products 215 89 n . a .  
Tobacco 49 56 n . a .  
Other 225 316 n . a . 
TOTAL 2 , 027 2 , 2 38 2 , 537 
' 
Provisional 
MAIN IMPORTS ( including thos e  from Kenya and Uganda and for Zanzibar) 
• ' ' 
J.972 1973 ' 1974 
Food and Live animals 313 275 1 , 05 3  
Beverages and Tobacco 14 2 2  n . a .  
Crude material s 40 5 9  ; n . a . 
Crude petroleum 104 2 3 8  92 8 
Other mineral fuels ,  etc . 193 157 · n . a .  
Oils and fats 46 46 n . a . 
' 
Pro.visional 
Source : Africa Contemporary Record , 1975 -1976 , p .  B34 1 .  
APPENDIX B 
THE TANU GOVERNMENT 
(as at 31 January 1975)  
Pre sident 
First Vice-President 
Second Vice-President and 
Prime Minister 
Other Ministers 
Foreign Affairs 
Finance 
Commerce and Industrie s  
Home Affairs 
Agriculture 
Economic Affairs and Development Planning 
Defence and National Service 
Natural Resources and Tourism 
National Education 
Communications and Transport 
Minister in the First Vice-President ' s  
Office 
Lands , Housing and Urban Development 
Water Development and Power 
Health 
Labor and Social Welfare 
Information and Broadcasting 
Sport arid National Culture (New Ministry ) 
Works (New Ministry )  
Minister of State for Capital Development 
Minister of State in the President ' s  
•· 
Office 
Junior Ministers 
Office of the Second-Vice President 
Prime Mini ster 
Foreign Affairs 
Defence and National Service 
Health 
Communications and Transport 
Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere 
Aboude .Jumbe 
Rashidi M, Kawawa 
John Malecela 
Cleopa Msuya 
Amir Jamal 
Omari Muhaj i 
Joseph Mungai 
Wilbert Chagula 
Edward Sokoine 
Hansu Makame 
Simon Chiwanga 
Alfred Tandau 
(Previously Job Lusinde) 
Has s an  Moyo 
Musobi Mageni 
I s aeli Elinewinga 
Hassan Mwenyi 
Gi sler Mapunda 
(Previous ly Alfred Tandau) 
Daudi Mwaicwago , 
Maj . -Gen . M .  s .  H .  Sarakikya 
Job Lusinde 
Chief Adam Sapi 
Peter Siyovelwa 
Patrick Qorro and Mussa Masomo 
Tawakali Khami s  Tawakali 
Geoffrey Mhagama 
Mustafa Nyang ' anyi 
Robert Ngitu 
Source :  Africa Contemporary Record ( ACR) 1974-1975 , p .  B290 . 
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on 9 November ,  1975 , Nyerere announced a government re shuffle . 
John Malecela was ,transferred to the .Agricu].ture Ministry and two 
New Ministries were established.  Women ministers were included for the · 
first time in the 26-merober cabinet . Mrs . Julie Manning was appointed 
to the newly created Ministry of Justice while Mrs . Thabita Siwale 
became Mini ster of Land , Housing and Urban Development .  
Ibrahim Kadume , formerly Di.rector o f  Poli ti cal Education at the 
University of Dar-es-Salaam became the new Foreign Minister . In addition 
a new department was created , i . e . , Ministry of Manpower , which had 
previously existed under the Ministry of Finance . 
* The Minister for Industries i s  now Mr . c .  D .  Msuya . 
APPENDIX C 
THE ARUSHA D:ECLAR.ATION 
Part One : THE TANU CREED 
The policy of TANU is to build a socialist state . The principles of 
socialism are laid down in the TANU constitution and they are as follows . 
Whereas TAmJ believe s : 
a) That all hUJl\an bei_ngs are equal 1 
b) That every individual has a right to dignity and respect ; 
c) That every citizen is  an integral part of the nation and has the 
right to take an equal part in Government at local , regional and 
national leve l ; 
d) That every citizen has the right of freedom of expres s ion , of 
11\0Vement , of religious belief and of association within the context 
of the law ;  
e )  That every individual has the right t o  receive from society 
. protection of his life and of property held according 1 to law ;  
f )  ·That every individual has a right to receive a j ust re'turn for his 
labo� ; 
g )  That all citi zens together possess all the natural resources of the stat 
in trust for their descendants ; 
h) That in order to ensure economic j ustice the state must have 
effective control over the principal means of production ; and 
i )  That it is the responsibility of the state to intervene actively in 
the economic life of the nation so as to ensure the well�being of 
all citizen s , and so as to ··prevent the exploitation of one person 
I 
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by another or one group by another , and so as to prevent the 
accumulation of wealth to an extent which is inconsistent with 
the existence of a classless society . 
The principal aims and obj ects of TANU are : 
a) To consolidate and maintain the independence of this country and 
the freedom of its peopl� ; 
b) To safeguard the inherent dignity of the individual in accordance 
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ; 
·
c )  To ensure that this country shall be governed by a democratic 
socialist government of the people ;  
d) To co�operate with all the political partie s in Africa engaged · 
in the l iberation of all Africa ; 
e )  To see that the Government mobilizes all the resources of this 
country towards the elimination of poverty , ignorance and di sease ; 
f )  To see that the Government actively ass ists in the formation and 
maintainance of co-operative organizations ; 
9_) _ ' .To see that wherever possible the Government itself directly 
participates in the economic development of this country ; 
h) To see that the Government gives equal opportunity to · all men and 
women irrespective of race , religion or status ; 
i )  To see that the Government eradicates all type s  of exploitation , 
intimidation , discrimination , bribery and corruption ; 
j )  To see that Government exercises effective control over the principal 
means of production and persue policies which facilitate the way to 
colle ctive ownership of the resources of this country ; 
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k) To see that the Government co-operates with other states in Africa 
in bringing about Africa.� unity 1 
. . 
1 )  To see that the Goverrunent works tirelessly toward world peace and 
security through the United Nation s  Organization . 
Part Two :  THE POLICY OF SOCIALISM (Summarized) 
a) Absence of Exploitation 
- Nyerere speaks out against the existence of classes and exploitation 
of one clas s by another .  
� Declares Tanzania a nation of peasants and workers . 
b) Public control of the means of production and exchange 
� Peasant and worker control of the means of production and exchange .  
c )  Existence of Democracy 
� Democracy declared a necess ary pre-requisite for socialism . 
d) Socialism is a belief 
� Socialism must be built by those who believe in it . 
Part Three : THE POLICY OF SELF-RELIANCE ( Summarized ) 
- TANU must fight the war against poverty , ignorance and disease . 
• Money · rej ected as the chief weapon for development . 
� Too much emphasi s  placed on industry 1 more attention must be paid 
to the peasant . 
- Development must be achieved by people through hard work and 
intelligence . 
- Land , people , good policies and good leadership maj or ingredients 
for development . 
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Part Four : TANU MEMBERSHIP 
The National Executive feels that the time has come when we should 
put more emphasis on the beliefs of our Party and its policies of 
socialism . 
. . .  if i t  is  discovered that a man doe s not appear to accept the faith , 
the obj ects , and the rules and regulations of the Party , then he 
should not be accepted as a member • • •  TANU is a Party of peasants 
and workers .  
Part Five : THE ARUSHA RESOLUTION 
The National Executive Committee resolves : 
a) The Leadership 
l .  Every TANU and Government leader must be either a peasant or a 
worker , and should in no way be associated with the practices of 
c apitalism of feudalism . 
2 . No TANU or Government leader should hold shares in any company . 
3 .  No TANU or Government leader should hold directorships in any 
privately owned enterprise . 
4 .  No TANU or Government leader should receive two or more salaries . 
s .  No TANU or Government leader should own houses which he rents to 
others . 
6 • • • •  the term " le ader" should comprise the following : 
Members of the TANU National Executive Committee ;  Ministers ; MP ' s ;  
I 
s enior officials of organizations affiliated to TANU ; senior 
o fficials of para-statal organization s ; all those appointed or elected 
under any clause of the TANU Constitution ; councillors ; and civil 
servants in the high and middle cadres • • •  
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b )  The Government an d  Other Institutions (Summarized) 
(deals primarily with Government and the . practical implementation 
of socialism) 
c) Membership 
1'1embers should get thorough teaching on :Party ideology so that they 
may understand it , and they should always be reminded of the 
importance of living up to its principles . 
Source : Nyerere , 1968 , pp . 231-250 . 
